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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters. They study two topics in the context of
a developing economy: how households make health-related decisions and how firms
make use of political connections.
Chapter One aims to understand the role of social stigma in the HIV epidemic. Public
health experts have seen the stigma as a leading barrier affecting the delivery of HIV-
related health care. This chapter uses a field experiment in Mozambique to tackle this
issue. To obtain local measures of the HIV stigma environment in the study sites, I
conducted a baseline survey one year before the experiment. Experiment participants
with excessive concerns, defined as overestimating the stigma in their communities,
were randomly assigned an intervention to relieve stigma concerns. The intervention,
which drew upon findings from the baseline survey, was designed to reveal the correct
degree of stigma that a participant had overestimated. Analyses show that this inter-
vention raised the HIV test uptake rate by 7.7 percentage points (or by 37 percent)
from 20.7 percent under the control condition. To quantify the intervention effect, I
introduced testing coupons of different values to estimate the demand curve for an
HIV test. The concern-relieving intervention raised an individual’s willingness-to-pay
for an HIV test by $1.30 or more than half of the daily cost-of-living in the study
population.
Chapter Two evaluates a prominent effort to help families cope with HIV/AIDS: a
U.S. government program in Mozambique, “Strengthening Communities and Chil-
dren” (or Portuguese abbreviation, FCC), that implements home visits alongside a
set of complementary interventions. This chapter focuses on the primary outcome
of HIV testing, and two key mechanisms: improvements in HIV-related knowledge,
and reductions in HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes. Causal identification exploits
multiple levels of random assignment, most prominently of entire communities to
FCC program receipt or a control group. We find that the FCC program has positive
but small effects on HIV testing. Treatment effects are only one-fifth the magni-
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tude of, and statistically significantly smaller than, the average of expert predictions
elicited in advance. Likely mechanisms behind these modest effects are that the pro-
gram worsened some aspects of households’ HIV-related knowledge, and also worsened
HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes. Additional treatments randomly assigned at the
household level during our follow-up survey further highlight the role of these mech-
anisms: treatments improving knowledge and alleviating stigma concerns raise the
impact of the FCC program on HIV testing.
Chapter Three focuses on a new context and studies the value of political connections
in China. Inviting a government official to sit on the board is a commonly used
strategy for firms seeking to become politically connected. This chapter estimates
the value of this type of political connection with a nationwide, targeted policy shock
in China. In October 2013, the central government announced a new policy that
restricted government officials from working in firms. Firms with government-official
outside directors were affected. I find that government-official outside directors do add
to firm value: The stock return of affected firms is, on average, eight percentage points
lower than that of the control firms in the 12 months following the policy change.
The variation in treatment effects across firms suggests that firms rely on this type of
political connection to different degrees. Several potential working mechanisms are
explored.
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CHAPTER I
Social Stigma as a Barrier to HIV Testing:
Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in
Mozambique
1.1 Introduction
In 2013, the United Nations called for ninety percent of all people living with HIV
to know their status by 2020 in its 90-90-90 goal.1 A month shy of 2020, however, this
goal will not be met. In 2018, the last year for which data was collected, only 79 per-
cent of the global infected population knew their status. Insufficient status-awareness
matters because it imposes extraordinary challenges on public health authorities to
prevent transmission and expand medical treatment.
Crucial to overcoming this challenge is to raise the HIV testing rate, and especially
in Sub-Sahara Africa, which remains the world’s most HIV-affected region. Of the
37.9 million people living with HIV, 25.6 million are from Sub-Sahara Africa. While
global donors, through a decade-plus of collaboration with local partners, have made
HIV testing freely accessible in almost all of Sub-Sahara Africa, a low test-uptake
rate has substantially undermined this supply-side effort.2
Medical practitioners and community leaders often blame the stigma attached to
HIV for the low testing rate. Anecdotal evidence suggests that people have avoided
HIV testing for fear of being seen and stigmatized by their neighbors. Although
public health scholars have documented correlations between high degrees of stigma
1The three specific goals are: “By 2020, 90% of all people living with HIV will know their HIV
status; 90% of all people with diagnosed HIV infection will receive sustained antiretroviral therapy;
90% of all people receiving antiretroviral therapy will have viral suppression.”
2Data source: UNAIDS AIDS information program: http://aidsinfo.unaids.org
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and low testing rates under various circumstances (Sambisa, Curtis and Mishra, 2010;
Berendes and Rimal, 2011; Maughan-Brown and Nyblade, 2014; Kelly, Weiser and
Tsai, 2016) , there is a dearth of well-identified evidence on the causal effect of stigma
on HIV testing. Nor do we know how large an impact the stigma imposes on an
individual’s testing behavior. The main challenge to causal identification is that
stigma, as a parameter of society, is difficult to experimentally alter without altering
confounding factors at the same time.
My paper overcomes this challenge by employing an intervention that tackles con-
cerns for stigma at the individual level.3 I use a randomized control trial (RCT)
in Mozambique for two purposes: to identify the role stigma concerns play in hin-
dering HIV testing and to quantify the stigma barrier. To obtain local measures
of the social stigma attached to HIV, we conducted a baseline survey in the study
communities one year before the RCT. Participants of the RCT estimated the degree
of stigma in their community before entering a randomization process. Those with
excessive stigma concerns, i.e., overestimated stigma in their community, were ran-
domly assigned to receive an intervention to alleviate concerns. The concern-relieving
intervention, which was individually tailored, revealed the true degree of stigma that
a participant had overestimated. We then tracked test-seeking behavior.
I find that the concern-relieving intervention raised the participants’ test uptake
rate by 7.7 percentage points, or by 37%, from 20.7 percent under the control con-
dition. This experiment provides clear evidence that the stigma concerns for stigma
are a barrier that has caused people to avoid taking HIV tests.
To quantify the stigma barrier, I introduce different levels of monetary incentives
for HIV testing. The testing service in Mozambique is free and anonymous. To track
individuals’ test-seeking behavior, I offered all study participants coupons (a condi-
tional cash transfer) to take tests. The Control Group and the Concern-Relieving
3I follow the conceptual work of Goffman (1963) and define the stigma attached to HIV as the
phenomenon that people living with HIV are socially avoided. Accordingly, the concerns for the
stigma are individuals’ concerns for being avoided in social life because of their association with
HIV. The stigma measures and interventions used in this study strictly followed this definition.
Public health scholars have discussed the concept of the stigma attached to HIV more broadly
(Parker and Aggleton, 2003; Stangl, Brady and Fritz, 2012; Stangl et al., 2013). According to
previous conceptual work, the broad concept of stigma has manifestations beyond social avoidance,
such as internal stigma (feel ashamed of oneself) and enacted discrimination (be assaulted or treated
unfairly by others). My study adopted a narrower working definition of stigma to allow for rigorous
quantitative analyses. Social avoidance is the core manifestation of all stigmas and can be measured
in my study setting. The rise of social avoidance is not the focus of this study; it could stem from
the moral judgment on the infected person or people’s excessive concerns for infection. See Stangl,
Brady and Fritz (2012) and Stangl et al. (2013) for reviews.
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Intervention Group received coupons of 50 Meticais (2.25 dollars by PPP), which was
equivalent to the daily cost-of-living. An additional study group, the High-Incentive
Group, was introduced in parallel, where participants received no intervention but
coupons of 100 Meticais. The Control Group and the High-Incentive Group locally
pin down the demand curve for an HIV test. On the demand diagram, relieving
stigma concerns raised individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) for an HIV test by 29
Meticais (1.30 dollars by PPP).
My paper contributes to the literature on understanding HIV testing behavior in
developing countries. While many studies in this literature have focused on exploring
practical interventions to promote HIV testing, they have often paid less attention to
investigating the mechanisms or identifying a specific barrier inhibiting HIV testing.
For example, researchers have found that financial incentives and home-base testing
delivery could raise the testing rate (Swann, 2018; Moshoeu et al., 2019), and have
argued that alleviating stigma was a working channel. Nevertheless, as both inter-
ventions addressed multiple potential barriers at the same time,4 we still do not know
which barriers prevent individuals from seeking a test or the best ways to overcome
these barriers. A recent effort to identify the barrier of stigma concerns is Derksen
and van Oosterhout (2019). They found that disseminating educational messages
in a community raised the HIV testing rate and argued that reducing the residents’
stigma concerns was the mechanism. The stigma’s role in their study, however, was
not directly supported by experimental evidence.5 Confounding mechanisms could
still drive the effect, such as people inferring higher medication effectiveness or acting
altruistically. The lack of knowledge on specific barriers obstructs us from learning
the underlining motivations behind human behavior and prevents us from designing
cost-effective interventions to fight HIV.
In contrast to the existing studies, my experimental intervention directly and solely
manipulates an individual’s stigma concerns. Any observed effect on the testing rate
4Providing financial incentives and delivering home-based testing services may both address sev-
eral barriers at the same time: monetary cost, by compensating or avoiding transportation fees
and loss of time; procrastination, by offering instant incentives for testing or reducing cost; stigma
concerns, by concealing the intrinsic motivation to learn one’s status or avoid being seen by others
(Thornton, 2008; Feyissa, Lockwood and Munn, 2015; Swann, 2018; Moshoeu et al., 2019).
5Derksen and van Oosterhout (2019) argued with suggestive evidence that their informational
intervention—health education meetings disseminating the effectiveness of the HIV treatment in
preventing transmission—made people think that their community became more aware that HIV
positive persons on medication have a low chance of transmitting HIV. Hence, people in their
intervention group had fewer concerns for “statistical discrimination” by potential sex partners,
and, as a result, sought more tests.
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can be traced back to relieved stigma concerns. The clear-cut design allows me to
establish the causal effect of the stigma concerns on testing and to quantify its impact.
My study also contributes to the literature on the role of stigma in socio-economic
life. Stigmas widely exist in human society and increasingly attract economists’ at-
tention. Some earlier work theoretically analyzed the rise and implications of stigma
related to social welfare receipt and divorce (Moffitt, 1983; Besley and Coate, 1992;
Ishida, 2003). A strand of empirical literature studied how stigma concerns affect
individuals’ decisions to claim welfare and reached mixed conclusions (Bhargava and
Manoli, 2015; Friedrichsen, Ko¨nig and Schmacker, 2018).
The stigma is especially widespread in the realm of public health. Many health
conditions are stigmatized (Puhl and Heuer, 2009; Bharadwaj, Pai and Suziedelyte,
2017), HIV infection being a common and policy-relevant example. Hoffmann, Fooks
and Messer (2014) documented evidence of the stigma attached to HIV: The general
population tended to avoid objects touched by people living with HIV. In my study,
I take a step further to show that stigma concerns can cause behavioral changes in
the vulnerable population and lead to real health and economic consequences.
In addition, my work relates to the literature on how misperceived social param-
eters affect human behavior (Jensen, 2010; Cruces, Perez-Truglia and Tetaz, 2013;
Armona, Fuster and Zafar, 2018). The intervention tool I use is built on a type of
“norm-based interventions,” which alter people’s perceptions of certain social norms
by revealing summary statistics of behavior in a reference group (Benabou and Ti-
role, 2011). Researchers have used “norm-based interventions” to study individuals’
reactions to learning social norms in energy consumption (Schultz et al., 2007), fe-
male labor force participation (Bursztyn, Gonza´lez and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2018), and
attitudes toward healthy sexual relationships (Banerjee, Ferrara and Orozco-Olvera,
2019). The study setting of Banerjee, Ferrara and Orozco-Olvera (2019) was the
closest to mine. In their experiment, young participants in Nigeria first viewed an
entertainment-education TV series promoting healthy sexual relationships and then
reported their attitudes towards the TV contents. The treatment group was in-
formed of their peer’s average post-view attitudes before they reported their own.
The authors did not find that the intervention of revealing peer’s attitudes affected
participants’ attitudes.
Unlike previous studies, my intervention identifies new parameters beyond the ef-
fect of social norms. I use social opinion statistics as a tool to mitigate a psychological
barrier, i.e., the stigma concerns. The outcome of interest, taking up an HIV test,
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is a behavior differing from the one in which I reveal summary statistics. My paper
shows how social opinions collected from hypothetical questions can affect the deci-
sion on behavior of high stakes. Moreover, I combine the norm-based intervention
with varying financial incentives to quantify the intervention effect.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 The HIV Epidemic and Testing Services in Mozambique
HIV prevalence in Mozambique reached 12.6% among adults in 2018, making it
one of the countries most affected by the epidemic. Mozambique has fallen behind the
United Nations’ 90-90-90 goal in each step of the HIV treatment cascade. Only 72%
of all people living with HIV in Mozambique know their status. This low awareness
has become a major obstacle for HIV treatment and prevention. In 2018, there
were 150,000 new HIV infections and 54,000 AIDS-related death in Mozambique,
accounting for one-twelfth and one-fourteenth, respectively, of the global totals.6
Mozambique built up its nationwide standardized HIV-testing (formally known as
Health Counseling and Testing) service system following WHO guidelines. Beginning
in 2008, the Mozambican government integrated HIV-related services into other clini-
cal services in sanitary units (US) in communities. HIV-related services and materials
are free of charge in all US’s.
In 2017, Mozambique conducted 7,866,465 HIV tests. (The ratio of the number
of tests to population is 0.273.) The majority, or 80.2%, of the tests were conducted
through the provider-initiated counseling and testing (Portuguese abbreviation ATIP)
approach, where doctors referred patients with symptoms of infections to take tests
for HIV. The ATIP approach is typically only able to catch HIV infections late in
the progress when the virus may already have transmitted to others, and the patient
has missed the best window to initiate medical treatment. Only 12.7% of HIV tests
were initiated by general residents who voluntarily sought to learn their status in a
sanitary unit (formally known as the user-initiated counseling and testing approach,
Portuguese abbreviation ATIU).7 In a high HIV-prevalence region like Mozambique,
encouraging the general population to learn its status before any sign is shown is
6Data source: UNAIDS (2019).
7Data source: “Annual report on activities related to HIV/AIDS 2017” National Healthcare
Service, Mozambican Ministry of Health (Portuguese: Relato´rio Anual 2017 Relato´rio Anual das
Actividades Relacionadas ao HIV/SIDA).
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essential for preventing transmission and improving treatment efficacy. In this study,
we collaborated with the local sanitary units, where we refer eligible participants to
take HIV tests through the ATIU approach and track their testing behavior.
1.2.2 Study Population
My research experiment is embedded in a broader evaluation study of the anti-
poverty program Forc¸a a` Comunidade e Crianc¸as (FCC, “Strengthening Commu-
nities and Children”) in Mozambique.8 Our research team conducted a household
survey, hereafter the baseline survey, between May 2017 and March 2018 in 76 com-
munities across three provinces in central Mozambique. The baseline survey covered
a population-representative sample in each study community and collected rich in-
formation about household members’ health, education, knowledge about HIV, and
social opinions. The experiment analyzed in this paper was conducted on an eco-
nomically disadvantaged subset of the baseline survey sample. 71.6% of the baseline
households are categorized as “vulnerable” according to a list of pre-specified criteria,
and they constituted the pool of potential participants for this experiment.9
1.2.3 Measures of the Stigma Environment
We constructed three measures of stigma environment within each community by
summarizing the baseline survey responses to each of the following questions.
Q1. Would you buy fresh vegetables from a shopkeeper if you knew that this
person had HIV? (Yes/No)
Q2. If a member of your family became sick with AIDS, would you be willing
to care for them in your own household? (Yes/No)
Q3. In your opinion, if a teacher has HIV but is not sick, should they be allowed
to continue teaching at school? (Yes/No)
The questions assess an individuals’ tendency to avoid people living with HIV
(stigmatize HIV); an affirmative answer indicates a supportive attitude, while a neg-
8See Yang et al. (2019) for an extensive discussion of the FCC program.
9We assessed a household’s vulnerability in 11 dimensions that covered income, food security,
adult-to-child ratio, and health conditions. Please see Appendix C for details. Since the baseline
survey sample is population-representative, the participant pool can be considered the bottom 71.6%
of Mozambique’s population in the economic well-being distribution. As a comparison, the poverty
headcount ratios at $1.90 (2011 dollar) a day and $3.20 (2011 dollar) a day are 62.4% and 81.5% of
the country’s population, respectively. Hence, people in my participant pool roughly lived on $1.90
to $3.20 a day. Data source: World Bank Data.
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ative answer indicates stigmatization. A higher fraction of affirmative responses from
a community indicates a local environment with less stigma.
The major takeaway from the baseline environment assessment is that the fraction
of respondents giving affirmative answers was high across all communities, indicat-
ing low social stigma attached to HIV. In an average community, the fractions of
respondents giving an affirmative answer to the three questions were 80.1%, 93.2%,
and 89.2%, respectively. The variation across communities is moderate, and except
for Q1 in three communities, the supportive fractions are always higher than 60%.10
The three community-level stigma measures are used in the experimental intervention
discussed later to mitigate participants’ concerns for stigma.
The worldwide panel AIDS Indicator Survey (AIS) has used the same three ques-
tions to monitor HIV-related stigmas. The low stigma finding from the baselines
survey is consistent with the findings from the AIS panel in Mozambique. The four
rounds of AIS between 2003 and 2015 show a trend of rapidly lowing stigma associ-
ated with HIV in Mozambique. Figure 1.1 presents the four rounds of AIS and our
baseline sample together.
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Q2. If a member of your
family became sick with
AIDS would you be willing
to care for them in your own
household?
Q3. In your opinion, if a
teacher has HIV but is not
sick, should they be allowed
to continue teaching at
school?
Q1. Would you buy fresh
vegetables from a
shopkeeper if you knew that
this person had HIV?
Figure 1.1: Stigma Environment Measures in Mozambique over Time
Notes: Data points for 2003, 2009, 2011, and 2015 are calculated from the nationally representative
sample of Mozambique AIDS Indicator Survey by USAID. Data points for 2017 are calculated by
taking a simple average from the baseline survey in this study.
10See Appendix D for the three measures in each study community.
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1.3 Experimental Design
1.3.1 Recruitment Survey and Stigma Concern Assessment
The experiment was rolled out between May and October in 2019. To recruit
participants, enumerators visited a list of prespecified “vulnerable” households from
the baseline sample. Adults available at the time of home visits first answered a
survey and then, depending on their survey responses, were assigned to a study group
at random.
The purpose of the survey upon recruitment is threefold. First, it collected testing
histories and screened eligible individuals to receive HIV test coupons. Survey re-
spondents who were already known to be HIV positive or had been tested within the
last three months were not offered coupons, and, thus, excluded from the RCT.11 62%
of the surveyed people were eligible for our testing coupons; 14% were not eligible
because they self-reported to be HIV positive; 24% were not eligible because they
had been tested negative within 3 months before the survey. Second, in the survey,
we assessed participants’ concerns for stigma. Participants who overestimated social
stigma in their community were subsequently randomized to the Concern-Relieving
Intervention Group or the Control Group. Lastly, the recruitment survey collected a
rich set of pre-intervention characteristics of the participants.
During the recruitment survey, we assessed each respondent’s concerns for the
stigma attached to HIV before randomly assigning them to different experiment con-
ditions. The baseline survey delivered the encouraging news of a low stigma environ-
ment; however, people may lack accurate knowledge about the environment in which
they live. In fact, it is not the true stigma environment, but people’s beliefs about the
stigma environment that concerns them and may affect their test-seeking decision.
In the recruitment survey, we ask participants to report their beliefs about the
three stigma measures of their community:
11The government-recommended frequency of testing for the general population is once per six
months. See “National Guideline for the Implementation of the Counseling and Testing in Health”
issued by the Mozambican Ministry of Health in 2017. (Portuguese: Directriz Nacional Para a
Implementac¸a˜o do Aconselhamento e Testagem em Sau´de.)
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EQ1. If I ask the question, “Would you buy fresh vegetables from a shopkeeper
if you knew that this person had HIV?” to 10 people in your neighborhood,
how many of them would you expect, to say “Yes”?
EQ2. If I ask the question, “If a member of your family became sick with AIDS,
would you be willing to care for them in your own household?” to 10 people
in your neighborhood, how many of them would you expect, to say “Yes”?
EQ3. If I ask the question, “In your opinion, if a teacher has HIV but is not sick,
should they be allowed to continue teaching at school?” to 10 people in
your neighborhood, how many of them would you expect, to say “Yes”?
If a belief is lower than the corresponding truth in her community, then this par-
ticipant has overestimated stigma in this measure. For example, if in the baseline
survey, 90% of the respondents in a community said “yes” when asked if they would
buy fresh vegetables from a shopkeeper whom they knew to have HIV, but a partic-
ipant believed that only 70% of people in her community would have said “yes” to
the question, then this participant had overestimated stigma in her community.
Table 1.1 summarizes participants’ beliefs in the recruitment survey and compares
them with statistics from the baseline. The coupon-eligible sample, on average, be-
lieved that 70.2%, 77.5%, and 81.4% of their neighbors would give affirmative answers
to the three stigma-measuring questions. These numbers are significantly lower than
the fractions collected from the baseline. Figure 1.2 depicts the distribution of bias of
participants’ beliefs about the stigma measures. The bias is defined as a participant’s
belief minus the true fraction of people in her community giving affirmative answers
in the baseline survey. A negative bias indicates overestimating stigma.
A participant is defined as “concerned” for social stigma if she overestimated at
least one of the stigma measures in her community. 62.7% of the coupon-eligible
sample fell into this category. Individuals in this category constituted the primary
analysis sample and were randomly selected to receive the concern-relieving interven-
tion.
At this point, we can glance at the correlation between the stigma concerns and
past test uptake behavior in our study population. For everyone in the survey sample,
we take an average of her guesses of the three stigma measures to obtain an individual
“stigma perception” measure. Figure 1.3 divides survey respondents to quintiles by
their beliefs about stigma measure and depicts the self-reported testing rate (the
fraction of people ever tested for HIV) of each quintile. Those with fewer stigma
concerns (i.e., those who guessed a high fraction of people giving affirmative answers to
9
Table 1.1: Beliefs and Truths of the Stigma Environment
Stigma
Measure
Question Obs.
Mean
belief
Truth
from the
baseline
survey
p-value of
ttest: belief =
truth
Share
overestimated
stigma in this
question
Q1 1,392 70.2% 79.4% <0.001 46.0%
Q2 1,397 77.5% 92.8% <0.001 51.3%
Q3 1,402 81.4% 88.8% <0.001 40.8%
Overestimated stigma measured in at least one of the three questions 62.7%
Notes: This table reports the beliefs of the coupon-eligible sample (sample size = 1,588). The
fraction of respondents answered ”yes”, Column (3), is calculated by reweighing the baseline sample
to match the geographic distribution of the experiment participants, Column (2). When calculating
the fraction of coupon-eligible participants that overestimated stigma measured in at least one of
the three questions, missing beliefs are treated as “not overestimate”. If we drop the missing beliefs,
the fraction is 70.2%.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of Participants’ Bias in the Belief about Stigma
Notes: A bias is defined as an individual’s belief about a stigma environment measure (an individ-
ual’s answer to question EQ1, EQ2, or EQ3, transformed to percent, i.g. 6 out of 10 is transformed
to 60 percent) minus the true stigma measure obtained from the baseline survey in her communi-
ties (summary of question Q1, Q2, or Q3). A negative bias indicates overestimating stigma. The
histograms are based on all participants that are eligible for coupons.
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Q1 to Q3) are in quintile 1 while the most concerned people are in quintile 5. Quintile
1 has a significantly higher testing rate compared to other quintiles. The pattern in
Figure 1.3 echoes previous findings that greater concerns for stigma are associated
with a lower HIV testing rate, but causality remains unknown. This association
could come from a hidden third factor that caused high stigma concerns and fewer
test uptakes at the same time or derive from the inverse causal channel that learning
one’s HIV status leads to lower stigma concerns. To rule out these hypotheses, we
introduced the concern-relieving intervention to experimentally mitigate the stigma
concerns of a random subset of participants.
.6
5
.7
.7
5
.8
.8
5
1s
t q
uin
tile
2n
d q
uin
tile
3r
d q
uin
tile
4th
 qu
int
ile
5th
 qu
int
ile
Figure 1.3: HIV Testing Rate by Belief about Stigma
Notes: The y-axis is the fraction of recruitment survey respondents self-reported to had ever tested
for HIV. The x-axis is the quintile groups of the belief about local stigma measures. An individual’s
belief is the average of her answers to question EQ1, EQ2, and EQ3, a higher average indicates that
this person perceived less stigma. Individuals are ordered by their beliefs, with those who perceived
the least stigma on the left and those perceived the most stigma on the right. The first quintile
group includes the left-most 20 percent, and so on.
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1.3.2 The Concern-Relieving Intervention
This intervention shares the measures of stigma environment from the baseline
survey with the participants. To protect human subjects, the information sharing is
asymmetric – a true measure was revealed to a participant only when she “overesti-
mated” stigma in that measure, but not when she correctly estimated or underesti-
mated it.
One-third of the “concerned” participants received the concern-relieving interven-
tion by random selection. The intervention was administered after the recruitment
survey. The enumerator revealed measure(s) of the stigma environment that the par-
ticipant had overestimated and explained the implications. As an example, a piece
of the enumerator’s scripts for the interventions goes as follows:
I’d like to share with you some information we collected from your neigh-
borhood. Recall that a few minutes ago, I asked you to guess, out of 10
people, how many of them would have answered “yes” to the following
question:
“Would you buy fresh vegetables from a shopkeeper if you knew that this
person had HIV?”.
Your guess was [6 out of 10] people would answer “yes.”
In fact, we did ask a large number of people this question last year in
your neighborhood. The fact is [more than 9 out of 10 people (or 91.5%)]
answered “yes.” People in your community are more acceptive of people
infected with HIV than you thought they would be.
The intervention shared one to three pieces of such information depending on the
number of overestimates a participant made in the concern-assessing process.
1.3.3 Coupon Distribution
The primary outcome of interest is the HIV test uptake. In Mozambique, HIV tests
are voluntary and anonymous. We adopted coupons to track participants’ test-seeking
behavior. HIV testing is free of charge at the local clinics. Hence, a coupon should
be considered a conditional cash transfer. After a participant completed the survey
and the concern-relieving intervention (when applicable), the enumerator distributed
a testing coupon to each participant who was not already known to be HIV positive
and had not been tested within the last three months.
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We varied the value of the coupons to pin down the effect of monetary incentives
on testing. A regular-value coupon was worth 50 Meticais (2.25 dollars by PPP), and
a high-value coupon was worth 100 Meticais. As discussed in the previous section, the
study population roughly matches the population in absolute poverty in Mozambique
who lived on $1.90 to $3.20 (2011 dollars) a day. A low-value coupon had the value
of an average participant’s daily cost-of-living.
In addition to one coupon for each adult participant, we also distributed coupons
of the same value for each of the participant’s eligible children. A child followed
the same eligibility criteria for a coupon as an adult. The enumerator informed the
participant that a coupon should only be used by the designated person (the adult
coupon for the participant himself or herself and the child coupons for any eligible
children). For the participant’s convenience, coupons for an adult male, adult female,
and a child were of different designs.
At the time of distributing coupons, we also informed the participants of the
typical time costs of testing in the local sanitary units, and the method of payment
for coupon redemption. To avoid any pressure or concerns for confidentiality loss, we
confirmed that at the time of coupon redemption, the study team would not collect
any individually identifiable information or ask for their test results.
1.3.4 Randomization Structure and Balance Test
We jointly randomized the concern-relieving intervention and the value of coupons.
Figure 1.4 summarized the group structure.12 Participants of the Concern-Relieving
Intervention Group received regular-value coupons. The rest of the “concerned” par-
ticipants were randomized to two groups: the Control Group, who received regular-
value coupons, and the High-Incentive Group, where high-value coupons were offered.
The non-concerned participants were also randomized to receive regular-value or high-
value coupons, but none received any information about stigma. The randomization
was conducted at the household level. If more than one adult from a household were
“concerned,” they received (or did not receive) the concern-relieving intervention at
the same time. (When multiple adults in the same household were to receive the
concern-relieving information, the information each person received was still indi-
vidually tailored and delivered in private.) All members from the same household,
12Please see for details in the recruitment and randomization procedures.
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including children, received coupons of the same value. Table 1.2 reports summary
statistics of the coupon-eligible sample and conducts balance checks.13
All recruitment survey respondents:
N = 2,551
Eligible for coupons
N = 1,588
Tested negative within 3 
months
N = 605
Tested positive before
N = 358
Concerned 
N = 996
Unconcerned 
N = 592
Control Group:
50MT coupon + 
no information
N = 381
Concern-Relieving 
Intervention Group: 
50MT coupon + 
Concern-relieving 
information
N = 373
High-Incentive Group:
100MT coupon + 
no information
N = 242
Unconcerned Group 1:
50MT coupon + 
no information
N = 408
Unconcerned Group 2:
100MT coupon + 
no information
N = 184
Figure 1.4: Experimental Design and Sample Structure
1.3.5 HIV Test and Coupon Redemption
All coupons were valid for 14 days. A coupon was redeemable at the designated
sanitary units when someone presented proof of HIV-testing with the coupon to the
research staff on site. The payment was made in digital cash through MPesa. There
was a unique barcode on each coupon that allowed us to link the use of the coupon
to one’s survey responses.
To redeem a coupon, a participant should take an HIV test at a local sanitary
unit. To ensure the convenience of testing, we involved all the commonly used sani-
tary units of the participating communities. They included but were not limited to
all the geographically closest ones. When distributing the coupons, we encouraged
participants to get tested in the closest sanitary units and promised staff presence in
those units within the 14-day window. Participants, however, were able to redeem
coupons at any sanitary units when our research staff was on site.
The HIV test in a sanitary unit is based on a 3-stage process.
13Please see Appendix A for summary statistics of other samples.
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Table 1.2: Balance Table
Variables Obs.
Control
Group
Mean
(s.d.)
Diff: Concern-
Relieving
Intervention
minus Control
(p-value)
Diff:
High-Incentive
minus Control
(p-value)
Indicator: female 996 0.685 0.002 0.007
(0.465) (0.947) (0.878)
Age 990 36.458 0.584 -2.878
(16.088) (0.622) (0.061)
Education in years 991 6.356 -0.418 -0.017
(4.005) (0.153) (0.964)
Indicator: is the primary guard 996 0.696 0.027 0.032
of some child(ren) (0.461) (0.437) (0.485)
Indicator: respondent provided 996 0.541 -0.028 0.075
a private phone number (0.499) (0.457) (0.108)
# of sex partners in the last 943 0.199 0.002 0.012
12 months: none (0.400) (0.954) (0.748)
# of sex partners in the last 943 0.667 0.017 0.008
12 months: only one (0.472) (0.659) (0.853)
# of sex partners in the last 943 0.134 -0.018 -0.020
12 months: more than one (0.341) (0.488) (0.527)
HIV-test history: never tested 985 0.388 0.047 0.017
(0.488) (0.220) (0.707)
HIV-test history: tested more 985 0.264 -0.011 0.006
than one year ago (0.441) (0.741) (0.897)
HIV-test history: tested within 985 0.348 -0.036 -0.023
one year (0.477) (0.335) (0.615)
# of correct answers out of 15 996 11.919 -0.131 -0.449*
HIV questions (2.998) (0.581) (0.094)
Subject risk of HIV+: the higher 965 1.761 0.056 -0.034
the riskier (0.920) (0.389) (0.652)
Distance in km between the 973 2.128 -0.010 0.086*
household and a clinic (2.941) (0.791) (0.054)
Indicator: household go without 996 0.564 -0.018 0.047
food in the past 12 months (0.496) (0.629) (0.266)
Indicator: household has HIV+ 920 0.072 0.016 0.056**
member (0.258) (0.484) (0.038)
1st principal component of the 996 0.884 0.003 0.201
ownership of 14 assets† (2.085) (0.986) (0.262)
Notes: The p-values are from t-tests of equality. The t-tests are controlled for community fixed-
effects and enumerator fixed-effects.
† The 14 assets are car, motorbike, bike, radio, TV, sewing machine, refrigerator, freezer, iron,
bed, table, mobile phone, clock, and solar panel. I use the mean and standard deviation of each
ownership indicator in the baseline sample to standardized the indicators. Loadings of each indicator
to construct the first principal component are also obtained from the baseline sample.
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1. Pre-test counseling
The health care provider will address HIV prevention strategies, assess the test
taker’s risk behavior, and introduce possible services available regardless of the
test result.
2. Testing and counseling during testing
The health care provider will perform a Rapid Test, explain how to interpret
the different potential test results, and provide psychosocial support to face the
test result.
3. Post-test counseling
The health care provider will review the test result with the test taker and en-
courage the testing of partners. Depending on the test results, the test provider
will refer the test taker to follow-up health counseling and services.
All three stages were conducted one-on-one in the clinics involved in this study.
The standard 3-stage process took around 30 minutes per person. At the end of the
process, the doctor would sign a proof-of-testing slip for the test taker. The research
staff on-site would pay the coupon value when a coupon was presented with proof of
testing.
When redeeming the coupon, the research staff did not try to identify the coupon
holder or link the coupon to any information collected from the survey. After the
coupon value was paid, the redemption staff would scan the coupon barcode, take
notes of the coupon holder’s gender and age range (below or above 18 years old), and
ask where the coupon was from. The coupon barcode and coupon holder’s information
were later linked to the recruitment survey responses.
1.4 Experimental Results
1.4.1 Main Result - Test Uptake
Comparing the test uptake rate of the Control Group and the Concern-Relieving
Intervention Group identifies the intervention effect, which in turn reveals the role of
stigma concerns on testing.
Figure 1.5 compares the raw test uptake rate of the two groups. Test uptake is
defined as a coupon distributed to a participant being used within 14 days by an adult
of the same gender and self-reported as the original coupon recipient. 20.7 percent
of the participants under the control condition take up a test. The test uptake rate
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increases to 27.1 percent with the concern-relieving intervention. (The p-value of a
t-test of equality is 0.0441.)
20.7% 27.1%
p = .0441
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Figure 1.5: Test Uptake Mean Comparison: Control and Intervention
Notes: The y-axis is the HIV test uptake rate measured by the fraction of participants redeemed
testing coupons. Both the Concern-Relieving Intervention Group and the Control Group received
coupons of the value of 50 Meticais.
Table 1.3 presents the finding in the regression format. Column (1) replicates
Figure 1.5. Column (2) shows the result from regressing Equation (1.1) that con-
trols for pre-intervention characteristics. The estimated intervention effect is stable
between the two specifications.
Yi = α + βG
relieve
i + Xi + i. (1.1)
Yi is an indicator for individual i taking up an HIV test.
14 Grelievei is the indi-
cator of receiving the concern-relieving intervention (as opposed to being assigned
14A participant is coded as tested if and only if the assigned coupon was used within 14 days
after distribution and was used by an adult of the same gender of the original coupon recipient who
self-reported as an original coupon recipient. See Appendix B for robustness checks of definition
variations.
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to the Control Group). Xi is the vector of individual characteristics. i is the error
term clustered at the household level. Equation (1.1) applies to the union of the
Control Group and Concern-Relieving Intervention Group sample.15 The estimated
intervention effect 7.7 percentage points.
Table 1.3: Main Result: The Effect of the Concern-Relieving Intervention
(1) (2)
Group Indicator Test Uptake
Concern-Relieving Intervention 0.0634** 0.0771**
(0.0315) (0.0326)
Control Group Mean 0.207 0.207
Observations 754 754
R-squared 0.006 0.292
Constant yes yes
Controls no yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The control variables are: Indicator: a participant is female (yes, no); Indicator: a participant is
the primary guardian of a child (yes, no); Indicator: a participant has his or her own mobile phone;
Indicator: number of sex partners in the last 12 months (zero, one, more than one); Indicator:
time of the most recent HIV test (never tested, tested more than a year ago, tested less than a
year ago); Age: in years; Education: highest grade completed Knowledge about HIV; Number of
correct answers to the 15 questions testing HIV-related knowledge; Subjective risk of HIV infection
(coded 1 to 5); The straight-line distance between the household and the testing clinic (in km);
Square of the straight-line distance between the household and the testing clinic (in km); Indicator:
the household ever go without food in the last 12 months (yes, no); Indicator: there is an HIV
positive household member (yes, no); Asset ownership index: the first principal component of 14
asset-ownership indicators; Enumerator fixed-effects; Community fixed-effects. If any missing value
exists for some variable “X,” an indicator variable is created for variable X to flag missing status (1
if missing, 0 otherwise). The missing value of the variable X is replaced with zero. The variable X
missing indicator variable is added to the set of control variables.
In conclusion, social stigma concerns attached to HIV is a barrier to the test uptake
for those people who overestimate stigma. Learning the evidence of a low-stigma local
environment raised the likelihood that the concerned individual would take a test by
7.7 percentage points, or by 37%.
15Equation (1.1) is equivalent to the primary regression equation specified in the Pre-Analysis
Plan in identifying intervention effects. I present the regression analysis of Equation (1.1) in this
paper for a more intuitive interpretation. Definitions of control variables Xi and sample inclusion
criteria used for Equation (1.1) followed the Pre-Analysis Plan. Conducting the primary regression
specified in the Pre-Analysis Plan reaches qualitatively the same and quantitatively very similar
conclusions. See Appendix C for Details.
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1.4.2 Quantifying the Intervention Effect
To quantify the stigma barrier, I include the High-Incentive Group in the analy-
sis. Figure 1.6 adds the test uptake rate of the High-Incentive Group in Figure 1.5.
Table 1.4 Column (1) presents the regression analog. Column (2) presents the regres-
sion coefficient for Equation (1.2):
Yi = α + β1G
relieve
i + β2G
high−incent
i + Xi + i. (1.2)
Ghigh−incenti is the indicator of receiving 100-Metical coupons as opposed to 50-
Metical ones. Doubling the monetary incentive raises the test uptake by 12.0 per-
centage points.
Participants from the Control Group and the High-Incentive Group are under
the same experimental condition (not exposed to concern-relieving intervention) but
have received different monetary incentives to take an HIV test. The varying incentive
value for the HIV test allows us to locally pin down the demand curve for an HIV
test. I derived the demand curve in Figure 1.7 with point estimates from Table 1.4,
Column (2). Consider the monetary incentives for taking a test as negative prices.
At the price of -50 Meticais, the test uptake rate is 20.7 percent. Lowering the price
to -100 Meticais increases the test rate by 12.0 percentage points and reaches 32.7
percent. Keeping the price at -50 Meticais but having the excessive stigma concern
corrected increases the test rate by 6.9 percentage points, reaching 27.6%. Assuming
local linearity, the concern-relieving intervention leads to a 29-Metical (1.30 dollars by
PPP) increase in willingness to pay (WTP) for an HIV test. The size of the increase
is over half of the daily cost-of-living.
One caveat when interpreting the change of WTP induced by the concern-relieving
intervention is that it is only valid around the price levels on which we conducted ex-
periments (between negative 50 to negative 100 Meticais). We remain agnostic about
the demand curve’s shape beyond this price range. Researchers have pointed out that
a financial incentive itself may relieve some of the stigma concerns by allowing test
takers to conceal their real motivations for taking the test (Thornton, 2008; Swann,
2018). If that is the case, then the demand curve for an HIV test will jump discon-
tinuously at the price equal to zero. The effect of the concern-relieving intervention
on the WTP at a positive price can differ from that at a negative price. However,
since both the Control Group and the intervention group received the same financial
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Figure 1.6: Test Uptake Mean Comparison: Three Study Groups
Notes: The y-axis is the HIV test uptake rate measured by the fraction of participants redeemed
testing coupons. Both the Concern-Relieving Intervention Group and the Control Group received
coupons of the value of 50 Meticais. The High-Incentive Group received coupons of the value of 100
Meticais.
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Table 1.4: Quantifying the Intervention Effect
(1) (2)
Group Indicators Test Uptake
Concern-Relieving Intervention 0.0634** 0.0686**
(0.0315) (0.0323)
High-Incentive 0.119*** 0.120***
(0.0377) (0.0389)
Control Group Mean 0.207 0.207
Observations 996 996
R-squared 0.011 0.247
Constant yes yes
Controls no yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The control variables are the same as in Table 1.3.
incentive, the design in this study is always valid in identifying the existence of the
stigma-concern barrier to testing, regardless of the financial incentive’s effect.
1.4.3 Heterogeneity by Belief Update
The concern relieving treatment is informational by nature. It is designed to change
an individual’s behavior by first changing his or her perceptions. An immediate
inference is that the intervention will show the strongest effect on people who are open
to and able to perceive the new information. Below I present suggestive evidence that
this is the case.
We introduced a “concern re-assess” procedure to a subset of the concern-relieving
group. The “concern re-assess” applied to a participant 15 minutes after the inter-
vention was performed. (During the interval between the treatment and the re-assess,
the participant was occupied by answering other survey questions unrelated to health
or HIV.) In the “concern re-assess” session, the enumerator re-asked the questions
in which the participant overestimated the stigma at first and learned the correct
answers during the intervention. A participant could still give an answer suggest-
ing high stigma concerns in the re-assess session, either due to lack of trust in the
enumerator-shared information or due to the inability to process and remember the
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information. If a participant still overestimated stigma in the re-assess session, the
enumerator would repeat the intervention one more time.
The “concern re-assess” allows us to observe participants’ updates of beliefs in the
immediate short term. Participants updating belief in the right direction were those
who took the new information seriously and correctly. We call them “fast-updaters.”
Due to resource constraints, the re-assess procedure was implemented only in the
provinces of Zambezia and Sofala. Two-thirds of the participants in the re-assess
session updated their beliefs about stigma in the correct direction.
Regressions in Table 1.5 explore intervention heterogeneity between the fast-updaters
and others. Column (1) replicates Column (2) of Table 1.3 to show the main inter-
vention effect. Column (2) and Column (3) run the same regression separately on
two subsamples: the one that we did not conduct a “concern re-assess” (Manica
province) and the subsample that we did (Zambezia province and Sofala province).
The two subsamples present very similar main intervention effects. Column (4) runs
a regression that includes the interaction between concern-relieving intervention and
fast-updater status. Since we were not able to measure whether a participant from
the Control Group would be a “fast updater”; an individual’s ability to digest infor-
mation and update beliefs is not fully controlled for. The point estimate of the main
effect shrinks to zero, and the intervention effect on the fast-updaters is almost twice
the size of the main effect in Column (3). Table 1.5 strongly supports the inference
that the concern-relieving intervention is more effective on the fast updaters. (In fact,
the main effect is entirely driven by them.)
Table 1.6 further explores intervention heterogeneity by four dimensions: gender,
education level, wealth, and subjective risk of infection. I split the sample into two
subgroups by each of the dimensions and run Equation (1.2). Coefficients obtained
from the high-education subsample remain significant after adjusting for Multiple
Hypotheses Testing (List, Shaikh and Xu, 2019). Table 1.6 also reports test of equal-
ity. The effect of the concern-relieving intervention exhibits strong heterogeneity by
education levels: It is close to zero in the low-education group in contrast to 16.0
percentage points in the high-education one.
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Table 1.5: Heterogeneous Intervention Effect on Test Uptake by Belief Updates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample
Full
sample
Not Re-
assessed
Sample
Re-
assessed
Sample
Re-assess
sample
Concern-Relieving Intervention 0.0771** 0.0766* 0.0895* -0.0272
(0.0326) (0.0436) (0.0539) (0.0687)
Concern-Relieving Intervention 0.166**
× Fast updater (0.0800)
Control Group Mean 0.207 0.181 0.241 0.241
Observations 754 413 341 341
R-squared 0.292 0.241 0.383 0.392
Constant yes yes yes yes
Controls yes yes yes yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The control variables are the same as in Table 1.3.
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Individuals with more education responded stronger to the concern-relieving in-
tervention potentially because they were able to process the information better. This
finding is consistent with the fact that the intervention is more effective on the fast
updaters. Both dimensions of heterogeneity remind us that when applying informa-
tional experiments to a low-literacy population, participants’ ability to understand
the information can substantially affect the intervention’s impacts.
1.4.4 Stigma and Test Uptake of Children
Till now, we have focused on adult participants and found that their stigma con-
cerns have discouraged their test-seeking behavior. 71% of the adult participants
are parents and make decisions for their children when it comes to HIV testing. If
stigma concerns hold adults back from HIV tests for themselves, do they hold children
back, too? The potential inter-generational effect of stigma concerns has important
implications because a child’s early experience in HIV testing can have prolonged ef-
fects not only on their short-term health status but also on their future habits about
and attitude towards health behavior when they reach adulthood. This study can
show the role of stigma concerns on children’s test-seeking behavior with its children’s
coupon design.
At the stage of coupon distribution at the participant’s home, each eligible child
of the survey respondent was offered coupons to take an HIV test, regardless of the
eligibility of the adult respondent. Each child received a coupon of the same value
as the adult household members. Children’s coupons were handed to the parent who
answered questions on their behalf. In the analyses below, a child’s group assignment
is considered the same as the parent who answered questions on their behalf. We
did not directly interact with children; in the Concern-Relieving Intervention Group,
only adults received the intervention.
In Table 1.7 we report regressions similar to Table 1.4, Column (2), but with a
sample of children. A child enters the regression in Column (1) if one of her parents
overestimated stigma, and the child herself is eligible to receive a coupon for testing.
The child sample presents a test uptake rate of 30.1% under the control condition,
higher than that of the adult sample. The high financial incentive displays a similar
impact, 9.3 percentage points, on the child testing as on the adult testing. The
concern-relieving intervention, on the other hand, does not play a significant role in
raising the test uptake rate in children: in Table 1.7 Column (1), the point estimate
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Table 1.7: Concern-Relieving Intervention Effect on Children
(1) (2)
Variables Test Uptake
Concern-Relieving Intervention 0.0147 0.0298
(0.0301) (0.0366)
High-Incentive 0.0934** 0.137***
(0.0363) (0.0434)
Parent tested within 3 months 0.126**
(0.0599)
Parent HIV positive 0.0538
(0.0847)
Concern-Relieving Intervention × -0.0905
Parent tested within 3 months (0.0789)
Concern-Relieving Intervention × 0.0290
Parent HIV positive (0.0944)
High-Incentive × -0.171*
Parent tested within 3 months (0.0925)
High-Incentive × -0.0618
Parent HIV positive (0.103)
Control Group Mean 0.301 0.301
Observations 3,519 3,519
R-squared 0.215 0.220
Constant yes yes
Controls yes yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The control variables are: Indicator: a child is female (yes, no); Indicator: time of the most recent
HIV test (never tested, tested more than a year ago, tested less than a year ago); Age: in years;
Indicator: the participating parent is female (yes, no); Parent’s Education: highest grade completed;
Parent’s Knowledge about HIV: Number of correct answers to the 15 questions testing HIV-related
knowledge; The straight-line distance between the household and the testing clinic (in km); Square
of the straight-line distance between the household and the testing clinic (in km); Indicator: the
household ever go without food in the last 12 months (yes, no); Indicator: there is an HIV positive
household member (yes, no); Asset ownership index: the first principal component of 14 asset-
ownership indicators; Enumerator fixed-effects; Community fixed-effects. If any missing value exists
for some variable “X,” an indicator variable is created for variable X to flag missing status (1 if
missing, 0 otherwise). The missing value of the variable X is replaced with zero. The variable X
missing indicator variable is added to the set of control variables.
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of the intervention effect is 1.5 percentage points. Table 1.7 Column (2) examines
how our interventions interact with parents’ testing history (the parent was eligible
for a coupon, the parent had been tested within 3 months, or the parent had been
tested HIV positive). When the parent him or herself was eligible for a coupon, the
concern-relieving intervention raises children’s test uptake by 3.0 percentage point
and the effect is still not statistically different from zero. Children’s testing behavior
is strongly correlated with their parents’. Parents who voluntarily sought tests for
themselves within 3 months before our study are 12.6 percentage points more likely
to take their children to be tested with our coupons. Both the concern-relieving
intervention and the high incentives appear to be substitutes for a parent’s active
testing history. The interaction term between the parents tested within 3 months
and either the intervention or the high incentives is negative and sizable.
Although we find that children’s testing behavior is closely correlated with their
parents’, a parent’s stigma concerns do not appear to be a major barrier when it
comes to children’s test uptake. The high test uptake rate among children in the
Control Group and lack of effect of the concern-relieving intervention provide sug-
gestive evidence. That the stigma barrier plays a less important role in children’s
testing than adults’ testing may stem from the nature of the stigma. HIV infection
is associated with some socially disapproved adult behaviors but not child behaviors;
thus, parents believed that children are less prone to stigmatization. Another possible
explanation is that even though children are equally prone to stigmatization, only the
health status of children, but not their social relationship concerns, enters a parent’s
utility function. The experiment design in this study does not allow us to separate
these different explanations. Learning stigma concerns’ role in children’s test uptake
requires future work.
1.4.5 Demand for Testing among the Concerned and the Unconcerned
The analyses above have focused on the population that had excessive stigma
concerns. We have shown that the concern-relieving intervention encouraged these
individuals to take an HIV test and that the effect size is comparable to that of
doubling the financial incentives. We also depicted their demand for HIV tests in the
short term (14 days) in Figure 1.7 and discussed how the intervention effect fit into
the demand curve.
In this section, we gauge the concern-relieving intervention from a different angle.
Specifically, we try to answer the following questions: To what degree has my inter-
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Figure 1.7: Quantifying the Intervention Effect on HIV Test Demand Curve
Notes: Curve D depicts the demand for an HIV test within 14 days among the “concerned” pop-
ulation. This study experimentally sets two price levels for a test: negative 50 Meticais (receive 50
Meticais conditional testing) and negative 100 Meticais (receive 100 Meticais conditional testing).
The x-axis of this demand diagram is the percent of people that take the test.
vention helped “concerned” individuals catch up with the “unconcerned” individuals
in taking HIV tests?
A naive approach is to compare the test uptake rate measured by coupon redemp-
tion of the Concern-Relieving Intervention Group (27.1%) with that of the “uncon-
cerned” participants with 50-metical coupons (23.3%). This comparison would lead
to the conclusion that the test uptake rate of the “concerned” after receiving the
concern-relieving intervention will surpass that of the “unconcerned” people by 3.8
percentage points. This approach is biased, however, because the two groups are not
comparable.16 The “unconcerned” were more likely to have already tested shortly
before the study, and as a result, were ineligible for coupons. Those who were “un-
concerned” and received coupons was a sample that faced higher barriers beyond
stigma concerns.
To get a comparable sample, consider everyone who did not know they were HIV
positive at the time of 3 months before the study. We calculate their demand for an
HIV test in the next three and a half months. Every one of them had the chance to
16See Appendix Table A.2 for comparisons between the concerned and unconcerned participants.
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take an HIV test without any financial incentives in the next 3 months, and if they
chose not to, they received coupons from this study to take tests in the following 14
days.
To simplify the analysis, for now, we assume that learning one’s HIV status does
not affect one’s belief about stigma in society. Thus, the “concern” status obtained
from the study survey correctly reflects participants’ “concern” status 3 months ago.
We will later discuss the implications of our results if the assumption does not hold.
Table 1.8 summarizes the choices in the next three and half months of those who
did not know they were HIV positive at the time of 3 months before the study, sep-
arately for the “concerned” and “unconcerned.” 28.4% of the concerned and 31.3%
of the unconcerned chose to take a test in the next 3 months. Those who did not
take a test (71.6% of the concerned and 68.7% of the unconcerned) received coupons
from this study. Of those who received coupons, when the coupon value is 50 Met-
icais, 20.7% of the concerned and 23.3% of the unconcerned took a test. When the
intervention is applied in addition to the 50-Metical coupons, 27.1% of the concerned
people took a test.
Combining the numbers, the fraction of concerned people who would have taken
a test in the 3.5 months at the price of negative 50 is 28.4%+ (1-28.4%)×20.1% =
43.2%. Similarly, the demand for a test in the 3.5 months period for the unconcerned
group is 31.3%+(1-31.3%)×23.3%= 47.3% at the price of negative. Of the concerned
people who also received our intervention and 50-Metical coupons, the test uptake
rate within the 3.5 months period would be 28.4%+(1-28.4%)×27.1% = 47.8%. The
relationships are depicted in Figure 1.8. In conclusion, when we examine a 3.5-month
period, the concern-relieving intervention makes the people concerned with stigma
catch up with, and even surpass, those who were unconcerned.
Now consider how violations of the assumption would affect this result. If learning
one’s HIV status makes people believe that there is less stigma, then some people
who tested for HIV before the study (row (1) of Table 1.8) and were assessed as
“unconcerned” in the study survey were in fact “concerned” 3 months before the
study. That means the test uptake rate within 3 months before the study for the
“concerned” should be higher than 28.4%, while, for the “unconcerned,” it should be
lower than 31.3%. As a result, with the intervention, the 3.5-months test uptake rate
of the concerned should be higher than 47.8% and that of the unconcerned lower than
47.3%. Correcting this bias would suggest that a previously “concerned” person with
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Table 1.8: Test Uptake of the Concerned and Unconcerned
Panel A: Concerned
(1): Test uptake rate within 3 months be-
fore the RCT
28.4%
(2) = 100% - (1): Entered the RCT 71.6%
Without
intervention With intervention
(3): Test uptake rate with 50-Metical
coupons 14 days into the RCT
20.7% 27.1%
Test uptake rate during the 3.5 months at
price = -50 Meticais
43.2% 47.8%
(1) + (2)*(3)
Panel B: Unconcerned
(4): Test uptake rate within 3 months be-
fore the RCT
31.3%
(5) = 100% - (4): Entered the RCT 68.7%
Without
intervention With intervention
(6): Test uptake rate with 50-Metical
coupons 14 days into the RCT
23.3% -
Test uptake rate during the 3.5 months at
price = -50 Meticais
47.3% -
(4) + (5)*(6)
30
31.3%
16.0%
28.3%
14.9%
19.4%
47.3%
43.2%
47.7%
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Fr
ac
tio
n 
Te
st
ed
 fo
r H
IV
Unconcerned Concerned
w/ 50MT coupons
 
w/ 50MT coupons
+ intervention
 
w/o incentives
Figure 1.8: Demand for Testing among the Concerned and Unconcerned
Notes: The analysis sample of this figure is all survey respondents that were eligible for a coupon
or were tested for HIV within 3 months before the recruitment survey. The y-axis is the HIV test
uptake rate.
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the concern-relieving treatment became even more likely to take an incentivized HIV
test than an “unconcerned” person.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed a randomized control trial to identify the role of stigma con-
cerns in hindering HIV testing and to quantify the stigma barrier.
We obtained local stigma environment measures of the study communities one
year before the RCT and used these measures to construct an intervention to ex-
perimentally mitigate individuals’ concerns for stigma. Participants with excessive
stigma concerns were randomized to receive the concern-relieving intervention; in this
intervention they are informed of the true stigma environment measures of their com-
munities that suggested lower-than-expected stigma. We then tracked participants’
test-seeking behavior with testing coupons.
This paper first establishes evidence that the stigma concerns are a barrier that has
caused people to avoid taking an HIV test. Participants from the Concern-Relieving
Intervention Group took up HIV tests 7.7 percentage points more or by 37% more,
than those from the Control Group.
Moreover, the experiment design allowed us to give the stigma barrier a dollar
value. We introduced study groups with different levels of monetary incentives for
HIV testing. The Control Group and the Concern-Relieving Intervention Group
received coupons of 50 Meticais (2.25 dollars by PPP, equivalent to the daily cost-of-
living). In an additional study group, the High-Incentive Group, participants received
no intervention but coupons of 100 Meticais. The Control Group and the High-
Incentive Group locally pin down the demand curve for HIV testing. In the demand
framework, the concern-relieving intervention raised individuals’ willingness to pay
(WTP) for an HIV test by 29 Meticais (1.30 dollars by PPP, or more than half of the
daily cost-of-living).
This paper conducted additional analyses to depict the role of stigma concerns in
HIV testing. Our concern-relieving intervention is most effective on those who were
able to perceive the information immediately or those with more years of educations,
which suggests that participants’ capacity to process new information substantially
affects the success of this informational intervention. In exploring children’s behavior,
the study shows that children’s test uptake rate under the control condition is higher
than that of their parents’ and that stigma concerns do not appear to play a significant
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role when parents make test-seeking decisions for their children. Combining self-
reported history with the coupon redemption, we found that the simple concern-
relieving intervention is effective enough to help individuals with excessive concerns
take HIV tests at a similar rate as those in the “unconcerned” group.
In response to the HIV epidemic, global donors and national governments have
launched a wide variety of campaigns in Sub-Sahara Africa. Many of these contain
informational components that disseminate knowledge about the disease and promote
supportive attitudes towards the infected population. This paper suggests a new piece
of information, the social stigma measures, that holds much promise in promoting
healthy behavior regarding HIV prevention and treatment. Building on the fact that
the stigma environment has continuously improved in Sub-Sahara Africa, I showed
that letting people learn the supportive, low-stigma environment of their community
has a large positive impact on the public uptake of HIV tests. This paper calls for
policymakers to pay particular attention to the social stigma barrier when advancing
public health programs related to HIV. The informational intervention designed in
this study can be scaled up in a broader population at a reasonable cost and can fit
into campaigns fighting HIV.
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CHAPTER II
HIV Testing, Knowledge, and Stigma: An
Analysis of a Widespread HIV/AIDS Program
2.1 Introduction
National governments and the global development community have pursued a wide
variety of programs to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Across the broad scope of
such programs, efforts to facilitate and promote HIV testing play a central role. HIV
testing is a central focus because, first of all, testing is the prerequisite for being
diagnosed as HIV positive and thereafter initiating life-saving anti-retroviral therapy.
Furthermore, HIV is typically asymptomatic for years before the disease progresses
to AIDS and symptoms become apparent. During the asymptomatic phase of the
disease, HIV testing leading to treatment via antiretroviral therapy (ART) at this
early stage has substantial benefits on two key dimensions. First, treatment leads to
lower viral loads and thus a much lower likelihood of transmission to sexual partners
(Cohen et al., 2013). Second, an HIV-positive individual’s longer-run adherence to
treatment and health outcomes are better when treatment occurs at an earlier stage
of the disease (Ford et al., 2018).
There has been substantial progress in implementing HIV testing around the world,
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa where HIV prevalence remains the highest on the
planet. That said, testing rates remain quite far from optimal levels for control of
the epidemic. In our study population, nearly half of adults and almost 90% of
children have never been tested for HIV. There thus remains a great deal of room for
improvement in HIV testing rates.
We seek to shed light on the impact of a major type of program combating
HIV/AIDS on HIV testing rates, and to understand the mechanisms underlying its
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effectiveness (or lack thereof). We focus on two mechanisms in particular: alleviating
imperfect information related to HIV, and reducing HIV-related stigmatizing atti-
tudes. We study a program in Mozambique, Forc¸a a` Comunidade e Crianc¸as (FCC,
“Strengthening Communities and Children”), funded by the U.S. government’s Pres-
idential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), that aims to raise HIV testing
rates by improving households’ information about HIV/AIDS and reducing HIV-
related stigmatizing attitudes. FCC is a community-level program that operates
primarily via home visits to households, alongside a set of complementary interven-
tions in communities and schools. The program is representative of a broad category
of PEPFAR-funded interventions to help households and communities respond to the
HIV/AIDS crisis, known as programs for “orphans and vulnerable children” (OVCs).
We exploit random assignment of household exposure to the FCC program to: 1)
estimate the causal impact of such exposure on household HIV testing rates, and 2)
reveal whether any such improvements operate via improvements in HIV-related infor-
mation and reductions in HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes. Our approach involves
a three-part randomized controlled trial methodology. First, communities as a whole
were randomly assigned to treatment or control status (inclusion in or exclusion from
the FCC program). Second, a subset of households within treatment communities
were randomly assigned to a strong encouragement to participate in FCC programs
( “directly enrolled” households). These directly enrolled households receive a home
visit by an FCC program community worker and are assessed for inclusion in various
FCC subcomponent programs. This led them to have higher participation rates in
the program than other households in treatment communities. Other households not
randomly selected for direct enrollment ended up being treated as well, but at lower
rates. These first two randomization components allow us to shed light on direct im-
pacts, and to quantify spillovers within treatment communities from directly-enrolled
to other households.
The third part of the randomized methodology is aimed at shedding light on the
role of particular mechanisms behind impacts of the FCC program: information about
HIV, information about HIV treatment, ART, and reducing concerns about HIV-
related stigma. We randomly assign simple treatments at the household level that
our project staff administer immediately after the endline survey. To gauge effect
magnitudes, we also randomly assign the size of monetary incentives for HIV testing.
We examine how these treatments affect one of our HIV testing outcomes, use of a
coupon for HIV testing after the endline survey.
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As specified in a pre-analysis plan (PAP), our primary analyses focus on the ef-
fect of a household being assigned to “direct enrollment” in a treatment community,
compared to all households in control communities. We conduct our analyses in a
sample of 4,240 households in 76 Mozambican communities who we have been fol-
lowing through a 2017-18 baseline and 2019 endline survey. The primary outcome
of interest is a composite outcome equal to one if anyone in a household is reported
to have had an HIV test in the last 12 months (reported in the endline survey), or
if anyone in the household uses a coupon for HIV testing at the local health clinic,
provided by our research staff during the endline survey, within the next 14 days; and
zero otherwise. Secondary outcomes, including those used to measure information
and stigma mechanisms, are from the endline survey.
We find that the FCC program has positive effects on the composite measure of
HIV testing (the combination of the 12-month self-report and the post-endline-survey
coupon use), but these effects are small: an increase of 2.21 percentage points, on
top of a base of 72.3 percent in the control group. The effect is also only marginally
statistically significantly different from zero (p-value 0.263). The treatment effect is
similar for each component of the testing measure examined separately: 2.45 percent-
age points for the 12-month self-report (control mean 62.6 percent; p-value 0.315),
and -2.18 percentage points for testing coupon use (control mean 26.4 percent; p-value
0.226).
A useful way to view the modest size of this treatment effect is to compare it to
expert predictions of the effect size. Prior to our results being known, in DellaVigna,
Otis and Vivalt (2020) collected from subject-matter experts their forecasts of the
treatment effect of being assigned to “direct enrollment” in a treatment community
on the 12-month self-report of HIV testing. The mean expert prediction was 11.36
percentage points. Our actual treatment effect, 2.45 percentage points, is substan-
tially below the expert prediction: it is only one-fifth the magnitude of the expert
prediction, and the difference between the two is highly statistically significant at
conventional levels (p-value 0.0004).
The program has no positive impact on other pre-specified secondary outcomes,
such as school enrollment and attendance, assets, life satisfaction, and adherence to
ART. We also find no evidence of HIV testing spillovers (via geographic or social
proximity) from directly-enrolled to other households in treatment communities (also
pre-specified).
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We then turn to understanding mechanisms behind the FCC program’s modest
effects on HIV testing. In secondary analyses that we also pre-specified, we examine
knowledge about HIV, HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes, and safe sexual behavior.
The program did not improve HIV-related knowledge, as measured by the share of
correctly-answered responses to 33 questions. Strikingly, the treatment actually wors-
ened HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes, measured by the share of non-stigmatizing
answers to four widely-used questions. Finally, the treatment led to improvements in
an index of self-reported safe sexual behavior, and reductions in the number of sexual
partners in the last 12 months.
The additional treatments randomly assigned at the household level during our
follow-up survey provide further highlight the role of stigma and information. We find
that separate treatments providing HIV-related information and alleviating concerns
about HIV-related stigma raise the impact of the FCC program on HIV testing. These
impacts on increasing the impact of the FCC program on testing are comparable in
size to the impact of a financial incentive for HIV testing about the size of the average
daily wage. These findings help confirm that the FCC program was deficient in the
areas of improving HIV knowledge and reducing stigmatizing attitudes.
We use the following conceptual framework to tie these different results together.
People decide whether to get tested for HIV, assess the costs and benefits of getting
tested, and get tested if the perceived benefits exceed perceived costs. FCC program
seeks to foster HIV testing by raising the perceived benefit of testing and reducing
perceived costs. It does so by implementing home visits to households (alongside other
complementary interventions) to improve knowledge about HIV, and reducing HIV-
related stigmatizing attitudes in the community. Improved knowledge about HIV
raises the perceived benefit of testing, while reducing stigmatizing attitudes reduces
the perceived cost of testing. In addition, improved knowledge about HIV also raises
testing indirectly since it may also reduce stigmatizing attitudes, which then further
increases testing.
With knowledge having such a central role in raising HIV testing, much can go
wrong if a program such as FCC inadvertently fails in its knowledge-raising objective,
and instead creates misinformation. Our results are consistent with the FCC program
actually worsening knowledge, which has a direct effect on reducing testing, as well
as an indirect effect via increasing stigmatizing attitudes, which further reduces test-
ing. This interpretation of the results also helps explain the increase in safe sexual
behaviors, in particular reductions in the number of recent sexual partners. Increased
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fear of being stigmatized could cause people to practice safer sexual practices, so as
to avoid HIV infection and the associated stigma.
This research is connected to a number of research areas in economics and pub-
lic health. In the context of studies of community-level interventions to combat the
HIV/AIDS crisis, the use of randomized controlled trial methodologies is rare. Prior
studies of PEPFAR programs have not exploited prospectively randomized research
designs, and instead have relied on retrospective analysis with control or comparison
groups that were not randomly selected. Relatedly, past studies have not tracked de-
fined groups of individuals over time (from before to after program implementation),
raising additional concerns about sample selection biases (Bryant et al., 2012). Ben-
david et al. (2012) examine the impact of PEPFAR funding at the country level using
a difference-in-difference approach, finding substantial reductions in adult mortality
in Africa. A number of past studies have used randomized controlled trials to exam-
ine the impact of narrower, more targeted interventions related to HIV/AIDS, such
as Thornton (2008), McCoy et al. (2017), Ssewamala, Han and Neilands (2009), Ivers
et al. (2014), Baird, McIntosh and Ozler (2011), Kiene et al. (2017), and Yotebieng
et al. (2017). None of these have studied community-level programs, or examined the
interplay between testing, knowledge, and stigmatizing attitudes as we do.
It is important to understand the extent to which various programs raise rates of
HIV testing, but it is just as important to understand the mechanisms through which
they do so. An understanding of mechanisms can shed light on the underlying market
failures, and thereby help guide future policy in the HIV/AIDS realm (and potentially
other related policy areas). We study whether improvements in information in ben-
eficiary households are an important mechanism through which direct and spillover
effects of such programs operate. Our findings can motivate future policies to address
informational market failures (and future research to delve more deeply into them).
Another mechanism through which program effects may operate is via reductions in
HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes in the social network. We find increases in stig-
matizing attitudes, which may be behind reduced willingness to be tested for HIV.
The role of stigma in inhibiting health care utilization has not been widely studied
in economics, in the HIV/AIDS context or elsewhere.
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2.2 Conceptual Matters
Among programs that have the promotion of HIV testing as a primary aim, a
common theory of change is as follows. People decide whether to get tested for HIV
assess the costs and benefits of getting tested, and get tested if the perceived benefits
exceed perceived costs. Perhaps the most important benefit of getting tested is that
if testing positive, one can then initiate treatment, anti-retroviral therapy (ART).
Initiating ART early leads to better health outcomes for the HIV-infected person, and
has spillovers onto others by reducing transmission. On the cost side, HIV testing
may itself be free of monetary costs (as in our context), but it still involves time
and effort costs. There are also social costs of experiencing HIV-related stigmatizing
attitudes from others, as well as potential psychological costs such as anxiety and
distress that can come from learning of a positive test result.
We view the FCC program we study as seeking to raise rates of HIV testing by
raising the perceived benefit of testing and reducing perceived costs. It does so by im-
plementing home visits to households (alongside other complementary interventions)
to improve knowledge about HIV, and reducing HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes
in the community.
Imperfect information on HIV and HIV treatment leads households to underesti-
mate the potential benefits of HIV testing. Improving HIV-related knowledge may
raise the perceived benefits of getting tested. This should then increase rates of HIV
testing as households become more likely to judge that the benefits of testing to
outweigh the costs.
Concerns about HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes raise the perceived costs of
HIV testing. Stigmatizing attitudes towards people infected with HIV impose social
and psychic costs on them, as well as on people suspected to be infected with HIV.
HIV testing is intended to be anonymous, but individuals may be concerned that
their anonymity may not be fully protected if they go for testing. Travel to a health
clinic can be observed by others, and one’s presence in a clinic can be observed by
other patients. In contexts where high shares of health services at clinics are related
to HIV testing and treatment, those observing someone traveling to or being in a
health clinic may place some positive probability in their being infected with HIV.
Moreover, individuals may not trust healthcare workers to keep secret that they came
for testing, or to be discreet about their HIV status. An intervention that reduces
stigmatizing attitudes may raise HIV testing rates by reducing the perceived costs
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of going for testing, making it more likely that individuals judge that the benefits of
testing exceed the costs.
The FCC program may reduce HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes in two ways.
First, community workers doing home visits are expected to engage households in
“sensitization” conversations to try to reduce stigmatizing attitudes and foster more
accepting and supportive attitudes towards HIV-infected individuals.
Second, simply improving knowledge about HIV as a disease and how it is treated
could reduce stigmatizing attitudes. If people learn that HIV can only be spread
via sharing of bodily fluids (and not through casual contact), this could make people
more comfortable interacting with HIV-infected individuals, which we would view as
a reduction in stigma. Stigmatizing attitudes could also fall as people learn that HIV
is a treatable disease, treatment is provided for free at the local health clinic, people
under treatment can lead relatively normal lives. In other words, if the FCC program
is successful in improving knowledge about HIV, it could also succeed in reducing
stigmatizing attitudes.
In this simple framework, efforts to improve HIV-related knowledge is central. A
program such as FCC aims to raise the rate of HIV testing by both improving HIV-
related knowledge (raising perceived benefits of testing) and reducing HIV-related
stigmatizing attitudes (reducing perceived costs of testing). Improvements in knowl-
edge can raise HIV testing directly, as well as indirectly by reducing stigmatizing
attitudes, which then also promotes testing.
There could, therefore, be substantial unintended consequences if the effort to
improve knowledge related to HIV goes awry. Should a program inadvertently spread
misinformation and worsen knowledge, it could reduce testing rates directly, as well
as indirectly by worsening stigmatizing attitudes.
In our empirical work, we will explore this possibility by examining both HIV-
related knowledge and stigmatizing attitudes as outcome variables, alongside HIV
testing. As we have highlighted in the introduction, we found that the program has
mixed impact on HIV-related knowledge (actually making certain knowledge areas
worse), and increases HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes. This helps explain the very
modest increases in HIV testing, much lower than expert forecasts.
At the same time, in our empirical work, we will highlight another impact of the
FCC program that confirms this interpretation of the findings: an increase in safe
sexual behaviors, and a reduction in the number of sexual partners. This is consistent
with the increase we see in stigmatizing attitudes. As individuals fear HIV-related
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stigma more, they may not only be less likely to get tested, they may also engage less
in unsafe sex so as to reduce the likelihood of becoming infected.
2.3 Research Design
2.3.1 Country and Programmatic Context
Out of an estimated 36.9 million people living with HIV worldwide in 2017, 25.7
million are in Sub-Saharan Africa. The region also accounts for a dominant share
of new HIV infections: 1.17 million out of a global 1.8 million in that year. In
Mozambique in 2017, 2.1 million people out of a population of 29.7 million were
living with HIV (7.1% of the population), out of which 170,000 were children (aged
14 or below). The country has an estimated 130,000 new HIV infections annually,
of which 13.8% are children. Mozambique recorded 70,000 AIDS-related deaths in
2017, likely because only slightly more than half of HIV-infected patients have access
to anti-retroviral therapy (ART). Poor access and adherence to ART contributes to
AIDS-related morbidity and mortality, as well as HIV transmission (to other adults
as well as from mothers to children) (UNAIDS, 2019).
The U.S. Government’s most important program responding to the HIV/AIDS cri-
sis is the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), initiated in 2003.
Recognizing that children are among the most vulnerable populations in the context
of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, PEPFAR mandates part of its funding be devoted to
programs benefiting children orphaned or made vulnerable by HIV/AIDS ( “orphans
and vulnerable children,” or OVCs).12 PEPFAR’s programs for OVCs take an in-
tegrated approach, with interventions at child, family, and community levels; that
target child needs at different developmental stages; and that are connected to other
development programs related to education, nutrition, and household economic de-
1The UN defines an “orphan” as a child who has lost one or both parents. An estimated 13.4
million children and adolescents (0-17 years of age) worldwide had lost one or both parents to AIDS
as of 2015. More than 80% of these children (10.9 million) live in sub-Saharan Africa (UNICEF,
2016).
2PEPFAR’s 2008 reauthorization mandated it to spend 10% of funds on assistance to OVCs.
PEPFAR defines children as those below 18 years of age. These funds amounted to more than $1
billion in 2006-09, and $672 million in 2010-11. (PEPFAR Operational Plans for fiscal years 2006-
2011, available at http://www.pepfar.gov.) In the 2015 fiscal year, PEPFAR spent $218 million on
OVC programming (PEPFAR, 2017).
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velopment (PEPFAR, 2006). In fiscal year 2016, PEPFAR OVC programs supported
6.2 million OVCs and their caregivers worldwide (PEPFAR, 2017).3
2.3.2 The Intervention
The program we study, Forc¸a a` Comunidade e Crianc¸as (FCC, “Strengthening
Communities and Children”), is a representative example of PEPFAR OVC programs.
Its high-level aim is to improve families’ and communities’ ability to support, protect,
and care for orphans and vulnerable children, their caregivers, and their households
more generally.
While the FCC program is multifaceted and can affect many possible outcomes,
this study focuses its primary analyses and hypotheses on central HIV testing outcome
variables, the main program component, and a subset of mechanisms (intermediate
outcomes) through which effects may operate. From this perspective, we will mea-
sure the program’s overall impacts, measure spillovers from program beneficiaries to
other households, and provide evidence on mechanisms through which the program
achieves its impacts. Other outcomes, program components, and mechanisms will be
the subject of secondary analyses, which can provide guidance for the foci of future
studies.
To be specific, our primary focus is on the following:
 Outcome variable: Having been tested for HIV in the past 12 months (self-
reported); take-up of a recommendation to get a new HIV test (directly ob-
served)
 Program component: Home visits by local implementing partner (LIP) staff
(Case Care Workers, or CCWs)
 Mechanisms / intermediate outcomes: Information on HIV; information
on ART; concerns about HIV-related stigma
HIV testing is the outcome variable of primary focus because it is the first, pre-
requisite step in the chain that then leads to the initiation of HIV treatment (ART)
and ART adherence. The importance of HIV testing is strongly emphasized in the
most central and widespread program components (OVC home visits by community
3Reviews of research on OVCs include Bryant and Beard (2016), Goldberg and Short (2016),
Nyberg et al. (2012), and Shann et al. (2013). See also Evans and Miguel (2007), Case, Paxson and
Ableidinger (2004), Larson et al. (2013), and Whetten et al. (2014).
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workers, and school-based programs) via information provision and efforts at reduc-
ing HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes. The more specialized and narrower program
components (such as Village Saving and Loan Associations, or VSLAs, and youth
groups) also systematically reinforce the importance of HIV testing.
We now describe the FCC program, highlighting in detail the outcome variables,
program components, and mechanisms (intermediate outcomes) of primary interest.
Other aspects of secondary interest will be described in less detail.
The FCC program is composed of a number of interrelated components, and is im-
plemented in study districts by LIP organizations under contract to the international
NGO World Education Inc./Bantwana. A number of FCC program components are
school-based, and so programs are implemented in local communities surrounding a
focal school. Some components are focused on children, others on adults. In each
community, activities take place with the collaboration and advice of a Community
Child Protection Committee (CCPC) whose membership includes community lead-
ers, volunteers, and local government officials. The program is implemented in seven
districts of three provinces of Mozambique.4
The most widespread FCC program component is home visits by LIP staff known
as “Case Care Workers” (CCWs) to households in program communities. Roughly 700
CCWs work across the study communities. LIPs hire CCWs from the communities
they serve, in part based on recommendations by the CCPC and community leaders.
In common with the local populations they serve, they typically have no more than
a primary school education. Roughly 80% of CCWs are female. They range in age
from 18 to 48, with most falling between 25 and 40 years of age. CCWs receive a
stipend of 3,100 MZN per month (roughly US$150), as well as in-kind compensation
in the form of a bicycle, a work uniform, and cellphone airtime.
CCWs conduct home visits of households thought likely to be OVC households,
based on personal knowledge and recommendations of the CCPC. The home visit
itself is a conduit for the dissemination of information and advice by CCWs, whose
impacts we seek to measure. All household members may then participate in other
FCC components, based on the results of the home visit. In home visits, CCWs
conduct systematic vulnerability assessments, and identified “OVC” households (and
individuals therein) are then linked to appropriate programs and services in commu-
4Program provinces and districts are: Manica province (Manica, Chimoio, and Gondola dis-
tricts), Sofala province (Dondo and Nhamatanda districts), and Zambezia province (Namacurra and
Nicoadala districts).
43
nities, schools, and health facilities. One of the most important results of these home
visits is the referrals of individuals for HIV testing at the nearest PEPFAR-funded
health clinic. The expectation is that CCWs refer all FCC program beneficiaries
(both adults and children of all ages) who do not know their HIV status for HIV
testing, and that even upon a negative test result testing should be repeated every
twelve months. The number of individuals referred to HIV testing is a key outcome
indicator for the FCC program, monitored by PEPFAR in the context of achieving
the UNAIDS 90-90-90 global goals (90% of those with HIV diagnosed, 90% of those
on ART, and 90% of those virally suppressed by 2020 (PEPFAR, 2017) ). Those
testing positive for HIV are then referred to receive ART through the clinic. CCWs
in the community then follow up with individuals initiating ART to promote ART
adherence on an ongoing basis. Because of the centrality of encouraging HIV testing
in the FCC program, it is the primary outcome of interest in this study.
During initial and subsequent home visits, CCWs undertake activities to increase
HIV testing rates via two mechanisms we will examine explicitly: improving infor-
mation and reducing stigma concerns. CCWs seek to improve FCC beneficiaries’
information related to HIV/AIDS, such as methods of disease transmission,
progression of the disease, treatment, HIV testing, and locations of health clinics
providing testing and treatment. Information is conveyed verbally and, at the LIP’s
discretion, on printed material given to the household. In addition, CCWs are ex-
pected to engage program beneficiaries in “sensitization” to address stigma related
to HIV (both one’s own stigmatizing attitudes, and fear of stigma from others).
CCWs engage in discussions to reduce stigmatizing attitudes among program ben-
eficiaries. CCWs provide psychosocial support (PSS) and gradually gain program
beneficiaries’ trust over time in repeated interactions, with the expectation that re-
ductions in fear of stigma will encourage people to be open to HIV testing, voluntarily
disclose HIV-positive status to CCWs, and be open to future CCW follow-up pro-
moting ART initiation and adherence.
In home visits, CCWs are also expected to give caregivers advice and encour-
agement regarding children’s education. Caregivers are encouraged to make sure
children go to school daily, have appropriate materials and uniforms, and have a place
to study at home without distractions. They are encouraged to be involved in their
children’s education, such as by establishing contact with a child’s teachers, main-
taining contacts with a child’s friends, and helping with homework. Caregivers are
also encouraged to discourage girls’ early marriage, and to keep girls in school even
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after the age of 18. Given the prominence of education advice and encouragement in
the home visit, child school attendance is a secondary outcome variable in the study.
The FCC program has a number of other components. Households are connected to
these other components after the home visits, based on needs assessments conducted
by CCWs. Many components are school-based, so children can also be included in
these components through their schools. In practice, very small shares of households
have participated in these other program components, so we believe they are likely
to contribute only a small part of the treatment effects we highlight in this paper.
2.3.3 Sample
The unit of analysis will be the household or individual, depending on the out-
come variable. Hypotheses related to HIV testing focus on household-level outcomes
because the intervention components related to HIV testing are delivered at the house-
hold level (not at the individual level). In addition, there is a correlation of attitudes
and testing within the household, so we can reasonably think of “household-level”
decision-making regarding HIV testing.
The sample was constructed as follows. We administered a baseline survey in
2017-18 to households in the 76 communities using random-route sampling, with
starting points at the focal school in each community. We then sought to survey these
“main list” households again in the 2019 endline survey. Given our staff and timing
constraints, we could only offer households the Randomization Stage 3 treatments
(described below) and HIV testing coupons if we were able to locate and survey them
in roughly the “regular round” of the endline survey in each community (roughly
the first week of surveying in each community). We were able to reach 80% of main
list households in this manner. To raise our sample size, we then supplemented this
set of households with a “back-up list” of households who were administered a short
screening survey in the baseline phase, until we reached a target of 60 households
in each community. These households from the back-up list were also offered HIV
testing coupons, and also enter our sample for analysis.
We later implemented an “intensive follow-up round” of the endline survey to
intensively track and survey the 20% of “main list” households who we were unable
to initially survey in the regular round. These households were found later, after we
had completed the Randomization Stage 3 treatments and the HIV testing coupon
redemption and tracking. Therefore, these households do not have the HIV testing
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outcome based on coupon redemption, and never received the Randomization Stage 3
treatments. These households are not included in the analysis sample in the current
paper.5 These households will be included in future papers that involve longer-term
follow-up of these households in subsequent survey rounds.
The sample is composed of 4,240 households, composed of 16,925 individuals, of
whom 11,751 are children (aged below 18) at the time of the endline survey.
2.3.4 Methodology: Random Assignment
This study aims to provide convincing estimates of causal and spillover effects of
the FCC program using a randomized controlled trial (RCT) methodology. Random
assignment allows estimated relationships to be interpreted as causal effects, rather
than simply correlations.
Our approach involves a three-stage randomized controlled trial methodology to
estimate causal direct and spillover effects of the FCC program, and to shed light on
some of the operative mechanisms through which it achieves its effects.
First, communities were randomly assigned to treatment or control status (inclu-
sion in or exclusion from the FCC program). Second, a subset of households within
treatment communities were randomly assigned to a strong encouragement to par-
ticipate in FCC programs ( “directly enrolled” households). These directly enrolled
households receive a home visit by an FCC program community worker and are as-
sessed for inclusion in various FCC subcomponent programs. This will leads them to
have higher participation rates in the program than other households in treatment
communities. Other households not randomly selected for direct enrollment end up
being treated as well, but at lower rates. These first two randomization components
were carried out in 2017, and led to varying household exposure to the FCC program
throughout 2018. They allow us to shed light on direct impacts, and to quantify
spillovers.
The third part of the randomized methodology is aimed at shedding light on the
extent to which the FCC program complements or substitutes for HIV information,
efforts to combat HIV-related stigma, and financial incentives for HIV testing. We are
interested in complementarity with information interventions focused on improving
information about HIV, improving information about HIV treatment (ART), and re-
5All other results we report in this paper (other than HIV testing based on coupon use, or
those related to the Randomization Stage 3 treatments) hold in an expanded sample that includes
households found in the second round of the endline survey.
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ducing concerns about HIV-related stigma. We are also interested in complementarity
with financial incentives for HIV testing. We randomly assign simple treatments at
the household level that our project staff administer immediately after the endline
survey. (These treatments are detailed below.) Complementarities could be posi-
tive or negative (the FCC program could magnify or reduce the impact of such later
more targeted interventions). If these treatments are found to have smaller effects on
directly-enrolled households in treatment communities than on households in control
communities, this would be evidence that the FCC program and these more targeted
interventions are substitutes. It is also possible that these treatments could be com-
plementary with the FCC program: they could have larger effects on directly-enrolled
households in treatment communities than on households in control communities.
Randomization Stage 1
The FCC program is a community-level intervention, so the first stage was random
selection of communities to receive or not receive the FCC program. FCC interven-
tions are centered in primary and secondary schools, so geographic areas of interest
are residential areas surrounding schools. (We refer to areas surrounding schools sim-
ply as “communities”, each of which has a “focal school” where school-based program
components are implemented.) World Education Inc./Bantwana consulted with local
implementing partners (LIPs) and government officials in the three provinces and
seven districts in which the FCC program was to be implemented to identify a set of
76 communities deemed to be “eligible” for the program. These communities were
chosen on the basis of being geographically proximate to ART sites (health clinics
offering HIV testing and treatment), having sufficient populations of orphans and
vulnerable children (OVCs), and having no other active donor-funded HIV/AIDS
programs. These 76 communities were then sorted into stratification cells of matched
community pairs, sets of two communities that were very similar in terms of distance
to ART sites, school type (secondary or primary), and student population size.
Within each matched pair, treatment status was randomly assigned to one com-
munity, with the other school assigned to control status. Randomization of treatment
status within matched pairs helps ensure balance in baseline characteristics between
treatment and control units, so that treatment-control comparisons can then be cred-
ibly interpreted as causal effects of the program. This random assignment was carried
out on the computer of one of the co-authors, one-time, with no re-randomization.
The result of the randomization was communicated to World Education/Bantwana
in November 2016. The FCC program was then implemented in treatment communi-
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ties, and not in control communities. School-based components of the program were
implemented in the focal school in each treatment community, and not in control
communities.
Randomization Stage 2
The second stage of randomization, at the household level, was implemented only
within treatment communities.
Of households originally contacted and consented by the study team, a subset were
randomly assigned to be “directly enrolled beneficiaries” (DEBs) of the FCC program:
their geographic coordinates and household head’s name and contact information
were provided to World Education/Bantwana and their local implementing partners
(LIPs). LIP staff (CCWs) then conducted household and individual assessments for
FCC program subcomponents. Analyses facilitated by this random assignment to
DEB status are outlined below.
Random assignment of households to direct FCC enrollment was carried out in
November and December 2017 on the computer of one of the co-authors, one time,
with no re-randomization. Out of the 40 OVC households administered the baseline
survey in each treatment community, 15 were randomly assigned to DEB status (so 25
baseline households in each treatment community have non-DEB status). In addition,
to enhance statistical power, we also randomly assigned DEB status to 20 households
who received a shorter Vulnerability Assessment (VA) survey but not the full baseline
survey in each treatment community.6 Therefore, a total of 35 households in each
treatment community received DEB status.
This stage of randomization had two motivations. First, it creates a subgroup of
households in treatment communities with relatively high take-up or participation
in the FCC program. Estimates of the impact of the FCC program comparing this
group to households in control communities, therefore, have higher statistical power.
We pursued this approach because of a fear of low statistical power for treatment
effect estimates based on generally comparing households in treatment and control
communities. The second motivation is to measure spillovers of impacts to other
households. Because DEBs were randomly selected, non-DEB households have ran-
dom geographic and social proximity to DEB households. This facilitates credible
measurement of spillovers from DEB to non-DEB households.
6This latter group of 20 households were also on the main list for surveying in the regular round in
treatment communities, as were a randomly-selected group of 20 (VA-only, no-baseline) households
in control communities for comparison purposes.
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Randomization Stage 3
To understand complementarities between the FCC program and more targeted
interventions, our research team provided additional treatments after the administra-
tion of the endline survey: HIV/AIDS information, HIV treatment (ART) informa-
tion, information to reduce stigma concerns, and higher financial incentives for HIV
testing.
Households participating in the regular round of the endline survey were randomly
assigned to one of the six groups described below, with equal probability. The treat-
ments were only administered to consenting survey respondents.
1) Anti-stigma: individual-specific information aimed at reducing the respon-
dent’s concerns about HIV-related stigma in the community.
2) HIV/AIDS Information: factual information about HIV/AIDS.
3) Antiretroviral Therapy (ART) Information: factual information about
ART.
4) Both HIV/AIDS and ART Information: the combination of items 2 and
3 above.
5) High incentive for HIV testing: each HIV testing coupon offered to the
household provides a financial incentive of 100 MZN (instead of 50 MZN for
everyone else).7
6) Control: None of the above treatments.
These treatments are randomly assigned on the computer of one of the co-authors
one time, with no re-randomization. The randomization is stratified by the commu-
nity, DEB status, and baseline asset level. The Randomization Stage 3 treatments
are independent of (orthogonal to) the Stage 1 and Stage 2 randomizations. The
sample sizes for each of the treatments are shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 presents the full cross-cutting set of treatments, indicating the number
of households per cell.
7The PPP conversion factor of the metical (MZN) is 20.62 in 2018. 50 MZN converts to 2.42 USD
and 100 MZN to 4.85 USD. As a comparison, the poverty headcount ratios at $1.90 (2011 dollar) a
day and $3.20 (2011 dollar) a day are 62.4% and 81.5% of the country’s population, respectively. The
poverty population in Mozambique roughly matches the sample from OVC households as defined
in this study, which takes up 71.6% of the general population in the study region. A coupon of
50 MZN can approximately cover the daily cost of living of a study participant. Data source: The
World Bank Data (https://data.worldbank.org).
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Table 2.1: Treatment Assignment and Sample Size
FCC Treatment FCC Control Total
Randomization Stage 3 Groups DEB Non-DEB
Anti-Stigma 192 201 377 770
HIV/AIDS Information 177 210 375 762
ART Information 209 192 381 782
HIV/AIDS, ART Info. Combined 145 145 286 576
High Testing Incentive 145 138 283 566
Control 200 200 384 784
Total 1,068 1,086 2,086 4,240
2.4 Hypotheses
We detailed our empirical analyses in a pre-analysis plan submitted to the Amer-
ican Economic Association’s RCT Registry (registration ID number AEARCTR-
0003990) on March 8, 2019, which was prior to the start of our endline survey field-
work.
2.4.1 Primary hypotheses
The primary question of interest in this study is: what are the direct effects of the
program on HIV testing in FCC beneficiary households?
We address this question by estimating the causal effect of a household being a
directly-enrolled beneficiary (DEB) of the FCC program, all of whom are in treatment
communities. In estimating this effect, all households in control communities will be
the control group. (Non-DEB households in treatment communities are the subject
of secondary analyses.)
Our primary analyses test whether household assignment to strong encouragement
for participation in the FCC program (which we refer to as directly-enrolled benefi-
ciary or “DEB” status) leads to higher rates of HIV testing in the household. HIV
testing is the outcome variable of primary focus because it is a prerequisite for bene-
fiting from the FCC program in the health domain.8 HIV testing opens the door to
FCC interventions promoting ART treatment initiation and adherence. In addition,
8Our primary outcome variables measure HIV testing for both adults and children. The health
of adults (in particular, their HIV status) is an important determinant of the outcomes of children
in their households; HIV testing can lead adults to learn they are HIV positive, leading them to
initiate ART, with positive effects on children in their households. When it comes to children (those
aged below 18), HIV testing is important as well, most importantly, after puberty and sexual debut
50
HIV testing is emphasized and encouraged in the context of major FCC program
components (OVC home visits by community workers, and school-based programs).
The more specialized and narrower program components (such as VSLAs and youth
groups) also systematically reinforce the importance of HIV testing.
The outcome variable of primary interest is HIV testing at the household level.
This will be a binary outcome indicating that the household either self-reports having
had or is directly observed by our survey staff having an HIV test upon our recom-
mendation. This outcome captures the combination of having already had an HIV
test, as well as responsiveness to recommendations for future testing, both of which
may be influenced by exposure to the FCC program.
To be specific, the component variables of this outcome variable are:
 HIV testing (self-reported): an indicator equal to 1 if at least one household
member is reported to have had an HIV test in the last 12 months, and 0
otherwise.
 HIV testing (directly observed): an indicator that at least one of a household’s
HIV testing coupons has been redeemed. This is a household-level variable
equal to 1 if at least one of a household’s incentive coupons is presented at
the local health clinic for the HIV testing incentive payment before the 14-day
deadline, and 0 otherwise.9
Our composite HIV testing outcome is therefore equal to 1 if HIV testing (self-
reported) is equal to 1 or HIV testing (directly observed) is equal to 1, and 0 otherwise.
Primary Hypothesis: Assignment of a household to DEB status raises rates of HIV
testing in households, compared to households in control communities.
2.4.2 Secondary Hypotheses
A number of secondary hypotheses are of interest, related to impacts on other
outcomes, mechanisms of impacts on DEBs, impacts on non-DEB households, and
spillovers from DEB to non-DEB households.
leads to non-trivial rates of new HIV infection. There are also much lower but nonzero rates of HIV
infection from mothers (or other household members) to younger children.
9The directly observed variable is coded as zero for households refusing any incentive coupons,
which is rare. Another rare case is households with no-one eligible for coupons because of everyone
having been tested within the last three months; in this case, the directly observed variable will
again be set to zero.
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First, we examine the two HIV testing variables separately, without combining
them into one composite outcome. These two outcomes are worth examining sepa-
rately, because they measure distinct things, and each has strengths and weaknesses.
HIV testing in the last 12 months is of greater research and policy interest, because
it is not financially incentivized and therefore is the “natural” context in which the
HIV testing decision is made. But this outcome measure has the downside that it is
self-reported, and may be subject to reporting biases; in particular, it is likely to be
overstated by households in the survey, particularly in treatment locations and for
DEB households. We therefore complement this measure with a directly-observed
measure: the redemption of the coupons incentivizing HIV testing. Because the take-
up of the coupons is directly observed, it has an important strength: it is immune
from survey-reporting biases. The downside of this measure is that the HIV tests
are financially incentivized, which departs from the general context of HIV testing.
We believe the financial incentive is necessary to ensure the respondents turn in the
coupons to our research staff at clinics (without submission of the coupons, there
would be no way to measure take-up of testing).
We pre-specified secondary outcomes and hypotheses related to the impact of DEB
status on other outcome variables. The secondary hypotheses are that assignment of
a household to DEB status:
 raises rates of school attendance among children in the household.
 raises life satisfaction, household assets, and ART adherence rates.
 raises HIV-related knowledge, reduces HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes, in-
creases other positive attitudes towards HIV, and reduces rates of risky sexual
behavior.
We also pre-specified secondary outcomes and hypotheses related to the impact of
non-DEB status on the same set of outcome variables for the DEB hypotheses. These
hypotheses are that households assigned to non-DEB status will have:
 higher rates of HIV testing
 higher rates of HIV testing, as measured by separately by the self-reported and
directly observed outcome variables
 higher rates of school attendance among children
 higher life satisfaction, household asset indices, and ART adherence rates
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 HIV-related knowledge, lower HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes, higher rates
of other positive HIV-related attitudes, and lower rates of risky sexual behavior
We also have secondary hypotheses related to spillovers from DEB to non-DEB
households in treatment communities. Given that not all households in a community
directly benefit from the program, to what extent do impacts spill over from directly-
affected households to others that are geographically or socially proximate? One
key channel through which spillovers may occur is information: DEBs may share
information with proximate non-DEBs. In addition, stigma may be a key mechanism,
if reduced stigma by DEBs leads non-DEBs in proximity to them to be more willing
to take up HIV testing. Other channels are possible.10 The outcome of interest for
this analysis is the composite measure of HIV testing. Right-hand-side variables of
interest are measures of social and geographic proximity to DEBs. We define and
discuss these proximity measures when we discuss the spillover analyses below.
The secondary hypotheses also include those related to the Randomization Stage
3 treatments. For these treatments, the outcome of interest is the directly-observed
measure of HIV testing (incentive coupon redemption) at the household level, as
described above. (This is the only outcome measure that is observed after the endline
survey.)
We will estimate the causal impacts of the Randomization Stage 3 treatments on
HIV testing, and the extent to which their effects vary according to a household’s
treatment status (DEB, non-DEB, and control). If these treatments have less impact
on HIV testing for treated than in control households, we will take this as evidence the
FCC program and these more targeted treatments are substitutes. Complementarity,
on the other hand, would be revealed if these targeted treatments have larger impact
for treated than control households. We also examine whether the effects of the
Randomization Stage 3 treatments on HIV testing differ for non-DEB households in
treatment communities, compared to households in control communities.
2.5 Empirical Analyses
We test hypotheses using ordinary-least-squares regression analyses. We cluster
standard errors at the level of 76 communities (Moulton, 1986).
10These other channels include health channels, such as via contagion, or financial channels, if
DEBs benefit financially from the program and transfer resources to non-DEBs.
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To estimate the impact of directly-enrolled beneficiary (DEB) and non-DEB status,
the regression equation will be as follows:
Yijs = α + βBijs + λNijs + γs + ijs. (2.1)
Yijs is the post-treatment outcome for individual or household i in community j in
stratification cell (matched pair) s. Bijs is the indicator for a household being ran-
domly assigned to directly-enrolled beneficiary (DEB) status (1 if DEB, and 0 if not),
while Nijs is the indicator for a household being randomly assigned to non-directly-
enrolled beneficiary (non-DEB) status in a treatment community (1 if non-DEB, and
0 if not). (Both variables are equal to zero for anyone in a control community. In
other words, Bijs and Nijs simply partition households in treatment communities into
two mutually exclusive subgroups.) γs is a fixed effect for stratification cell s.
11 ijs
is a mean-zero error term.
The coefficient β is the intent to treat (ITT) effect of assignment to DEB status
(high probability of home visit by a CCW), while the coefficient λ is the correspond-
ing effect of assignment to non-DEB status (receiving a CCW home visit at the lower
ambient rate in the community). Random assignment of DEB status allows interpre-
tations of these coefficients as causal effects.
This regression will be used to test hypotheses related to the impact of random
assignment to DEB status and non-DEB status within treatment communities. Hy-
pothesis tests regarding the impact of DEB status will refer to coefficient β in this
regression for the relevant outcome variable. Hypothesis tests regarding the impact of
non-DEB status will refer to coefficient λ in this regression for the relevant outcome
variable.
2.5.1 Effects of DEB and Non-DEB Status
2.5.1.1 Balance and Attrition
It is important to confirm the balance of baseline variables with respect to treat-
ment assignment. We examine eleven variables that were collected in the base-
line survey round (in 2017-18). These are dependent variables in estimation of
11The inclusion of the stratification cell fixed effects reduces standard errors by absorbing residual
variation. Stratification is at the level of 38 matched pairs of communities within which treatment
status was randomly assigned (so stratification cell fixed effects are equivalent to matched pair fixed
effects).
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Equation (2.1). We report the results in Table 2.2. None of the coefficients on the
DEB coefficient are large or statistically significant at conventional levels. Among
the non-DEB coefficients, only one is statistically significant at conventional levels
(the one in the regression for having a ratio of children to adults greater than four).
This share of significant coefficients is about what one would expect to see by chance.
These results provide no indication of a substantial imbalance in baseline household
characteristics across treatment conditions.
Table 2.2: Balance of Baseline Household Characteristics
Vulnerability Indicators
Control
Group
Mean
Coef.
on
DEB
Coef.
on
Non-
DEB
Coef
on
Treat-
ment
p-value of
test: DEB
=
nonDEB
A grandparent of children is the .304 -.00187 -.0205 -.0113 .313
household head (.0156) (.0149) (.0121)
Ratio of children to adults >= 4 .0709 .0180 .0309** .0245* .265
(.0134) (.0138) (.0123)
There are school-aged children .305 .0227 .0171 .0199 .807
that are not in school (.0189) (.0177) (.0143)
Household eat less than 2 meals .0134 -.00125 3.74e-5 -.0006 .745
a day (.00362) (.00369) (.00308)
Household go some days without .597 .0253 .0193 .0223 .785
food (.0277) (.0230) (.0230)
Primary income source illegal or .0221 -.00706 .00325 -.00186 .0430
no source of income (.00596) (.00552) (.00520)
There are chronically ill .226 -.00452 .00524 .000396 .524
household members (.0195) (.0190) (.0177)
There are HIV positive household .157 -.00734 -.0100 -.00869 .824
members (.0147) (.0159) (.0141)
There are household members on .118 .0112 .00710 .00915 .732
ART medications (.0135) (.0131) (.0119)
There are orphaned children .270 .0116 .0317 .0217 .271
(.0197) (.0211) (.0183)
There were adults died of chronic .0911 .000996 .00823 .00464 .479
illness in the last 5 years (.0105) (.00988) (.00884)
Notes:Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. All
regressions control for matched-pair fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Number of
observations = 4,240.
Another key question is whether success in locating households from the main list
in the regular round of the endline survey (which determines inclusion in the analysis
sample) is affected by treatment status. If so, this raises concerns about selection
bias due to differential attrition. We examine this by regressing an indicator variable
55
for being surveyed in the regular round on treatment indicators and stratification cell
(matched pair) fixed effects. The results are in Table 2.3. The mean of the depen-
dent variable in the control communities is 0.799. The coefficient on the indicator
for being a directly-enrolled beneficiary (DEB) of the FCC program is very small in
magnitude and not statistically significantly different from zero at conventional levels.
The coefficient on non-DEB status is positive and modest in size (0.033), and sta-
tistically significant, indicating that non-DEB households in treatment communities
are slightly more likely to have been successfully surveyed in the regular round of the
endline survey.
Table 2.3: Main list Attrition Analysis
Group Indicators
Surveyed in the regular
follow-up
DEB -0.00500
(0.0121)
Non-DEB 0.0329**
(0.0138)
Observations 4,546
R-squared 0.061
Control Group Mean 0.799
p-value of test DEB = nonDEB 0.0170
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. All
regressions control for matched-pair fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
These results indicate no concern with selection bias for our pre-specified primary
coefficient of interest, on DEB status, since DEB status is not associated with attri-
tion. They do raise the possibility of selection bias due to differentially lower attrition
related to non-DEB status. This should be kept in mind when interpreting coeffi-
cients on non-DEB status.12 (Note that we pre-specified that the treatment effect of
non-DEB status is only of secondary interest in the analysis.)
2.5.1.2 “First Stage” Impacts on Contacts with FCC Program
As a starting point for understanding any treatment effects to come, it is useful to
examine impacts on outcomes measuring knowledge of, contact with, and services pro-
12That said, we do not find evidence of major worries related to the selectivity of the non-DEB
households. Controlling for a full set of baseline variables does not have an appreciable effect on the
non-DEB coefficients in our analyses, providing no evidence of concerns about selection bias in the
non-DEB coefficient estimates.
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vided by the FCC local implementing partner (LIP) organization. While we are not
conducting instrumental variables (IV) estimation, these could be considered “first
stage” outcomes, confirm and measure the extent to which the FCC program reached
the intended beneficiaries. These outcomes come from the endline survey, reported by
the primary household respondent. We examine an indicator for a household having
heard of the LIP, an indicator for a household having been visited by a Case Care
Worker (CCW) of the LIP, and an indicator for a household having been referred
to or received any services from the LIP. The indicator is constructed from several
survey questions asking about services received from non-government organizations
(NGOs), and which organization provided these services.
Regression results from estimation of Equation (2.1) for these first stage outcomes
are in Table 2.4. Being a DEB leads to higher rates of having heard of, been contacted
by, or received services referred by the LIP. Non-DEB status also has positive effects
on these outcomes, indicating that LIPs also reached households in the community in
general. All coefficients on DEB and non-DEB status are all statistically significant
at the 1% level.
DEBs did have higher rates of contact with the FCC program than non-DEBs. For
each outcome, coefficients on DEB status larger in magnitude than the corresponding
coefficient for non-DEBs. For the “contacted by” and “referred service” regressions,
the difference between the DEB and non-DEB coefficients is statistically significantly
different from zero at conventional levels (p-values 0.082 and 0.006, respectively, re-
ported in the bottom row of the table.)
These results indicate that the FCC program did differentially reach households
in treatment communities than in control communities, and DEBs more than non-
DEBs in treatment communities.13 That said, the contact and referral rates for
DEBs are lower than we expected in advance. WEI/Bantwana reports (based on
data collected from LIPs) that 77.0% of households assigned to DEB status were
successfully administered a home visit by a CCW.
By contrast, our estimates imply that only 12.3% of DEBs were contacted by LIPs,
and only 19.2% were referred to any service by LIPs. These findings potentially shed
a negative light on the accuracy of WEI/Bantwana’s reports about Randomization
Stage 2 implementation. It is also possible that households are underreporting the
13Note each of the outcome variables have means that are nonzero in control communities. This
is to be expected, because LIPs tend to be well-established organizations and have other activities
separate from those they are contracted to undertake as part of the FCC program.
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Table 2.4: “First Stage” Impacts on Contacts with FCC Program
(1) (2) (3)
Group Indicators Heard of LIP
Contacted by
LIP
Referred
service by LIP
Panel A
DEB 0.132*** 0.0676*** 0.102***
(0.0254) (0.0115) (0.0197)
Non-DEB 0.108*** 0.0430*** 0.0709***
(0.0253) (0.0112) (0.0179)
R-squared 0.120 0.068 0.089
Panel B
Treatment 0.120*** 0.0552*** 0.0863***
(0.0233) (0.00896) (0.0180)
R-squared 0.120 0.067 0.088
Observations 4,240 4,240 4,240
Control Group Mean 0.488 0.0551 0.0916
p-value of test DEB =
nonDEB 0.231 0.0820 0.00600
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. All
regressions control for matched-pair fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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extent to which they had interactions with LIPs, perhaps because LIPs interacted with
a different household member than the survey respondent, the survey respondent has
forgotten the interaction with the LIPs, or the survey respondent did not correctly
report that the identity of the organization with which the household had a contact
or referral.
Whatever the reason for the lower-than-expected rates of interaction with the FCC
program, these low rates may be one reason why treatment effects on other outcomes
reported below are relatively modest in size. On the other hand, any treatment
effects that we do find should be interpreted as lower bounds on the effect of an
FCC-like program if it were to be implemented with higher rates of penetration into
the population.
2.5.1.3 Primary Analysis
We now turn to tests of the primary hypotheses of the paper: impacts on HIV
testing. Results are presented in Table 2.5.
The coefficient on the pre-specified primary outcome of interest, the composite
HIV testing measure (Column 1) is positive, but modest in size and not statistically
significantly different from zero at conventional levels. The point estimate indicates
a 2.2 percentage point increase in testing rates, relative to the 72.3% rate in control
communities.
Coefficients on the pre-specified secondary outcomes, the HIV testing measures
considered separately, are also small in magnitude and not statistically significantly
different from zero at conventional levels. The point estimate on the HIV test
self-report (Column 2) is positive and similar in magnitude to the coefficient in
Column (1). The point estimate on the HIV test based on coupon use (Column 3) is
actually negative in sign.
By contrast, the coefficients on the non-DEB indicator (pre-specified as of sec-
ondary interest) in the three columns are all positive in magnitude, in magnitudes
indicating 2.4-3.9 percentage point increases in testing rates. The non-DEB coef-
ficients are actually statistically significant at the 10% level in Column (1)-(2). In
Column (3), the non-DEB coefficient is statistically significantly different from the
coefficient on the DEB indicator (p-value 0.010, reported in the bottom row of the
table).
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Table 2.5: FCC Impacts on HIV Testing
(1) (2) (3)
Group Indicators HIV test
HIV test:
self-report
HIV test:
coupon use
Panel A
DEB 0.0221 0.0245 -0.0218
(0.0196) (0.0242) (0.0179)
Non-DEB 0.0350* 0.0386* 0.0243
(0.0185) (0.0225) (0.0183)
R-squared 0.033 0.033 0.057
Panel B
Treatment 0.0286* 0.0316 0.00139
(0.0169) (0.0216) (0.0158)
R-squared 0.033 0.033 0.056
Observations 4,179 4,179 4,240
Control Group Mean 0.723 0.626 0.264
p-value of test DEB =
nonDEB 0.466 0.434 0.0100
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. All
regressions control for matched-pair fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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It is additionally informative to compare our treatment effect estimate to expert
predictions elicited in advance. Prior to our results being known, in DellaVigna,
Otis and Vivalt (2020) collected from subject-matter experts their forecasts of the
treatment effect of being assigned to DEB status in a treatment community on the
12-month self-report of HIV testing.14 The mean expert prediction was 11.36 per-
centage points. Our actual treatment effect, 2.45 percentage points (Column 2), is
substantially below the expert prediction: it is only 21.6% as large in magnitude, and
a Wald test rejects the hypothesis of equality of two at conventional levels (p-value
0.0004).
In our pre-analysis plan, we stated that if results on HIV testing differed between
the self-reported (Column 2) and directly-observed (Column 3) measures of HIV test-
ing, we will base substantive conclusions and policy recommendations on the findings
that use the directly-observed outcome. Prioritizing the result in Column (3) pro-
vides an even more pessimistic assessment of the performance of the FCC program
in promoting HIV testing.
The modest size of the effect of DEB status, and the fact that non-DEB status may
if anything actually have more positive effects on HIV testing, are a first indication
that the FCC program appears to be having unintended consequences. To explore
what these unintended consequences might be, we now turn to additional empirical
estimates, which will be a combination of pre-specified secondary analyses as well as
exploratory (not pre-specified) analyses.
2.5.1.4 Secondary Analyses
Potential mechanisms behind HIV testing results
In Table 2.6 we examine impacts on hypothesized mechanisms behind the impacts
on HIV testing: information, stigmatizing attitudes, and safe sexual behavior. DEB
status has no large impact on the index of HIV knowledge, other positive HIV at-
titudes, or the safe sex behavior index. By contrast, the coefficient on the DEB
indicator is negative in the regression for the HIV stigma attitudes index and for the
number of sex partners in the last 12 months.
14DellaVigna, Otis and Vivalt (2020) elicited predictions from 73 experts, mostly in December
2019. The online survey eliciting predictions closed on January 3, 2020. This process was completely
arms-length from us. We proposed five names of potential expert forecasters to DellaVigna et al,
but had no knowledge of the identities of the ultimate set of expert forecasters.
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Table 2.6: FCC Impacts on Knowledge, Stigma, and Sexual Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Group Indicators
HIV
knowledge
index
HIV stig-
matizing
attitudes
index
HIV other
positive
attitudes
index
Safe sex
behavior
index
# of sex
partners
last 12
months
Panel A
DEB -0.00562 -0.0123** -0.00700 0.00521 -0.0969***
(0.00842) (0.00519) (0.0168) (0.00604) (0.0308)
Non-DEB -0.00359 -0.00634 -0.0126 0.00334 -0.0984***
(0.00876) (0.00590) (0.0164) (0.00605) (0.0335)
R-squared 0.062 0.026 0.066 0.080 0.011
Panel B
Treatment -0.00459 -0.00924* -0.00986 0.00427 -0.0977***
(0.00753) (0.00488) (0.0148) (0.00529) (0.0283)
R-squared 0.062 0.026 0.066 0.080 0.011
Observations 4,584 4,450 4,536 4,577 4,517
Control Group
Mean
0.756 0.744 0.537 0.669 1.115
p-value of test DEB
= nonDEB
0.807 0.274 0.713 0.750 0.961
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. All
regressions control for matched-pair fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Given these results, in exploratory analyses, we examine subcomponents of the
HIV knowledge and stigma indices to get a more detailed sense of what may be driv-
ing these findings. We first examine the HIV information questions in greater detail.
We divide the 33 questions into thematic subgroups and create sub-indices in a way
analogous to the overall knowledge index. We report the regression results for treat-
ment impacts on these sub-indices in Table 2.7. Underlying the lack of impact of the
DEB status on the overall knowledge index, the impact on sub-indices is positive in
some cases and negative in others. This can be described as a mixed set of impacts
on knowledge. What is striking, however, is the negative impact on the index of
“transmission myths”. These are questions about whether HIV can be transmitted
in certain ways, all of which are not transmission channels (in other words, correct
answers to these questions are always “no”): mosquito bites, shaking hands, kissing,
sharing food, or witchcraft. This impact on the transmission myths index is negative
(meaning an increase in false beliefs that these are in fact transmission channels),
and is statistically significant at the 10% level. In regressions that are not shown
(but available on request), we have run regressions on the individual questions com-
prising the index. We find that DEB status leads to higher rates of incorrect beliefs
about each of these false transmission channels, and that the impact is statistically
significantly different from zero for shaking hands, sharing food, and witchcraft.
We also examine the four separate components of the HIV stigma index as outcome
variables, to see what responses are driving the change in stigmatizing attitudes. We
report the regression results in Table 2.8. While none of the coefficients on DEB are
statistically significantly different from zero on their own, the coefficient on DEB in
the regression for “would not keep it a secret if a family member had HIV” is negative
and the largest in magnitude in the table, and is statistically significantly different
from the (slightly) positive coefficient on non-DEB status in the same regression.
This is suggestive evidence, indicating that the increase in stigmatizing attitudes
associated with DEB status is driven by increased reported desires to keep a family
member’s HIV-positive status secret.
In the context of our conceptual framework, we view these results as revealing
reasons why the FCC program had such modest impacts on testing: worsened knowl-
edge about transmission methods could have increased stigmatizing attitudes, and
the increase in stigmatizing attitudes had a negative impact on testing rates.
Other secondary outcomes
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Table 2.7: FCC Impacts on HIV-related Knowledge
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Group Indicators
General
HIV
knowledge
Correct
ways of
transmis-
sion
Transmission
myth
Protection
methods
Knowledge
about the
treatment
for HIV
Panel A
DEB -0.00401 -0.00787 -0.0292* 0.00170 0.00182
(0.0100) (0.0134) (0.0148) (0.00908) (0.00997)
Non-DEB -0.00176 -0.0137 -0.0311* -0.00147 0.0142
(0.00940) (0.0126) (0.0162) (0.00878) (0.00964)
R-squared 0.051 0.038 0.068 0.054 0.065
Panel B
Treatment -0.00287 -0.0108 -0.0302** 8.77e-05 0.00813
(0.00896) (0.0112) (0.0139) (0.00743) (0.00883)
R-squared 0.051 0.038 0.068 0.054 0.064
Observations 4,584 4,584 4,584 4,584 4,584
Control Group
Mean
0.621 0.831 0.749 0.821 0.772
p-value of test DEB
= nonDEB
0.765 0.655 0.893 0.750 0.143
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. All
regressions control for matched-pair fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: FCC Impacts on HIV-Related Stigmatizing Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Group Indicators
Would buy
fresh food
from
PLHIV
Would
NOT keep
secret if
family
member
HIV+
Would
take care
of family
sick with
AIDS
Would
allow
HIV+
teachers at
school
Panel A
DEB -0.0136 -0.0233 -0.00424 -0.00365
(0.0101) (0.0192) (0.00311) (0.00636)
Non-DEB -0.0227** 0.00945 -0.00217 0.000589
(0.0113) (0.0183) (0.00268) (0.00513)
R-squared 0.040 0.048 0.015 0.027
Panel B
Treatment -0.0182** -0.00662 -0.00318 -0.00149
(0.00834) (0.0174) (0.00201) (0.00454)
R-squared 0.040 0.047 0.015 0.027
Observations 4,374 4,397 4,425 4,358
Control Group Mean 0.857 0.162 0.993 0.965
p-value of test DEB = nonDEB 0.500 0.0258 0.622 0.552
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. All
regressions control for matched-pair fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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We now examine the impact of DEB and non-DEB status on other pre-specified
secondary outcomes. In Table 2.9 the outcome variables are related to schooling,
and in Table 2.10 we examine assets, life satisfaction, and ART adherence using
Equation (2.1). For none of these outcomes does DEB status have a positive effect
that is large in magnitude or statistically significantly different from zero at conven-
tional levels. The same holds true for non-DEB status. In the regression for the asset
index, the coefficient on both DEB and non-DEB status is actually negative in sign
and statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
Table 2.9: FCC Impacts on Educational Outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
Group Indicators
At school:
household
reported
At school:
observed
registered
At school:
observed
attend
Panel A
DEB -0.0161 -0.0167 -0.0160
(0.00984) (0.0241) (0.0518)
Non-DEB 0.00887 0.000199 0.00437
(0.0103) (0.0221) (0.0385)
R-squared 0.034 0.043 0.043
Panel B
Treatment -0.00325 -0.00602 -0.00404
(0.00846) (0.0207) (0.0373)
R-squared 0.034 0.043 0.043
Observations 10,094 4,351 1,526
Control Group Mean 0.864 0.429 0.316
p-value of test DEB = nonDEB 0.0280 0.410 0.681
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. All
regressions control for matched-pair fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.5.2 Spillovers from DEB to non-DEB households
We are also interested in spillovers from direct beneficiary households (DEBs) to
non-direct beneficiaries (non-DEBs). One key channel through which spillovers may
occur is information: DEBs may share information with proximate non-DEBs. In
addition, stigma may be a key mechanism, if reduced stigma by DEBs leads non-
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Table 2.10: FCC Impacts on Assets, Life Satisfaction, and ART Adherence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Group Indicators
Asset
Index
Life satis-
faction
ladder
0-10 On ART
High
adherence
of ART
meds
Panel A
DEB -0.169* 0.0356 0.00503 -0.0103
(0.0988) (0.169) (0.0195) (0.0274)
Non-DEB -0.157* 0.256 0.0162 0.0208
(0.0856) (0.175) (0.0214) (0.0334)
R-squared 0.206 0.094 0.046 0.080
Panel B
Treatment -0.163* 0.148 0.0103 0.00443
(0.0872) (0.166) (0.0150) (0.0224)
R-squared 0.206 0.093 0.045 0.079
Observations 4,240 4,575 768 736
Sample Households Adults HIV+ HIV+
Control Group Mean 0.621 4.623 0.940 0.789
p-value of test DEB = nonDEB 0.845 0.0257 0.689 0.446
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the community
level. All regressions control for matched-pair fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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DEBs in proximity to them to be more willing to take up HIV testing. This analysis
seeks evidence of spillovers via geographic proximity and social network ties.
Building on Equation (2.1), we will use the following equations to estimate spillovers,
separately for social and geographic proximity:
Yijs = α + δBijs + σNijs
+ νEnrollSijs
+ ωSijs
+ γs + ijs,
(2a)
Yijs = α + δBijs + σNijs
+ µEnrollDist1ijs + ζEnrollDist2ijs
+ κDist1ijs + λDist2ijs
+ γs + ijs.
(2b)
Compared to regression Equation (2.1), regression equations (2a) and (2b) add es-
timates of spillover impacts on households of being socially and geographically proxi-
mate to other households that were directly enrolled in the FCC program. EnrollSijs
is a measure of the extent to which members of one’s social network were randomly
assigned to direct program enrollment.15 EnrollDist1ijs is the number of directly-
enrolled beneficiaries within a “close” radius of household i, while EnrollDist2ijs is
similar but for direct beneficiaries in an “intermediate” distance.16
In each of these regression specifications, it is also important to control for variables
representing the household’s general social connectedness and geographic proximity to
other surveyed households, because we would expect that households with larger social
networks or in more densely-populated neighborhoods to have more directly-enrolled
individuals in their social networks or in geographic proximity. Failing to control
for such variables would lead to biased estimates of the coefficients on EnrollSijs in
Equation (2a), and on EnrollDist1ijs, and EnrollDist2ijs in Equation (2b). There-
15The number of social network members enrolled as direct beneficiaries is typically in the single
digits. We specify this variable simply as the count (number) of social network members enrolled as
direct beneficiaries. In the analysis sample, the number of social network members who are DEBs
has mean 0.260 and standard deviation 0.781.
16The definition of “close” and “intermediate” distances are as follows, with mean and standard
deviation of the number of DEBs: close 0-200 meters (mean 2.08, std.dev. 3.17), intermediate
200-500 meters (mean 6.37, std. dev. 7.41). “Far” distance would be the excluded or reference
category.
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fore, in Equation (2a), we control for Sijs, a measure of the extent to which members
of one’s social network are included in the survey sample. In Equation (2b), we
control for Dist1ijs (the number of surveyed households within a “close” radius of
household i) and Dist2ijs (similar but for surveyed households in an “intermediate”
distance).
In equations (2a) and (2b), the coefficients on EnrollSijs, EnrollDist1ijs, and
EnrollDist2ijs quantify particular types of spillover effects. The coefficient EnrollSijs
isolates spillovers that operate through social network connections. It represents the
impact of having additional social network members randomly assigned as DEBs.
Spillovers operating via geographic proximity are revealed in the coefficients on
the interaction terms with the EnrollDist1ijs and EnrollDist2ijs variables.
17 The
coefficient µ on EnrollDist1ijs is the impact of having more geographically close indi-
viduals randomly assigned as DEBs. We would expect this coefficient to be larger in
magnitude than the coefficients ζ the term corresponding to “intermediate” distance.
These spillover coefficients are all credibly interpreted as causal effects. Because di-
rect enrollment in FCC is randomly assigned, the extent to which households have
directly-enrolled households in their social network or geographically proximate is
also random.18
Hypothesis tests regarding spillovers from DEB to non-DEB households refer to
coefficients ν, µ, and ζ in these regressions for the relevant outcome variable.
Regression results from the estimation of equations (2a) and (2b) are presented in
Table 2.11. None of the coefficients representing spillovers (on the variables “Number
of DEBs in Social Network”, “Number of DEBs within 0-200 meters”, and “Number
of DEBs within 200-500 meters”) are large in magnitude or statistically significantly
different from zero. These results provide no indication of substantial spillovers be-
tween DEB and non-DEB households leading to differences in HIV testing.
17Measuring geographic spillovers in this manner corresponds to the widely-emulated method used
in Miguel and Kremer (2004) to capture health spillovers of deworming in Kenya.
18It is reasonable to presume that spillover effects differ between households who themselves were
and were not randomly assigned to direct FCC enrollment. In particular, we might expect spillover
impacts to be larger for households not directly enrolled. We will also investigate such heterogeneity
in the magnitude of spillovers. In exploratory analyses, we would estimate regression specifications
that add interaction terms with the EnrollSijs, EnrollDist1ijs and EnrollDist2ijs variables, on the
one hand, with the indicators Bijs and Nijs on the other. A comparison of corresponding coefficients
on the Bijs and Nijs interaction terms would reveal whether spillovers had a greater impact among
the directly-enrolled compared to the non-directly-enrolled.
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Table 2.11: The Spillover of FCC Impacts on HIV Testing
(1) (2) (3)
Variables HIV test
HIV test:
self-report
HIV test:
coupon use
Panel A
DEB 0.0224 0.00709 -0.0359
(0.0283) (0.0346) (0.0356)
Non-DEB 0.0478 0.0297 0.0364
(0.0302) (0.0348) (0.0302)
# of DEBs in Social Network 0.00330 0.00774 -0.0292
(0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0177)
# of OVC HHs in Social Network 0.00273 0.00147 0.00869*
(0.00536) (0.00575) (0.00454)
Observations 1,424 1,424 1,444
R-squared 0.051 0.050 0.072
Control Group Mean 0.723 0.630 0.280
p-value of test DEB =
nonDEB 0.412 0.535 0.0150
Panel B
DEB 0.0247 0.0336 -0.0337
(0.0262) (0.0308) (0.0309)
Non-DEB 0.0363 0.0466 0.0106
(0.0276) (0.0328) (0.0320)
# of DEBs in 0-200 meters -0.00205 -0.00288 0.00438
(0.00398) (0.00454) (0.00345)
# of DEBs in 200-500 meters 0.000515 8.96e-05 -0.000496
(0.00211) (0.00247) (0.00245)
# of OVC HHs in 0-200 meters 0.00155 0.00100 0.000532
(0.00107) (0.00127) (0.00127)
# of OVC HHs in 200-500 meters 0.000453 0.000951 0.000614
(0.000565) (0.000748) (0.000677)
Observations 4,179 4,179 4,240
R-squared 0.034 0.035 0.059
Control Group Mean 0.723 0.626 0.264
p-value of test DEB = nonDEB 0.509 0.471 0.0140
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the community
level. All regressions control for matched-pair fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
70
2.5.3 Randomization Stage 3 Treatments
The purpose of the Randomization Stage 3 treatments is to understand the com-
plementarity between the FCC program, on the one hand, and future public health
information interventions and HIV testing incentives, on the other. They also help
reveal the potential mechanisms behind our primary results above. That said, the
main effect of the Randomization Stage 3 treatments themselves is also of interest.
The main effect of these treatments is estimated using the following modification
of Equation (2.1):
Yijs = α + βBijs + λNijs
+ ρInfoHIV ijs + τInfoART ijs + θInfoHIV/ART ijs
+ piAnti-Stigma ijs + ψHighTestPayment ijs
+ γs + ijs.
(3)
Yijs is the post-treatment outcome for household i in community j in stratification
cell (matched pair) s. The outcome variable for this analysis is the objective (coupon-
redemption-based) measure of household HIV testing. Bijs, Nijs, γs, and ijs are as
in previous regressions.
InfoHIV ijs is an indicator equal to one if a household was randomly assigned to
receiving the treatment providing information on HIV/AIDS, and zero otherwise.
InfoART ijs and Anti-Stigma ijs are defined similarly, but for the randomly-assigned
ART information and anti-stigma treatments, respectively. InfoART ijs is the indica-
tor for receiving both the HIV and ART information treatments. HighTestPayment ijs
is an indicator for being offered the higher-value coupon for receiving an HIV test.
The coefficients ρ, τ , θ, pi, and ψ are the intent to treat (ITT) effects of household
assignment to the corresponding treatment. These can be interpreted as causal effects
because each is randomly assigned.
The hypothesis tests regarding the impact of the Randomization Stage 3 treat-
ments refer to coefficients ρ, τ , θ, pi, and ψ in this regression.
Analyses of complementarity between the FCC program and the more targeted
Randomization Stage 3 treatments are conducted using the following regression equa-
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tion, which is a modification of Equation (3):
Yijs = α + βBijs + λNijs
+ ρInfoHIV ijs + τInfoART ijs + θInfoHIV/ART ijs
+ piAnti-Stigma ijs + ψHighTestPayment ijs
+ δBijs × InfoHIV ijs +$Bijs × InfoART ijs + ξBijs × InfoHIV/ART ijs
+ ωBijs × Anti-Stigma ijs + µBijs × HighTestPayment ijs
+ σNijs × InfoHIV ijs + φNijs × InfoART ijs + ηNijs × InfoHIV/ART ijs
+ υNijs × Anti-Stigma ijs + νNijs × HighTestPayment ijs
+ γs + ijs.
(4)
This regression is similar to Equation (3), but adds interaction terms between Bijs
and each of the Randomization Stage 3 treatments, as well as interaction terms be-
tween Nijs and each of the Randomization Stage 3 treatments. These interaction
terms reveal whether the effects of the Randomization Stage 3 treatments differ for
DEB and non-DEB households, compared to the effect in control communities. Be-
cause of the inclusion of these interaction terms, the coefficients ρ, τ , θ, pi, and psi
represent the difference between the ITT effects of assignment to the treatments for
households in control communities.
The coefficients δ, $, ξ, ω, and µ represent the difference in the ITT effect of
the Randomization Stage 3 treatments for DEB households, compared to the effect
for households in control communities. The hypothesis tests regarding how impacts
of the Randomization Stage 3 treatments differ for DEB households refer to these
coefficients.
The coefficients σ, φ, η, υ, and ν represent the difference in the ITT effect of the
Randomization Stage 3 treatments for non-DEB households, compared to the effect
for households in control communities. The hypothesis tests regarding how impacts
of the Randomization Stage 3 treatments differ for non-DEB households refer to these
coefficients.
Results from estimating equations (3) and (4) are in Table 2.12. Estimation of the
average effects across the full sample (Equation (3), Column 1) reveals that only the
high-value coupon has an effect on HIV testing rates that is statistically significant
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at conventional levels. The effect amounts to 6.9 percentage points, on top of the
control group rate of 28.4%.
Estimation of differential effects of the Stage 3 treatments across DEB and non-
DEB treatment groups (Equation (4), Column 2) helps provide explanations for the
effects found in prior results tables. The coefficient on the DEB main effect (top row
of Column 2) represents the impact of DEB status for individuals who did not get
any of the Stage 3 treatments. The coefficient is negative, large in magnitude (10.7
percentage points), and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result reveals
that DEB status actually substantially reduces HIV testing rates.
Coefficients on the interaction terms between DEB status and the Stage 3 treat-
ments (row 9-13 of Column 2) indicate how the Stage 3 treatments modify the main
effect of DEB status. All of the interaction term coefficients are positive, and most are
large in magnitude and statistically significantly different from zero at conventional
levels. Providing HIV-related information, counteracting concerns about HIV-related
stigma, and providing higher financial incentives all make the impact of DEB status
on HIV testing more positive. These effects are comparable to the magnitude to that
of the main effect of DEB status; all these Stage 3 treatments therefore can be viewed
as counteracting the negative effect of DEB status on HIV testing. These effects are
also all similar in magnitude to the effect of providing additional financial incentives
(an additional 50 MZN) to get an HIV test.
The exception to this pattern is the coefficient on the interaction term with the
combined HIV and ART information treatment, which is much smaller in magnitude
and not statistically significantly different from zero at conventional levels. This is
somewhat hard to explain. It is possible that providing too much information to
respondents reduces the effectiveness of all information provided, perhaps by causing
lapses in respondents’ concentration or attention.
The main effects of the Stage 3 treatments in Column (2) (row 4-8) represent
impacts in control communities. All of these effects are negative, small in magnitude,
and not statistically significantly different from zero. The exception is the coefficient
on the anti-stigma treatment, which is significant at the 10% level. It is possible that
in control communities the anti-stigma treatment actually makes stigma concerns
more salient, making people more reticent about getting tested.
Coefficients on the interaction terms between non-DEB status and the Stage 3
treatments (the last rows of coefficients in Column 2) indicate how the Stage 3 treat-
ments modify the main effect of non-DEB status. Consistent with the non-DEB
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Table 2.12a: Randomization Stage 3 Treatment Effects - part 1
(1) (2)
Group Indicators HIV test: coupon use HIV test: coupon use
DEB -0.0217 -0.107***
(0.0179) (0.0381)
Non-DEB 0.0246 0.0155
(0.0181) (0.0424)
Anti-Stigma 0.00654 -0.0529*
(0.0202) (0.0269)
HIV Information -0.00113 -0.0326
(0.0220) (0.0304)
ART Information -0.0112 -0.0334
(0.0239) (0.0319)
High-Value Coupon 0.0693** 0.0304
(0.0272) (0.0443)
HIV and ART Information -0.0342 -0.0229
(0.0223) (0.0352)
DEB×Anti-Stigma 0.140***
(0.0472)
DEB×HIV Information 0.108**
(0.0515)
DEB×ART Information 0.131**
(0.0547)
DEB×High-Value Coupon 0.123**
(0.0588)
DEB×HIV and ART Information 0.000591
(0.0543)
Non-DEB×Anti-Stigma 0.0928*
(0.0478)
Non-DEB×HIV Information 0.0165
(0.0566)
Non-DEB×ART Information -0.0479
(0.0637)
Non-DEB×High-Value Coupon 0.0299
(0.0710)
Non-DEB×HIV and ART Information -0.0471
(0.0626)
Observations 4,240 4,240
R-squared 0.062 0.066
FCC and Stage3 Control Group Mean 0.284 0.284
74
Table 2.12b: Randomization Stage 3 Treatment Effects - part 2
(3) (4)
Group Indicators HIV test: coupon use HIV test: coupon use
Treatment 0.00165 -0.0458
(0.0157) (0.0344)
Anti-Stigma 0.00673 -0.0530*
(0.0202) (0.0269)
HIV Information -0.000151 -0.0326
(0.0220) (0.0304)
ART Information -0.0118 -0.0334
(0.0239) (0.0318)
High-Value Coupon 0.0691** 0.0304
(0.0272) (0.0443)
HIV and ART Information -0.0340 -0.0228
(0.0224) (0.0351)
Treatment×Anti-Stigma 0.117***
(0.0374)
Treatment×HIV Information 0.0636
(0.0432)
Treatment×ART Information 0.0424
(0.0478)
Treatment×High-Value Coupon 0.0761
(0.0538)
Treatment×HIV and ART Information -0.0235
(0.0451)
Observations 4,240 4,240
R-squared 0.060 0.063
FCC and Stage3 Control Group Mean 0.284 0.284
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. All
regressions control for matched-pair fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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treatment being less intensive than the DEB treatment, all of these interaction term
coefficients are closer to zero compared to the corresponding interaction terms with
the DEB treatment. Only one is statistically significantly different from zero: the
coefficient on the interaction term with the anti-stigma treatment, which is positive
and significant at the 10% level.
All told, we view the results from the analysis of the Stage 3 treatments as provid-
ing additional support for the interpretation of our prior results. The FCC program’s
modest effects on HIV testing are likely due to the unintended consequence that the
program led to increases in stigmatizing attitudes, and had no effect on HIV-related
information.
The pattern of impacts of Stage 3 treatments additionally bolster the idea that the
FCC program had important deficiencies in providing HIV information and in coun-
tering stigma concerns. The Stage 3 treatments providing HIV-related information
and countering concerns about HIV-related stigma make the impact of the FCC pro-
gram on HIV testing more positive. This positive effect is off a base of a substantial
negative impact of the program on testing among those who got none of the Stage 3
treatments.
2.6 Conclusion
We study the impacts of a widespread community health program on HIV testing
in Mozambique. We exploit a multilevel randomized treatment design to identify
causal effects. We find that the program Forc¸a a` Comunidade e Crianc¸as (FCC,
“Strengthening Communities and Children”) had only modest positive effects on HIV
testing rates. These effects are substantially smaller than the effects predicted in
advance by expert forecasters. Rich survey data on secondary outcomes, alongside
additional household-level treatments, helps shed light on underlying mechanisms.
These additional analyses suggest that the program’s modest impacts are due to the
fact that it led to misinformation about HIV, and worsened HIV-related stigmatizing
attitudes. Consistent with the increase in HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes, we
find that the treatment also leads to a variety of safer sexual behaviors, including a
reduction in the number of recent sexual partners.
Our interpretation that worsened information and stigma are behind the modest
impact of the FCC program on testing is bolstered by additional treatments we ad-
minister at the household level. These additional treatments providing HIV-related
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information and countering HIV-related stigma concerns make the treatment effects
of the FCC program on HIV testing rates more positive, suggesting that the FCC
program was deficient in these areas.
This study provides a rare glimpse into the impacts and mechanisms of a widespread
community-level program seeking to raise HIV testing. Our results point to a thus-far
neglected possibility: programs seeking to raise HIV testing may fail due to deficien-
cies in information delivery and in counteracting HIV-related stigma. Indeed, efforts
such as the FCC program may inadvertently worsen stigmatizing attitudes. From a
policy standpoint, it is important to know that PEPFAR programs may not currently
be delivering the gains in HIV testing as currently structured. Our results point to
deficiencies in the areas of HIV knowledge and HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes.
It is important to study what is going on with PEPFAR OVC programs in more
detail to get a better sense of what is leading to worsened information and worse
stigmatizing attitudes.
These results suggest priority directions for future research. A key question is what
exactly led the program to worsen HIV-related stigmatizing attitudes. It is possible
that the program led to misinformation about HIV on some dimensions that we do
not measure. This may be consistent with our finding that the FCC program led
people to have fewer sexual partners. The program may have magnified beliefs about
HIV’s negative consequences, leading them to safer sexual behavior, as well as more
stigmatizing attitudes. Another profitable area for future exploration is in ways to
better improve people’s knowledge about HIV. There are clearly better and worse
ways to improve knowledge, as evidenced by our own results: the FCC program did a
poor job of it, while our own simple post-survey treatments did have positive effects.
Future work should seek to pursue these and other related avenues for research.
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CHAPTER III
The Value of Political Connections for Firms the
Case of Government-Official Outside Directors in
China
3.1 Introduction
Political connections are special resources for firms across the world. They can
be obtained in various ways under different political institutions. In some firms, the
major shareholders have family ties to politicians in power; in others, people from
the management hold public positions themselves. Many firms can also build such
connections by supplying political contributions. Since the pioneering work of Fisman
(2001), researchers have been trying to determine and quantify the value of political
connections to firms.
Some studies document that gaining (or losing) political connections instantly
raises (or lowers) a firm’s stock price (Faccio, 2006; He, Wan and Zhou, 2014; Luechinger
and Moser, 2014). Politically-connected firms seem to receive more subsidies (Qin,
2013), sign more government contracts (Amore and Bennedsen, 2013; Ag˘ca and Igan,
2015), enjoy more bailouts (Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 2006), obtain more IPO
approvals (Liu, Tang and Tian, 2013), and acquire cheaper bank loans (Houston et al.,
2014; Infante and Piazza, 2014).
Firms with political connections may systematically differ from those without such
connections. Direct comparisons between connected and unconnected firms, therefore,
often face endogeneity concerns. Researchers usually explore exogenous changes in
political connections to identify their values. Examples of popular exogenous changes
include the sudden rise and fall of connected politicians and unexpected election
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results (Fisman, 2001; Fan, Rui and Zhao, 2006; Jayachandran, 2006; Ferguson and
Voth, 2008; Faccio and Parsley, 2009).
There remain unsolved concerns in these identification strategies, however. First,
although the events mentioned above are mostly unexpected, they are not usually
“clean” shocks: These big events affect firms’ political connections but can also shock
firms in many other ways. If an event affects connected and unconnected firms dif-
ferently through other channels, the estimated effect of the event is a mixture of “the
value of political connections” and these other unknown factors. Second, by focusing
on influential politicians or important elections, these studies consider very high-level,
salient political connections. Firms with such connections are special, and findings
from this small selective sample do not support a general narrative.
From the summaries above, obtaining a credible and generalizable evaluation of
political connections requires large-scale, clean, exogenous shocks that affect firms’
general political connections. A recent policy change in China is a good example of
this kind.
As a part of its anti-corruption campaign, the Chinese central government an-
nounced a new policy in October 2013 to restrict government officials from working
in firms. At that time, the position in firms that government officials held most often
is the outside director position. After the new policy was announced, government-
official outside directors left firms gradually. Firms previously having such outside
directors were affected. These affected firms exogenously lost a certain type of polit-
ical connection: government-official outside directors.
Taking this policy as an exogenous shock to firms, this paper employs difference-in-
difference (DID) and matching methods to estimate the value of government-officials
outside directors for listed non-state-controlled firms. In the 12 months following the
policy change, the affected firms exhibit an 8 percentage point lower stock return
on average. The change in stock returns reflects the market-perceived value of this
type of political connections. Further analyses show that the value of such political
connections varies substantially across firms. There is also suggestive evidence that
the loss of government-official outside directors has real effects on firms’ business
performances, as are reflected in the financial reports.
This study contributes to the discussion of the value of political connections. Sev-
eral properties of the particular policy change help us fill gaps in the existing lit-
erature. First, it is a policy that was announced suddenly and enforced effectively
throughout the country. This gives us exogenous variations at a large scale to iden-
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tify causality. Second, this new policy specifically targeted the connections between
firms and government officials. The shock is clean in the sense that it affects firms
only through the channel of government official-firm connections. This allows us to
relate the effect of this policy to the value of political connections, but not to other
factors. Last, this policy enables us to study a new form of political connection:
employing government officials as outside directors. This type of political connection
exists widely but has not been well understood.
The findings on stock return changes in this study extend findings from Fisman
(2001), Jayachandran (2006), Faccio and Parsley (2009), and others. These previous
works have documented that the shocks in connections with very influential politicians
lead to turbulence a firm’s stock return in a few-day window. This paper further shows
that shocks in connections with general government officials can also affect stock
returns, and that the effect can last in a longer time horizon - it appears gradually in
several months and persists for up to a year.
Several research papers have studied this policy change from different perspectives.
Fan (2016) analyzes a sample of all mainboard listed firms in China, which includes
state-controlled firms and are, in general, larger and older than firms in our sample.
The “government officials” are defined in a broader way than those in this paper,
some of whom are not directly regulated by the new policy. Fan (2016) finds that
a firm’s stock return was affected when a government-official board member actually
left the firm, while this current paper shows that the policy effect appeared as soon
as the policy was announced and that whether or not a government official actually
left the firm does not change the estimated policy effect. Liu, Lin and Wu (2016)
and Tang et al. (2016) study the short-term effect of the policy. Using all listed
firms in China, they both find that firms with government-official outside directors
had negative cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in a few-day window. They also
document that the policy effect varies with industry and region. This paper does not
find similar patterns in the sample of non-state-controlled firms in the longer time
horizon.
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3.2 Institutional Backgrounds and the Policy Change
3.2.1 Outside Directors in Publicly-Traded Companies in China
Outside directors are board members who are independent of the firms they serve.
An outside director should not be a shareholder or employee of the firm, or a family
member of a major shareholder or employee. Many countries have required publicly-
traded companies to have a certain number of outside directors on the board. An
outside director position is designed to be a part-time job. They do not involve
themselves in the everyday businesses of the firm. The main duty of an outside
director is to provide independent opinions on major firm events, such as correlative
transactions and appointment and removal of managers.
China began to build its Outside Director System in 2001, when the China Securi-
ties Regulatory Commission (CSRC) released The Guidance to Build Outside Director
System in Publicly Traded Companies. CSRC requires that all companies traded in
the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges should have at least one-third of their
board members to be outside directors and that at least one outside director should
be an accounting professional. In practice, other popular choices for outside direc-
tors include lawyers, professors, and retired government officials. Each individual can
work as outside directors for no more than 5 firms at the same time and the maximum
appointment in one firm should not exceed six years.
3.2.2 Government-Official Outside Directors
Government officials in China have always been popular candidates for outside
director positions. In theory, under a political system lacking transparency, they could
benefit firms with their experience in dealing with political issues and their powers in
influencing government decisions. Having a government official on the board also send
a signal to the market that the firm has a good relationship with the government.
This practice is also greatly welcomed by government officials themselves, because
this is a legal and convenient way they could receive monetary compensation from
firms.
3.2.3 Old Regulations
The practice that government officials work as outside directors has long been
subject to regulations in China. Two regulations were already in force by the time
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the new policy was announced in 2013: The Civil Servant Law, and an official order
issued by Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI).
The Civil Servant Law came into effect in 2006. By this law, when government
officials are in office, they should not involve themselves in any for-profit business.
Within 3 years after leaving office, they should not work for any firm in the same
industry and administrative area as their previous public positions were in.
The CCDI order was issued in 2008. It put extra restrictions on central-disciplined
officials’1 ability to work as outside directors. Hereafter, we call the restrictions put
by the CCDI order Old Restrictions. Column (1) in Table 3.1 summarizes the key
elements. Under the Old Restrictions, government officials could work for multiple
firms and could receive compensation from firms.
Table 3.1: Comparison between the Old Restrictions and the New Restrictions
Old Restrictions New Restrictions
Case approved by
The government agency one
previously held office in and
ODCCCPC
The government agency one
previously held office in;
ODCCCPC for
central-disciplined officials,
OD of the local committee of
CPC for other officials.
Monetary compensation No restrictions
Should not receive any
monetary compensation
Number of firms to
work for
No restrictions No more than one
Age limit to work in
firms
No restrictions Under 70
Column (1) in Table 3.2 lists the restrictions government officials were facing in
different scenarios before the policy change in 2013. In summary, government offi-
cials who are currently in office are not allowed to take jobs in firms. Government
officials who have left their positions in the government could work for firms that
were unrelated to their previous public positions immediately after leaving office.
They became eligible to work for any firms after having left office for 3 years. Only
central-disciplined officials faced some further restrictions.
1Central-disciplined officials are high-rank government officials whose appointments and dis-
missals are directly controlled by the central government. They include heads of national ministries,
provinces and major cities.
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Table 3.2: Restrictions before and after the Policy Change
Scenarios Description of Scenarios
Before the Policy
Change
After the Policy
Change
I In office, work for any firms Not allowed Not allowed
II
Within 3 years after leaving office,
work for firms related to the
previous public position
Not allowed Not allowed
Within 3 years after leaving office,
work for firms unrelated to
previous public positions
III – Central-disciplined officials Old Restrictions New Restrictions
IV – Other public employees No restriction New Restrictions
Left office for more than 3 years,
work for any firms
V – Central-disciplined officials Old Restrictions New Restrictions
VI – Other public employees No restriction New Restrictions
3.2.4 The New Policy
On October 19, 2013, the Organization Department (OD) of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) announced a package of new
regulations concerning government officials working at firms. The new CD regulation
package is the policy change of interest in this study. The restrictions enacted by
this new policy, hereafter New Restrictions, are stricter than the Old Restrictions.
See Column (2) in Table 3.1. The New Restrictions are imposed on not only central-
disciplined officials but also all other government officials. Table 3.2 compares the
restrictions under different situations before and after the policy change.
The new policy greatly tightened restrictions on working for firms and expanded
the number of constrained persons from a few thousand high-rank officials to all
the millions of government officials. By the new policy, none are allowed to receive
any compensation from firms, which is essential to cut the benefit chain between
government officials and firms.
There are two caveats. First, in theory, former government officials could work
for firms not only as outside directors, but also as full-time managers, before and
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after the policy change. But working full time in firms is subject to even stricter
regulations. In general, if government officials choose to work full time in firms after
leaving office, they will lose their administrative ranks and any associated pensions
and benefits. Therefore, even before the policy change, being an outside director was
the only practical choice for government officials who wanted to work in firms. Such
cases are rare and beyond the scope of this paper. Second, the Civil Servant Law,
CCDI order and the new OD policy regulate not only government officials, but also
state-owned-enterprise managers and public institute directors. Of all three types of
persons, however, only government officials hold or have held positions in government
agencies and, thus, have public power. Their sitting on the board brings a firm
“political connection” in its narrow sense. This study will only focus on the value of
government officials on the board.
3.2.5 Policy Enforcement and Affected Firms
The new policy was strongly enforced as part of the nationwide anti-corruption
campaign. Before the policy change, many government officials facing scenario III - VI
in Table 3.2 worked in firms as outside directors. Although the new policy specified
conditions under which government officials can stay in firms, it effectively removed
all government officials from the boards under high political pressure. In the fierce
“War Against Corruptions,” government officials try to stay away from any suspicion
of “being corruptive”. Resigning from the firms, therefore, showed their support for
the new policy and their loyalty to the anti-corruption campaign. Moreover, the new
policy prohibits government officials from receiving compensation, which leaves them
with no economic incentives to stay.
Firms that previously had government-official board members were affected by this
new policy. They lost their political connections through outside directors. In prac-
tice, immediately after the policy change, the government officials make announce-
ments of their intent to resign from the outside director positions. Firms usually
accept their resignations but require them to keep performing their duties as outside
directors until the next board election. The policy-makers allow this compromise
practice to avoid interrupting firms’ operations. In practice, about half of the govern-
ment officials left the board within one year after resigning, while the others stayed
longer.
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3.3 Data
The sample in this paper consists of private companies listed on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. From the 2458 companies listed by Oc-
tober 19, 2013, we dropped 1094 companies whose actual controllers were government
agencies or public institutions. We further dropped 2 companies that had been listed
for less than one year by the policy change. The remaining 1362 firms constitute the
main analysis sample. All firm information, stock market returns, firm performance
variables, and profiles of board members are exported from Wind Database.
3.3.1 Construction of Treatment Variable
There were 3449 outside directors in all 1362 sample firms on the policy change
day. Their profiles are available in the 2013 annual reports. A profile usually includes
a board member’s birth year, education, professional titles, major social positions and
a brief history of employment. Since government officials in office were not allowed
to take jobs in firms by law, all government officials in the sample had already left
government agencies. By manually reading all profiles, we can identify government
officials from all outside directors. A person is identified as a government official if
he or she
1. has been formally employed in a government agency, has administrative
rank and
2. retired from the government agency, or been appointed to a government-
run social organization 2 after leaving the government agency.
Following the rules above, 260 out of the 3449 outside directors are identified as
government officials. The 260 government officials worked in 261 firms (out of 1362
sample firms). Note that one person could work in multiple firms and one firm could
have multiple government-official outside directors. These 261 firms constitute the
treatment group. The remaining 1101 firms constitute the control group. The board
structures are summarized in Table 3.3. On average, each treatment firm had 3.18
outside directors, of which 1.21 were government officials. Each control firm had 3.06
outside directors and, by construction, had no government officials on its board.
2Examples are industry associations, academy societies.
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Table 3.3: Board Structure of the Treatment and the Control Firms
Treatment Firms Control Firms
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
# of outside directors 3.18 1 5 3.06 2 6
(0.03) (0.01)
of which
# of government officials 1.21 1 4
(0.03)
Number of observations 261 1,101
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 3.4 compares the characteristics of the government officials and the other
outside directors. Not surprisingly, since they are mostly retirees from public posi-
tions, the government officials are older. The government officials are significantly less
likely to be females. They are also less likely to hold graduate degrees compared to
the other outside directors, whose main occupations are usually lawyers, accountants
or professors, etc. The government-official outside directors are usually influential
officials, at least locally. Over 90 percent of them have administrative ranks that are
no lower than that of the head of a county. More than 40 percent have higher ranks
than that of the head of a municipality.
Table 3.5 compares the baseline characteristics of the treatment and the control
firms. The treatment firms are, on average, larger than the control ones. They have
significantly more assets, higher revenues and higher market values. The treatment
and the control firms do not systematically differ in other dimensions like profitability
(measured by profit margin, ROA, ROE), growth momentum (measured by revenue
growth rate and past 12-month stock return), or investment behaviors (measured by
R&D expense and investment).
3.4 The Policy Effect on Stock Market Performances
Following Fisman (2001), Faccio (2006) and many others, we use the stock return
as the outcome variable to study the value of political connections. The stock return
has several merits that serve the goal of this paper well. First, the stock prices reflex
overall firm performance. Their fluctuations, therefore, could in principle capture
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Table 3.4: Outside Director Characteristics
Characteristics
Government
Officials Mean
Non-
Government
Officials Mean
Difference (std.
err.)
Age 64.76 51.59 13.17***
(0.41) (0.16) (0.58)
Female 0.09 0.17 -0.08***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Tenure as outside director 3.17 3.06 0.11
(0.11) (0.03) (0.12)
Education
College degree or higher 0.83 0.94 -0.11***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
Graduate degree or higher 0.32 0.67 -0.35***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Administrative rank
County level or higher 0.92
(0.02)
Municipality level or higher 0.43
(0.03)
Observations 260 3,189
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 for the last
column. Tenure as outside director is defined on (person × firm) pairs. There are 316 (government
official × firm) pairs and 3,888 (non-government official × firm) pairs. Standard errors in the Tenure
as an outside director row are clustered at the individual level.
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Table 3.5: Baseline Firm Characteristics
Mean Median
Treat Control Diff. Treat Control Diff.
Total Assets 4,398 3,105 1,293*** 1,923 1,543 380.6***
(548.7) (176.1) (449.5) (164.7) (56.58) (142.7)
Tangible Assets 1,470 1,268 201.2* 955.0 852.5 102.5*
(123.0) (47.65) (114.7) (55.76) (27.46) (60.74)
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 38.95 39.35 -0.41 35.65 31.00 4.657**
(1.39) (2.07) (4.31) (2.31) (1.02) (2.35)
Book-to-Market Ratio 44.80 44.72 0.08 43.30 43.24 0.06
(1.31) (0.69) (1.56) (1.57) (0.72) (1.65)
Operating Revenue 2,762 2,029 732.8* 1,014 795.0 219.1**
(400.1) (159.1) (380.3) (90.97) (39.33) (92.93)
Revenue Growth -81.41 -36.44 -44.97 -93.55 -91.31 -2.242
(3.73) (34.46) (70.73) (1.78) (0.90) (2.00)
R&D Expenditures 61.35 44.72 16.63* 21.53 22.27 -0.74
(14.12) (2.43) (8.48) (2.73) (1.11) (2.53)
Net Investment 101.7 135.2 -33.53 26.09 32.12 -6.030
(24.72) (16.82) (36.59) (5.70) (2.96) (6.61)
Profit Margin -9.34 -10.06 0.72 -8.13 -8.61 0.48
(0.84) (2.73) (5.62) (0.79) (0.39) (0.89)
Return on Assets (ROA) 5.22 5.56 -0.34 4.32 4.75 -0.44
(0.37) (0.48) (1.01) (0.34) (0.18) (0.40)
Return on Equity (ROE) 7.76 7.69 0.08 7.14 7.26 -0.12
(0.60) (0.34) (0.75) (0.46) (0.23) (0.53)
Market Value 6,155 4,980 1,175** 3,648 3,054 594.0**
(574.6) (228.4) (546.1) (278.7) (97.19) (236.9)
12-Month Stock Return 37.18 36.82 0.357 23.08 21.22 1.865
(3.44) (1.83) (4.10) (3.65) (1.46) (3.21)
Observations 261 1,101 261 1,101
Notes: The Total Assets, Tangible Assets, Operating Revenue, R&D Expenditures, and Net In-
vestment are measured by million RMB (Chinese yuan). The Debt-to-Asset Ratio, Book-to-Market
Ratio, Revenue Growth, Profit Margin, ROA, and ROE are measured in percentage points. All
variables above are reported in or derived from the 2012 Annual Financial Reports of the firms.
The Market Value is measured by the end of September 2013, in million RMB. The 12-Month
Stock Return is the stock return between October 2012 and September 2013 (inclusive), measured
in percentage points. The Book-to-Market Ratio is constructed following Fama and French (1993).
For the two columns reporting differences, standard errors are clustered at the industry levels. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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policy effects on any aspect of the firm. Second, stock prices are sensitive to infor-
mation as well as actual events. The new policy was announced at one time, but
firms reacted at different times. Stock returns can capture any effect after the policy
was announced, even before a firm had enforced the policy. Moreover, stock prices
are available at high frequency, which allows us to study the dynamics of the policy
effect.
Figure 3.1 compares the equal-weighted mean market returns of the treatment
firms and the control firms in a 24-month window covering the policy change. We de-
fine the policy change month, October 2013, as month 0, the month prior to the policy
change month as month -1, the month after the policy change month as month 1, and
so on. During the analysis period, the stock market in China has experienced a fast
growth as a whole. The treatment and the control groups co-moved before the policy
change. Their performances began to diverge after the new policy was announced.
The discrepancy between the two groups evolved to more than 10 percentage point
by month 6 and stabilized thereafter.
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Figure 3.1: Equal-Weighted Mean Market Returns since Month -12
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3.4.1 Difference-in-Difference Approach
The close co-movements of the two groups in the pre-treatment period suggest
a valid difference-in-difference (DID) setup. As the first step to obtain the overall
treatment effect in the long term, we stack the 24 months (from month -12 to month
11) into two 12-month-long periods: one pre-treatment period and one post-treatment
period. The following regression is estimated with data from the two periods:
Yit = α + β(Ti × Pt) + δTi + ρPt + γXi + it (3.1)
The dependent variable Yit is firm i’s stock return in a 12-month-long period t. In
the pre-treatment period (t = 0), it is the stock return from the beginning of month
-12 to the end of month -1. In the post-treatment period (t = 1), it is the stock
return from the beginning of month 0 to the end of month 11. Ti is a treatment
indicator that takes value 1 if and only if firm i is in the treatment group. Pt is
a post-treatment indicator that takes value 1 if and only if the period is after the
policy change. The coefficient on the interaction of treatment and post, β, is the DID
estimate of the policy effect. Xi is a vector of predetermined controls. In regressions
with firm-fixed effects, Ti is absorbed by firm-fixed effects and Xi is replaced with a
set of firm indicators. Because there are only two periods in the baseline specification,
time-fixed effects are not included in the regression.
Column (1) in Table 3.6 corresponds to Figure 3.1. The estimated treatment effect
on the 12-month return is -12.94 percentage point. Column (2) controls for some
predetermined characteristics instead of firm-fixed effects and brings us very similar
estimates, -12.62 percentage points.
Column (3)-(4) redo the practice in Column (1)-(2) but shorten the analysis period
to month -6 through month 5. The dependent variable in Column (3)-(4) becomes the
6-month stock return instead of the 12-month stock return. Analogously, regressions
in Column (3)-(4) use two periods: one pre-treatment period and one post-treatment
period. In the pre-treatment period (t = 0), the dependent variable is the stock
return from the beginning of month -6 to the end of month -1. In the post-treatment
period (t = 1), it is the stock return from the beginning of month 0 to the end of
month 5. These point estimates of the treatment effect on the 6-month-return are
close to those on the 12-month return, which suggests that most of the treatment
effect arose during the first 6 months after treatment.
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Table 3.6: Difference-in-Difference Regressions on Stock Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables
12-Month
Return
12-Month
Return
6-Month
Return
6-Month
Return
Monthly
Return
Monthly
Return
Treat×After -12.94** -12.62** -10.54* -10.03***
(5.40) (4.29) (5.20) (2.66)
Treat×M0 0.28 0.30
(0.82) (0.76)
Treat×M1 -2.13** -2.01**
(0.76) (0.88)
Treat×M2 -1.01 -0.98*
(0.56) (0.53)
Treat×M3 -1.93** -2.12**
(0.75) (0.66)
Treat×M4 -2.17*** -2.13***
(0.62) (0.57)
Treat×M5 -1.33 -1.22
(0.94) (1.00)
Treat×M6 -0.87 -0.75
(0.57) (0.61)
Treat×M7 -1.06** -1.20**
(0.39) (0.41)
Treat×M8 -0.60 -0.56
(0.69) (0.65)
Treat×M9 0.16 0.37
(0.87) (0.89)
Treat×M10 0.62 0.62
(0.94) (0.88)
Treat×M11 0.19 0.16
(0.56) (0.61)
Controls X X X
Outcome Mean 45.88 45.82 22.37 22.17 3.524 3.453
Observations 2,620 2,512 2,620 2,490 32,923 31,282
R-squared 0.42 0.13 0.48 0.15 0.320 0.33
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Control variables are Market Value, 12-Month Return, Debt-
to-Asset Ratio, Book-to-Market Ratio, and industry fixed effects. Market Value, 12-Month Return
and Debt-to-Asset Ratio are measured by the end of Month -13 (September 2012). Book-to-Market
Ratio is measured by the end of Month -16 (June 2012), because book value is only available on
semiyearly reports and yearly reports (every June and December). The post-policy change indicator
is controlled for in Column (1)-(4). Firm fixed-effects are included in Column (1) (3) and (5), while
Column (2) (4) and (6) include the treatment indicator. Time fixed-effects are included in Column
(6).
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To break down the treatment effect into each individual month, Column (5)-(6)
estimate a modified version of Equation (3.1).
Y monthlyit = α +
∑
τ
βτ (Ti × Pt × I(t=τ)) + δTi +
∑
τ
ρτ I(t=τ) + γXi + it (3.2)
The dependent variable, Y monthlyit , in Equation (3.2) is the monthly stock return of
firm i in month t. In practice, data from month -12 to month 11 (24 months in total)
are used. Month-fixed effects are included in the equation to control for time trend.
Each post-treatment month is interacted with the treatment indicator to decompose
the policy effect into each individual month. The coefficient βτ is the treatment effect
that arose during month τ . In theory, the sum of βτ ’s in Equation (3.2) is equal to
the β in Equation (3.1) when other things equal.
From Column (5)-(6), we find that the treatment effect accumulated steadily dur-
ing the first 7 months after the policy change, at a rate of 1 to 2 percentage point
per month. The stock return discrepancy between the treatment and control group
remained for at least another 4 months thereafter. Note that three important con-
trol variables, Market Value, Book-to-Market Ratio and Momentum, i.e. the past
12-month stock return, are endogenous to stock returns by construction. In the re-
gressions, control variables are measured by the end of month -133. All controls are
predetermined for the analysis period.
3.4.2 Matching
The matching approach adopted in this paper is motivated by the idea of Buy-
and-Hold-Abnormal-Return (BHAR) in corporate finance literature. BHAR, in its
simplest form, equals to the return on a buy-and-hold investment in the treatment
firm less the return on a buy-and-hold investment in a matched control firm. The use
of BHAR in long-run event study is advocated by Barber and Lyon (1997), because
it effectively alleviates new listing bias, rebalancing bias, and skewness bias. BHAR
method also has the merit of closely resembling the investors’ behaviors in the stock
market. The mean BHAR over multiple treatment firms can be interpreted as a
3Book-to-Market Ratio is measured by the end of month -16 (June 2012) because it can be
measured only when the annual report or the semi-annual report is available.
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matching estimator of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) on buy-
and-hold returns.
Table 3.7 reports estimates of the policy effect on the treatment firms from nearest
neighbor matching. The outcome variable is buy-and-hold return since the beginning
of month 0. The policy effect is estimated at two time points: the end of month 6
(results reported in the top panel) and the end of month 12 (results reported in the
bottom panel). In the baseline specification in Column (1), each treatment firm is
matched to three control firms from the same industry. The matching variables used
to determine “distance” are Market Value by the end of month -1, Book-to-Market
Ratio by the end of month -4, and Momentum, i.e., the stock return from month
-12 to month -1. These matching variables have been shown to be predictors of the
future stock return and have been widely used in event studies (Carhart, 1997; Lee,
1997; Wruck and Wu, 2009; He, Yang and Guan, 2010). The distance between any
pair of firms is calculated under the Mahalanobis metric. The ATET estimates are
adjusted for large sample bias when more than one continuous matching variables are
used according to Abadie and Imbens (2006) and Abadie and Imbens (2011).
The point estimate in the top panel of Column (1) suggests that the policy change
lowered a treatment firm’s stock return by 8.64 percentage point between month 0
and month 6. This estimate is robust to varying numbers of matching neighbors
(Column 2-3) or varying combinations of matching variables (Column 4-5). The es-
timates of the policy effect at the end of month 12 are mostly close to those at the
end of month 6.
Figure 3.2 takes more snapshots over time to show how the policy effect developed.
It plots the treatment effect on buy-and-hold returns by the end of each month after
the policy change up to month 18. The pattern in Figure 3.2 affirms what we learned
from the DID regressions: the treatment effect accumulated during the first 6 to 7
months after the policy change and then stabilized for another 6 months.
The point estimates from matching methods are systematically lower in absolute
value than those from the DID approach. This may arise for several reasons. First,
DID regressions control firm characteristics only parametrically, while the matching
method allows any non-parametric relationships between control variables and stock
market returns. There are some firms from the control group that are included in the
DID regressions but are not matched to any treatment firms in the matching estima-
tion. If these unmatched control firms enjoyed higher stock returns than the matched
control firms in the post-treatment period, the point estimate from a DID regression
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Table 3.7: Nearest Neighbor Matching Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable 6-Month Buy-and-Hold Return
ATET -8.64*** -8.13*** -8.82*** -7.02*** -7.64***
(2.15) (2.89) (2.05) (2.01) (2.00)
# of treatment firms 249 249 245 250 250
# of control firms matched 515 210 691 514 505
Total # of control firms 1,027 1,027 1,017 1,036 1,028
Dependent Variable 12-Month Buy-and-Hold Return
ATET -8.70*** -5.75 -8.76*** -8.18** -9.45***
(3.21) (3.99) (3.07) (3.30) (3.15)
# of treatment firms 236 236 232 237 237
# of control firms matched 487 199 648 475 487
Total # of control firms 1,007 1,007 996 1,018 1,010
# of match(es) per
treatment firm 3 1 5 3 3
Matching Variables
Industry X X X X
Market Value X X X X X
Book-to-Market Ratio X X X X
12-month Stock Return X X X X
Notes: Standard errors are robust Abadie-Imbens standard errors with 2 matches. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Estimators in Column (1)-(3) and Column (5) are bias-adjusted, following
Abadie and Imbens (2006) and Abadie and Imbens (2011). The bias-adjusted covariates are the same
as the matching covariates in that column. Market Value and Past 12-month Return are measured
by the end of month -1 (September 2013). Book-to-Market Ratio is measured by the end of month
-4 (June 2013). Firms from an entire industry will be dropped from analysis if the industry includes
too few firms. In Column (1)-(4), firms in telecommunication industry are dropped. Column (3)
further drops firms in the public utility industry.
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Figure 3.2: ATET from Matching Estimations over Time
Notes: ATET estimates are from nearest neighbor matching. The matching algorithm is the same
as that in Table 3.7 Column (1).
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will be biased away from zero. Second, the control variables used in the DID regres-
sions are measured 12 months before the policy change, while those used in matching
are measured more immediately before the policy change. The earlier the variables are
measured, the less prediction power they have for the post-treatment stock returns.
For these reasons, we prefer the matching estimates to the DID estimates.
3.4.3 Interpreting the Policy Effect
The matching estimates have a straightforward real-life interpretation. Think
about two investors, A and B. A invested 100 dollars in the stock of a treatment firm
immediately before the policy change. At the same time, B invested 100 dollars in
the stock of a control firm that looked very similar to the firm in which A invested. A
and B both held their stocks for six months before trading them out. The matching
estimates above suggest that A would gain 8 to 9 dollars less than B in the investment.
To trace the source of the return discrepancy, a further investigation of the policy
change is required. Before the policy change, firms chose their board members to
maximize benefits. It turned out that some firms chose to include government of-
ficials on the boards, while others did not. In either case, the pre-treatment board
structure should reflect the firm’s optimal board member choice. The new policy
added new restrictions to board member choices. The firms that previously chose to
include government officials on the board had to turn to their next-best choice after
the policy change. Thus, the policy effect can be interpreted as the value added by the
government officials to a firm that had chosen to invite government officials to sit on
the board without the new restrictions. The identifying assumption is that, in equi-
librium, firms having chosen their optimal board structures before the policy change
have the same stock market return conditional on their observed characteristics.
3.4.4 A Placebo Test
The previous analyses have identified a discrepancy between the stock returns of
the treatment firms and the control firms after the policy change. Before we can
attribute this discrepancy to the removal of government officials, alternative explana-
tions need to be ruled out. Researchers may concern that it is the political environ-
ment created by the anti-corruption campaign, but not the specific policy shock on
government-official outside directors, that have caused the treatment firms and the
control firms to perform differently. For example, Lin et al. (2016) have documented
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in an event study that the effect of the anti-corruption campaign varies among private
firms.
This section addresses this concern by conducting a placebo test. We assume a
placebo treatment at month -12, redo the matching analyses and calculate placebo
policy effects since month -12. The placebo policy effect should be zero before the
actual policy change, if the discrepancy between the stock returns of the treatment
firms and the control firms is caused by the new policy.
Table 3.8 reports the estimates of the placebo effect. It replicates Table 3.7 while
replacing the actual treatment at month 0 with the placebo treatment at month -12.
The matching variables are also pushed back by 12 months. Throughout Table 3.8,
the matching variables used to determine “distance” are market value by the end
of month -13, book-to-market ratio by the end of month -16, and stock return from
month -24 to month -13 . None of the placebo ATET estimates are significantly
different from zero, which suggests that the stock returns of treatment firms and
control firms did not diverge before the policy change actually happened.
Figure 3.3 takes more snapshots over time to show how the placebo treatment
effect developed from month -12 to month 12. We find that the estimated placebo
ATET is close to zero before month 0, when no treatment has actually taken place.
The “placebo ATET” estimate becomes more and more negative only after month
0, i.e. when the true policy change happened. The segment between month 0 and
month 12 in Figure 3.3 resembles the segment of the same time period in Figure 3.2.
This affirms the pattern that the treatment effect arose and accumulated during the
first 7 months after the actual policy change and then remained for some time. Note
that the two segments are not exactly the same because the matching variables used
in the two figures are measured at different time points.
3.5 Treatment Heterogeneity
In the previous section, we have established evidence that the removal of govern-
ment officials from the board lead to lower stock returns of the affected firms. The
ATET on the stock return is 8 to 9 percentage points. As the first step to explore
potential treatment heterogeneity, Figure 3.4 depicts the distribution of the implied
treatment effect of all treated firms. The implied firm-specific treatment effect equals
to the buy-and-hold return of a treatment firm less the mean of buy-and-hold re-
turn of three matched control firms. The matching algorithm is the same as that
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Table 3.8: Nearest Neighbor Matching Estimations: A Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable 6-Month Buy-and-Hold Return
Placebo ATET 2.44 0.46 1.51 1.43 1.38
(1.99) (2.39) (1.98) (2.10) (2.09)
# of treatment firms 247 247 243 254 248
# of control firms matched 209 498 669 506 518
Total # of control firms 1,023 1,023 1,013 1,071 1,026
Dependent Variable 12-Month Buy-and-Hold Return
Placebo ATET 2.90 -2.29 4.20 4.15 1.76
(3.95) (4.88) (3.80) (3.82) (4.00)
# of treatment firms 248 248 244 255 249
# of control firms matched 208 491 656 503 518
Total # of control firms 1,008 1,008 998 1,056 1,011
# of match(es) per
treatment firm 3 1 5 3 3
Matching Variables
Industry X X X X
Market Value X X X X X
Book-to-Market Ratio X X X X
12-month Stock Return X X X
Notes: Standard errors are robust Abadie-Imbens standard errors with 2 matches. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Estimators in Column (1)-(3) and Column (5) are bias-adjusted, following
Abadie and Imbens (2006) and Abadie and Imbens (2011). The bias-adjusted covariates are the
same as the matching covariates in that column. Market Value and 12-month Return are measured
by the end of month -13 (September 2012). Book-to-Market Ratio is measured by the end of month
-16 (June 2012). Firms from an entire industry will be dropped from analysis if the industry includes
too few firms. In Column (1)- (4), firms in telecommunication industry are dropped. Column (3)
further drops firms in public utility industry.
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in Table 3.7 Column (1). Figure 3.4 shows that the implied policy effect has large
variations across treatment firms. The variation could be partly due to stochastic
elements. In this section, we explore some factors that have potentially driven the
observed treatment heterogeneity.
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Figure 3.4: Histogram: Estimated Treatment Effect across Firms
3.5.1 Government-Official Characteristics
Why do government officials make such different contributions to different firms?
One natural explanation is that the government officials themselves have heteroge-
neous “qualities”. They vary in personal characteristics, work experience, adminis-
trative rank, and so on. These factors may determine how much benefit a government
official can bring to a firm. When the new policy forced all government officials to
leave the boards, it meant different things for different firms: some lost very useful
board members, and thus were badly affected, others lost only mediocre ones, and
thus were affected less.
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We first test this explanation in a difference-in-difference framework. A triple-
interaction term is added to Equation (3.1). The following equations are estimated:
Yit = α + β(Ti × Pt) + χk(Ti × Pt ×Gki )
+ δ1Ti + δ2G
k
i + ρPt + γXi + it, ∀k. (3.3)
As in Equation (3.1), the dependent variable Yit is firm i’s stock return in a 12-
month-long or 6-month-long period t. Ti is the treatment group indicator and Pt is
the post-treatment period indicator. The coefficient on the interaction between Ti
and Pt, β, is the regular treatment effect from a DID regression. Xi is a vector of
predetermined controls. Time-fixed effects are not included because only two time
periods are used in the estimations in this section.
Gki is a binary variable that describes a certain characteristic, k, of the government-
official working in firm i. Each Gki divides the treatment group into two subgroups.
If the treatment effect is correlated with government official characteristic k, then the
coefficient on the triple-interaction term, χk, should be significantly different from
zero.
Table 3.9 reports the estimation results of Equations 3.3. The top panel uses
6-month return as the dependent variable and the bottom paned uses 12-month re-
turn. All regressions include the same predetermined controls as specified in the
table notes. The benchmark regressions are reported in Column (1). They repli-
cate results in Table 3.6 Column (4) and Column (2). In what follows, six charac-
teristics derived from the government officials’ profiles are investigated separately:
High-Rank, Experienced, Leave-Firm-Late, Hold-Current-Position, Worked-in-Local-
Government, Worked-in-Central-Government.
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Table 3.9 Column (2) compares firms with high-rank government officials with
firms with only low-rank government officials. The variable High-Rank takes value
1 if and only if the firm had at least one government official on its board whose
administrative rank is higher or equal to zhengting (comparable to the head of a
municipality). Column (3) explores whether a government official’s experience as
a board member matters. The variable Experienced takes value 1 if and only if
the firm had a government official who had been sitting on the board for no less
than three years (the length of a typical appointment). Column (4) explores the
potential selection in the serving time after the policy change. Recall that while
some government official left firms immediately after the new policy was announced,
others stay for some time to avoid disruption of firms’ management. Leave-Firm-
Late takes value 1 if and only if the firm had a government official that stayed on
the board for more than 12 months after the new policy was announced. Column (5)
explores the potential effect of having a Hold-Current-Position government official.
Hold-Current-Position takes value 1 if and only if a firm had a government-official
outside director who was holding social positions. Column (6) compares firms with
and without local government officials. Column (7) compares firms with and without
central government officials.
Due to the small sample size, we do not have enough power to relate a government
official’s characteristics to their values for a firm: Throughout Table 3.9, none of
the coefficients on the triple-interaction terms are statistically significant. The point
estimates, however, do have some meaningful suggestions. For example, Column (3)
seems to suggest that firms were hurt more severely when they lost an experienced
government-official outside directors than when they lost a newer one. This pattern
is in line with the intuition that longer-lasting connections are more valuable.
Matching methods can also help to disentangle treatment heterogeneity. To study
the correlations between the treatment effect and government-official characteristics,
we divide the treatment group into two sub-groups by each Gk. The ATET on each
sub-treatment-group is estimated separately. Table 3.10 reports the ATET on each
sub-treatment-group. The dependent variable is buy-and-hold return between month
0 and month 6 in the top panel, and buy-and-hold return between month 0 and month
12 in the bottom panel.
The following example explains how the ATET on each sub-treatment-group is
obtained. When estimating the ATET on the High-Rank = 0 sub-treatment-group,
treatment firms with High-Rank = 1 are dropped but all control firms are retained.
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Table 3.10a: Nearest Neighbor Matching Estimations on Sub-Groups: part 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Official’s Characteristics High Rank Experienced Leave Firm Late
=0 =1 =0 =1 =0 =1
Dependent Variable 12-Month Buy-and-Hold Return
ATET -10.1*** -5.30** -6.22* -9.11*** -7.23*** -8.13***
(2.83) (2.40) (3.34) (2.12) (2.44) (2.72)
# of treatment firms 131 119 116 134 107 143
# of control firms matched 310 300 291 321 275 344
Total # of control firms 1028 1028 1028 1028 1028 1028
p-value from permutation
test
0.16 0.16 0.4 0.42 0.74 0.85
Dependent Variable 6-Month Buy-and-Hold Return
ATET -9.82** -6.81* -11.6** -5.86 -4.87 -11.0***
(4.52) (3.67) (4.59) (3.79) (4.14) (4.08)
# of treatment firms 125 112 110 127 101 136
# of control firms matched 300 280 275 307 252 327
Total # of control firms 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010
p-value from permutation
test
0.67 0.52 0.32 0.29 0.23 0.38
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Table 3.10b: Nearest Neighbor Matching Estimations on Sub-Groups: part 2
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Official’s Characteristics Hold Current
Position
from Local
Gov.
from Central
Gov.
=0 =1 =0 =1 =0 =1
Dependent Variable 12-Month Buy-and-Hold Return
ATET -7.05*** -8.53*** -5.26 -8.97*** -8.66*** -6.35**
(2.52) (2.85) (3.30) (2.36) (2.48) (3.03)
# of treatment firms 153 97 80 170 155 95
# of control firms used in
match
367 251 211 387 362 244
Total # of control firms 1028 1028 1028 1028 1028 1028
p-value from permutation
test
0.58 0.76 0.3 0.3 0.53 0.52
Dependent Variable 6-Month Buy-and-Hold Return
ATET -6.41 -11.2*** -7.24 -9.85*** -10.2*** -6.66
(4.03) (4.23) (5.36) (3.60) (3.84) (4.77)
# of treatment firms 141 96 76 161 147 90
# of control firms used in
match
338 238 198 378 350 228
Total # of control firms 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010
p-value from permutation
test
0.3 0.46 0.71 0.62 0.55 0.56
Notes: Standard errors are robust Abadie-Imbens standard errors with 2 matches. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Each treatment firm is matched to three control firms. The matching algorithm
is the same as that in Table 3.7 Column (5). The null hypothesis of the permutation test is “H0: the
ATET of the sub-treatment-group = the ATET of the treatment group.” The tests are conducted
by permuting the subgroup assignment among the treatment firms.
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Each treatment firm with High-Rank = 0 is matched to three control firms based
on Market Value, Book-to-Market Ratio, and Momentum as those used in Table 3.7.
Due to insufficient observations in each sub-treatment-group, matching on industry
is not required. The matching algorithm employed here is thus the same as that in
Table 3.7 Column (5).
The estimated ATET in Table 3.10 does not vary substantially across subgroups.
This observation can be justified by permutation tests. Along with each ATET es-
timate, the p-value of the permutation test is reported . The null hypothesis of the
test is
H0: the ATET of the sub-treatment-group = the ATET of the treatment group.
In none of the subgroups H0 is rejected, which suggests that these observed government-
official characteristics cannot explain the treatment heterogeneity.
We are not able to connect the heterogeneity in treatment effect to any of the
government-official characteristics discussed above. But this does not invalidate the
hypothesis that a government official’s value-added to a firm depends on his or her
“quality”. The “quality”, however, cannot be easily measured by observables. Some
unobserved government-official characteristics may be of great relevance, for example,
a government official’s actual influencing power and work efforts. Without further
information, we cannot fully answer the question that “what kind of government
officials bring more value for a firm”.
3.5.2 Firm Characteristics
To explain treatment heterogeneity, we turn to another dimension: firm character-
istics. Political connections through an outside director may have different values for
firms of different sizes, in different stages of development or under different operating
conditions. What kinds of firms enjoy more benefits from having government officials
on the board? We estimate a DID equation with a triple-interaction term that is
similar to Equation (3.3):
Yit = α + β(Ti × Pt) + χl(Ti × Pt × F li )
+ ν1(Ti × F li ) + ν2(Ti × F li ) + δ1Ti + δ2F li + ρPt + γXi + it,∀ l. (3.4)
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F li is a binary variable that describes the characteristic l of firm i. Each F
l
i divides
the all sample firms into two subgroups. If the treatment effect is correlated with the
firm characteristic l, then the coefficient on the triple-interaction term, χl, should be
significantly different from zero. Other notations are the same as those in Equations
3.3.
We studied five different F li ’s in this section. Table 3.11 reports the results. The
top panel uses 6-month return as the dependent variable and the bottom paned
uses 12-month return. All regressions include the same predetermined controls.
Column (1) is the benchmark DID regression replicating Table 3.6 Column (4) and
Column (2). In Column (2)-(6), the treatment indicator interacts with five firm char-
acteristics one by one. The characteristic variables are defined in the table notes.
None of the triple-interaction terms are statistically significant.
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There is no straightforward way to relate the treatment heterogeneity to either
observed government-official characteristics or firm characteristics. The value of a
government-official as a board member for a firm seems to be driven by unobserved
factors. As discussed above, we do not have good measures of a government official’s
influencing power or work efforts, which are potentially very important factors. Some
hidden firm characteristics may also be relevant. For example, some firms have indi-
rect business relationships with the government, other firms may have hidden political
connections that can substitute government officials on the board. Moreover, it could
be the match between a government official and a firm that matters. Future research
can revisit this question when more detailed data are collected.
3.6 Policy Effects on the Real Side
Empirical evidence in the previous sections suggests that government officials on
the board can affect the firms’ stock prices. This section goes one step further to
explore how government officials can influence the firms’ real business performance.
A large range of indexes derived from annual reports are used to measure firms’
performance from different perspectives. The following equation is estimated.
Yit = α + β(Ti × I(t=2014)) + δTi + ρI(t=2014) + it (3.5)
The dependent variable in Equation (3.5) is a performance index. Ti is the treat-
ment indicator as that in Equation (3.1). The treatment effect is captured by the
coefficient on the interaction term, β.
Annual reports from two years, 2012 and 2014, are used to include a full pre-
treatment year and a full post-treatment year. Data from the transition year, 2013
are excluded . The reason we restrict the analyses to only two years is to minimize
endogenous turnovers of non-government-official board members.
Table 3.12 reports the estimation results. In each regression in Table 3.12, only
firms with non-missing dependent variables for both 2012 and 2014 are used. The
first two columns measure the treatment effect on business expansion and overall
profitability, respectively. The dependent variable in Column (1) is the logarithm of
operating revenue. The (insignificant) point estimate suggests that operating revenue
for the treatment group dropped by 4 % in the post-treatment year, 2014. The
treatment effect on profitability is more prominent, as suggested by Column (2). The
109
probability of acquiring positive profit for the treatment firms dropped by 0.05 because
of the policy change. This result is consistent with the drop in stock return.
Table 3.12a: Policy Effects on the Real Side: part 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables
Log Op-
erating
Revenue
Positive
Profit ROIC
Gross
Margin
Tax to
Profit
Cash
Inflow
Treat×Year2014 -0.04 -0.05*** -0.27 0.99 -2.42 1.37
(0.05) (0.01) (1.29) (2.42) (2.84) (2.45)
Treat 0.27*** -0.01 -1.01 -1.29 -0.24 -1.16
(0.06) (0.02) (1.11) (0.75) (1.39) (1.53)
Year2014 0.28*** -0.02** -1.64 -2.30 2.27 -0.96
(0.03) (0.01) (1.10) (2.70) (2.30) (2.27)
Constant 20.57*** 0.86*** 7.29*** 30.45*** 17.45*** 100.13***
(0.14) (0.01) (0.85) (2.99) (1.13) (1.86)
Outcome Mean 20.75 0.840 6.256 29.15 18.31 99.56
Observations 2,720 2,724 2,724 2,716 2,328 2,716
R-squared 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Aiming to explore the mechanisms of the treatment effect on firms’ profitabil-
ity, Column (3)-(12) analyze more business performance measures: profit quality (
Column 3-4), tax burden (Column 5), cash adequacy (Column 6-7), asset structure
(Column 8), turnover (Column 9-10), R & D investment (Column 11), and subsidy
receipt (Column 12). Definitions of dependent variables are in table notes. No sig-
nificant results are found with these measures.
In summary, the removal of political connections through outside directors affects
firms’ overall profitability. There are very limited findings, however, on the mecha-
nisms. Several reasons might explain why. First, the indexes we used here are not as
sensitive as the stock price and are measured only once a year. Many confounding
factors may interfere with firm performance between two measuring time points and
thus contaminate the policy effect. This makes the policy effect, even if it exists, hard
to detect. Second, when discussing treatment heterogeneity, we have shown that the
estimated value of political connection varies dramatically across firms. The working
mechanisms of political connection may also vary across firms. Government officials
may help different firms in different aspects. As a result, when averaging each as-
pect of performance across all firms, we cannot find a significant effect of political
connection on any one of the aspects.
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Table 3.12b: Policy Effects on the Real Side: part 2
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables
Cash to
Invest
Asset to
Equity
Business
Turnover
Full
Asset
Turnover
Positive
R&D
Received
Subsi-
dies
Treat×Year2014 0.14 -0.08 182.41 -0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.67) (0.05) (214.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Treat -0.18 0.15 9.49 0.02 -0.03 0.03**
(0.54) (0.11) (122.17) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01)
Year2014 0.51 0.11*** 9.91 -0.02 0.01 0.08***
(0.28) (0.03) (82.59) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.08 1.85*** 374.75*** 0.66*** 0.85*** 0.85***
(0.24) (0.09) (87.16) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Mean Outcome 0.316 1.926 398.9 0.650 0.850 0.896
Observations 2,558 2,686 2,712 2,722 2,724 2,724
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Operating Revenue is measured in million RMB (Chinese yuan).
Positive Profit indicates the adjusted profit being positive. ROIC is short for Returns on Invested
Capital. The unit of ROIC, Gross Margin, Tax to Profit and Cash Inflow is a percentage point. The
Business Turnover is measure in days. The Full Asset Turnover is the the ratio of totoa revenue
to total assets. Positive R& D indicates the R&D expenditure being positive. Received Subsides
indicates that the firm received government subsidies. Four control variables are included in each
regression. See Table 3.6 for their construction details.
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3.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine a policy that removed government officials from the
boards to estimate the value of this type of political connections for firms. The
empirical analyses suggest that removing government officials from the board makes
an affected firm yield 8 percentage point less return in the stock market in the next
12 months. The policy change exogenously cut firms’ political connections through
outside directors, but left other aspects of the firms untouched. The observed policy
effect can thus be interpreted as the value of this type of political connections.
The policy effect varies across firms, which suggests that government officials on the
board have different values for different firms. The variation cannot be explained well
by either observed government-official characteristics or firm characteristics. Future
research can revisit the heterogeneity in values when more detailed data are available.
We also studied the policy effects on a large range of real business performance
measures of firms. Although, given our limited data on business performance, we
cannot draw conclusions on the mechanisms of how political connections help firms,
we do find that the affected firms, on average, became less profitable due to the loss of
political connections. This finding is consistent with the findings in the stock return
changes. The mechanisms suggested by previous studies could apply in this paper’s
context. The value of government-officials as outside directors could take different
forms. They could bring firms preferential government treatment, relaxed regulatory
oversight, business opportunities in the public sector or insider’s information on public
policy. In a well-functioning stock market, stock prices reflect the composite benefit
from all aspects.
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APPENDIX A
Characteristics of All Survey Respondents
This section reports the characteristics of all respondents of the follow-up survey
in Chapter I and that of the coupon-eligible sample.
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Table A.1: Characteristics of All Survey Respondents
Variables Obs.
Full
Survey
Sample
Mean
(s.d.)
Coupon-
Eligible
Sample
Mean
(s.d.)
Diff:
tested
neg. wi
3m minus
coupon-
eligible
(p-value)
Diff:
tested
pos.
minus
coupon-
eligible
(p-value)
Indicator: female 2,551 0.700 0.673 0.029 0.119***
(0.458) (0.469) (0.228) (0.000)
Age 2,530 36.074 36.259 -2.323*** 1.434*
(14.807) (15.571) (0.003) (0.079)
Education in years 2,523 6.146 5.907 0.967*** 0.033
(3.981) (4.009) (0.000) (0.885)
Indicator: respondent 2,551 0.525 0.509 0.043* 0.086***
provided a phone number (0.499) (0.500) (0.070) (0.003)
# of sex partners in the last 2,330 0.162 0.174 -0.077*** 0.006
12 months: none (0.369) (0.379) (0.000) (0.820)
# of sex partners in the last 2,330 0.725 0.716 0.064*** -0.003
12 months: only one (0.446) (0.451) (0.008) (0.923)
# of sex partners in the last 2,330 0.112 0.110 0.013 -0.003
12 months: more than one (0.316) (0.313) (0.447) (0.886)
HIV-test history: never 2,519 0.268 0.431 -0.388 -0.442***
tested (0.443) (0.495) (0.000) (0.000)
HIV-test history: tested 2,519 0.242 0.254 -0.265*** 0.347***
more than one year ago (0.428) (0.436) (0.000) (0.000)
HIV-test history: tested 2,519 0.490 0.315 0.653*** 0.095***
within one year (0.500) (0.465) (0.000) (0.002)
# of correct answers out of 2,367 11.932 11.572 0.730*** 1.101***
15 HIV questions (3.408) (3.664) (0.000) (0.000)
Subject risk of HIV+: the 2,138 1.746 1.886 -0.408*** 0.000
higher the riskier (0.942) (0.982) (0.000)
Distance (km) between the 2,471 2.221 2.348 -0.007 0.007
household and a clinic (2.832) (3.135) (0.743) (0.775)
Indicator: household go 2,550 0.576 0.604 -0.040* 0.074***
without food sometimes (0.494) (0.489) (0.091) (0.004)
Indicator: household has 2,392 0.228 0.090 0.010 0.888***
HIV+ member (0.420) (0.286) (0.528) (0.000)
1st principal component of 2,551 0.714 0.648 0.239** -0.216**
14 assets† (2.018) (2.036) (0.015) (0.046)
Notes: The p-values are from t-tests of equality. The t-tests are controlled for community fixed-
effects and enumerator fixed-effects.
† The 14 assets are the same as those in Table 1.2
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Table A.2: Characteristics of the Coupon-Eligible Sample
Variables Obs.
Coupon-
Eligible
Sample
Mean
(s.d.)
Concerned
Sample
Mean
(s.d.)
Diff: Un-
concerned
minus
Concerned
(p-value)
Indicator: female 1,588 0.673 0.675 -0.015
(0.469) (0.469) (0.601)
Age 1,575 36.259 36.334 0.551
(15.571) (15.838) (0.591)
Education in years 1,574 5.907 6.012 -0.158
(4.009) (4.066) (0.513)
Indicator: respondent provided 1,588 0.509 0.525 0.010
a private phone number (0.500) (0.500) (0.725)
# of sex partners in the last 1,453 0.174 0.183 -0.034
12 months: none (0.379) (0.387) (0.190)
# of sex partners in the last 1,453 0.716 0.694 0.074**
12 months: only one (0.451) (0.461) (0.015)
# of sex partners in the last 1,453 0.110 0.123 -0.040*
12 months: more than one (0.313) (0.329) (0.047)
HIV-test history: never tested 1,570 0.431 0.422 -0.002
(0.495) (0.494) (0.938)
HIV-test history: tested more 1,570 0.254 0.253 -0.005
than one year ago (0.436) (0.435) (0.842)
HIV-test history: tested within 1,570 0.315 0.325 0.008
one year (0.465) (0.469) (0.792)
# of correct answers out of 15 1,480 11.572 11.721 -0.809***
HIV questions (3.664) (3.128) (0.003)
Subject risk of HIV+: the higher 1,541 1.886 1.836 0.053
the riskier (0.982) (0.957) (0.345)
Distance in km between the 1,540 2.348 2.231 0.018
household and a clinic (3.135) (3.107) (0.508)
Indicator: household go without 1,588 0.604 0.592 0.040
food sometimes (0.489) (0.492) (0.136)
Indicator: household has HIV+ 1,469 0.090 0.080 0.023
member (0.286) (0.272) (0.231)
1st principal component of the 1,588 0.648 0.757 0.071
ownership of 14 assets† (2.036) (2.087) (0.516)
Notes: The p-values are from t-tests of equality. The t-tests are controlled for community fixed-
effects and enumerator fixed-effects.
† The 14 assets are the same as those in Table 1.2
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APPENDIX B
Robustness Checks for the Definition of Test
Uptake
Test uptake is the primary outcome of interest. In this paper, tt is measured by
coupon redemption. Specifically, I follow the rules below to code the test uptake
indicator:
1. It takes value 1 only if the coupon was redeemed by an adult of the same gender
as the coupon recipient.
2. It takes value 1 only if the coupon was redeemed within 14 days as instructed
by the enumerators.
3. If a coupon’s code was not properly read when distributing,1 it is considered
“not redeemed”.
4. If a participant received special coupons,2 he or she remained in the analysis
sample.
This section shows that the conclusions we obtained in the paper are robust to
alternations of the rules above. Consider four alternative ways to code test uptake.
Alternative 1 : follows rule 2-4, but drops rule 1;
Alternative 2 : follows rule 1, 3, 4, but drops rule 2;
Alternative 3 : replace rule 3 with
1Due to technical errors, 2.3% of the coupons distributed were not correctly read by scanners,
and thus cannot be linked to redeemed coupons.
2To incentivize truth-telling in the willingness-to-accept measure, we introduced special coupons
(See the Pre-Analysis Plan for details). 9.2% of the participant from the Control Group and the
Concern-Relieving Intervention Group ended up received special coupons.
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Alt3. If a coupon’s code was not properly read when distributing, exclude the coupon
recipient from the sample;
Alternative 4 : replace rule 4 with
Alt4. If a participant received special coupons, exclude this participant from the sam-
ple.
Table B.1 Panel A and Panel B replicate regressions in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4, re-
spectively, with the four alternate definitions of test uptake. The estimated treatment
effect is stable across all four alternative definitions.
118
T
ab
le
B
.1
:
R
ob
u
st
n
es
s
to
A
lt
er
n
at
e
D
efi
n
it
io
n
s
of
T
es
t
U
p
ta
ke
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
D
efi
n
it
io
n
s
O
ri
g
in
al
A
lt
er
n
at
iv
e
1
A
lt
er
n
at
iv
e
2
A
lt
er
n
a
ti
ve
3
A
lt
er
n
a
ti
ve
4
P
a
n
e
l
A
C
o
n
ce
rn
-R
el
ie
v
in
g
0
.0
6
34
**
0.
07
71
**
0.
05
10
0.
07
35
**
0.
06
08
*
0.
07
33
**
0
.0
6
47
**
0
.0
8
2
5
*
*
0
.0
5
2
0
0
.0
6
5
7
*
In
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
(0
.0
3
15
)
(0
.0
32
6)
(0
.0
34
5)
(0
.0
35
6)
(0
.0
31
5)
(0
.0
32
7)
(0
.0
32
1)
(0
.0
3
3
5
)
(0
.0
3
3
2
)
(0
.0
3
5
1
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
75
4
75
4
75
4
75
4
75
4
75
4
73
3
7
3
3
6
6
6
6
6
6
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
0
06
0.
29
2
0.
00
3
0.
29
0
0.
00
5
0.
29
2
0.
0
06
0
.3
0
3
0
.0
0
4
0
.3
0
4
P
a
n
e
l
B
C
o
n
ce
rn
-R
el
ie
v
in
g
0
.0
6
34
**
0.
06
86
**
0.
05
10
0.
06
11
*
0.
06
08
*
0.
06
47
**
0
.0
6
47
**
0
.0
7
1
9
*
*
0
.0
5
2
0
0
.0
5
9
4
*
In
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
(0
.0
3
15
)
(0
.0
32
3)
(0
.0
34
5)
(0
.0
35
2)
(0
.0
31
5)
(0
.0
32
4)
(0
.0
32
1)
(0
.0
3
3
2
)
(0
.0
3
3
2
)
(0
.0
3
4
8
)
H
ig
h
-I
n
ce
n
ti
ve
0
.1
1
9*
**
0.
12
0*
**
0.
13
0*
**
0.
14
0*
**
0.
12
5*
**
0.
12
6*
**
0
.1
1
6*
**
0
.1
2
0
*
*
*
0
.1
1
6
*
*
*
0
.1
0
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
37
7)
(0
.0
38
9)
(0
.0
42
3)
(0
.0
42
2)
(0
.0
37
8)
(0
.0
39
0)
(0
.0
3
81
)
(0
.0
3
9
4
)
(0
.0
3
8
6
)
(0
.0
4
0
5
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
on
s
9
96
99
6
99
6
99
6
99
6
99
6
9
73
9
7
3
9
0
6
9
0
6
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.0
1
1
0.
24
7
0.
01
2
0.
25
8
0.
01
2
0.
24
6
0
.0
1
1
0
.2
5
2
0
.0
1
1
0
.2
6
3
C
o
n
tr
ol
G
ro
u
p
m
ea
n
0
.2
0
7
0.
20
7
0.
25
5
0.
25
5
0.
21
0
0.
21
0
0
.2
1
4
0
.2
1
4
0
.2
1
3
0
.2
1
3
C
o
n
st
an
t
ye
s
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
y
es
C
o
n
tr
ol
s
n
o
ye
s
n
o
ye
s
n
o
ye
s
n
o
ye
s
n
o
y
es
N
o
te
s:
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
le
ve
l.
**
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
T
h
e
co
n
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
th
e
sa
m
e
as
in
T
a
b
le
1
.3
.
119
APPENDIX C
Analysis Specified in the Pre-Analysis Plan
Recruitment and Randomization Procedures
The participants for my experiment were drawn from the “vulnerable” households
survey in the baseline between May 2017 and March 2018. A household was consid-
ered “vulnerable” if it satisfied at least one of the following 11 criteria at the time of
the baseline survey:
1. Some child’s parents were not living in the household;
2. The children-to-adults ratio was greater than 4;
3. Some school-aged child was not at school;
4. The household ate only one meal per day on average;
5. Household went someday without food;
6. Household’s primary source of income was illegal or had no source of income;
7. Some household member was chronically ill;
8. Some household member was HIV+;
9. Some household member was on Anti-Retroviral Therapy (ART);
10. Some child was orphaned;
11. Some adults died of chronic illnesses in the past 5 years.
Before the research team started recruiting for the stigma experiment, each “vul-
nerable” household was randomly assigned a priority order to be recruited and a
group status, control, concern-relieving, and high-incentive. The randomization of
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priority order and group status are orthogonal to each other and stratified at the
community level. The pre-assigned group status was programmed into the survey
software and was concealed from enumerators. Enumerators approached the house-
holds according to the priority order until the targeted number of households were
recruited. A household’s group assignment was revealed to the participant and the
enumerator after the recruitment survey, before the distribution of testing coupons.
The study groups mentioned in the pre-analysis plan refer to the group status as-
signed to the household before any recruitment attempts. At the time of pre-assigning
group status, whether a respondent would overestimate stigma was unknown. The
“control group” in the pre-analysis plan, hereafter PAP-Control Group, refers to the
households assigned not to receive intervention and to receive coupons of 50 Meticais.
It is the union of the Control Group and part of the Unconcerned Group 1 in Figure
4. The “Anti-stigma” intervention group, hereafter PAP-Intervention Group, in the
pre-analysis plan, refers to the households assigned to receive the concern-relieving
intervention conditional on being concerned and to receive coupons of 50 Meticais.
It is the union of the Concern-Relieving Intervention and the rest of Unconcerned
Group 1. The “High-Incentive” group is not included in the pre-analysis plan. It was
added to the experiment design after the pre-analysis plan was registered.
Protocol for the Concern-Relieving Intervention
Details in the intervention procedure can be found in the Pre-Analysis Plan under:
Yu, Hang. 2019. “Anti-Stigma Interventions to Encourage HIV Testing in Vulner-
able Households in Mozambique.” AEA RCT Registry. October 18. DOI
Results from the Primary Specification
The primary regression specification is (Equation 1 in the pre-analysis plan):
Yihc = α + β
IS
1 Th + β
IS
2 Si + β
IS
3 (Th × Si) + δIXi + δHXh + ihc (C.1)
Yihc is the outcome of interest for individual i in household h of community c. Th
is the treatment indicator that takes value 1 if household h was assign to the PAP-
Intervention Group and 0 otherwise. Xi and Xh are the vectors of control variables
at the individual level and the household level. Joining them together produces the
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control vector used in the paper, Xi. ihc is the error term clustered at the household
level. Si is the binary indicator of overestimating stigma.
The primary hypothesis is βIS3 > 0. The intervention effect identified in the paper
is equivalent to βIS1 +β
IS
3 , which means, among the “concerned” individuals, receiving
the intervention raises the testing rate. In theory, βIS1 should be equal to 0 as the
unconcerned individuals pre-assigned to PAP-Intervention Group did not receive any
differing from those received by the PAP-Control Group. βIS1 will pick up any random
imbalance between the two groups of people.
Table C.1 reports results from the primary regression specification.
Table C.1: Primary Regression Specification in PAP
(1)
Outcome Test Uptake
β1 -0.0380
(0.0436)
β2 -0.0549
(0.0432)
β3 0.121**
(0.0528)
PAP-Control Group Mean 0.224
Control Group Mean 0.207
Implied Intervention Effect: β1 + β3 0.0834
p-value of test: β1 + β3 = 0 0.00821
Observations 1,162
R-squared 0.239
Constant yes
Controls yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The control variables are the same as in Table 1.3.
Results from Subgroup Analyses
Table C.2 reports results from subgroup analyses.
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Secondary Outcomes of Interest
There are three secondary outcomes of interest: household-level coupon redemp-
tion, willingness to accept (WTA) a testing coupon (as opposed to a visiting coupon),
changes in beliefs about stigma. For variable definitions and data collection proce-
dures, please see the Pre-Analysis Plan.
Regression analyses on the secondary outcomes of interest are reported in Table
C.3.
Table C.3: Secondary Outcomes of Interest
(1) (2) (3)
Outcomes
Household
level coupon
redemption
WTA for a
testing coupon
Changes in the
belief about
stigma
β1 -0.0286 0.707** -0.844
(0.0433) (0.300) (1.441)
β2 -0.0374 0.296 5.618***
(0.0419) (0.305) (1.461)
β3 0.0669 -0.690* 0.917
(0.0527) (0.380) (1.651)
PAP-Control Group Mean 0.319 5.502 0.0400
Control Group Mean 0.314 5.550 1.952
β1 + β3 0.0383 0.0166 0.0728
p-value of test β1 + β3 = 0 0.196 0.944 0.950
Observations 1,408 1,159 344
R-squared 0.196 0.395 0.663
Constant yes yes yes
Controls yes yes yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The household-level coupon redemption is an indicator for at least
one of the coupons in a household is used. For the definition of WTA and changes in belief, please see
the Pre-Analysis Plan. Control variables for Column (1) are Indicator: the head of the household
is female (yes, no); Indicator: there is a child living in this household (yes, no); Indicator: the
household has a mobile phone (yes, no); Education of the household head: highest grade completed;
Primary respondent’s knowledge about HIV (Number of correct answers to the 15 questions testing
HIV-related knowledge); The straight-line distance between the household and the testing clinic
(in km); Square of the straight-line distance between the household and the testing clinic (in km);
Indicator: the household ever go without food in the last 12 months (yes, no); Indicator: there is an
HIV positive household member (yes, no); Asset ownership index: the first principal component of
14 asset-ownership indicators; Enumerator fixed-effects; Community fixed-effects. Control variables
for Column (2) and Column (3) are the same as those in Table 1.3.
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APPENDIX D
Baseline Measures of Social Stigma Environment
Table D.1: Baseline Stigma Measures in 76 Study Communities
Q1. Would you buy
fresh vegetables from a
shopkeeper if you knew
that this person had
HIV? (Yes/No)
Q2. If a member of your
family became sick with
AIDS would you be
willing to care for them
in your own household?
(Yes/No)
Q3. In your opinion, if a
teacher has HIV but is
not sick, should they be
allowed to continue
teaching at school?
(Yes/No)
Comm-
unity
ID
# of re-
spondents
Share of
“yes”
answers
# of re-
spondents
Share of
“yes”
answers
# of re-
spondents
Share of
“yes”
answers
1 91 0.813 93 0.989 87 0.954
2 96 0.875 98 0.990 96 0.938
3 98 0.745 99 0.919 98 0.878
4 95 0.684 96 0.854 92 0.750
5 84 0.726 89 0.843 80 0.762
6 83 0.675 84 0.857 63 0.714
7 93 0.925 93 0.968 91 0.923
8 109 0.936 109 0.991 108 0.963
9 106 0.868 106 0.962 105 0.914
10 106 0.755 104 0.942 101 0.851
11 62 0.871 63 1 48 0.875
12 72 0.792 71 0.986 58 0.897
Continued on the next page
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Table D.1 – Continued from the previous page
13 90 0.889 89 0.955 77 0.857
14 59 0.915 60 0.967 52 0.942
15 56 0.893 55 0.982 56 0.911
16 66 0.818 65 1 57 0.895
17 60 0.933 63 0.968 63 0.937
18 62 0.790 66 0.985 53 0.849
19 67 0.716 68 0.897 69 0.870
20 74 0.811 77 0.961 75 0.947
21 62 0.726 64 0.828 63 0.889
22 72 0.750 74 0.959 73 0.904
23 84 0.881 85 0.953 80 0.938
24 81 0.728 85 0.941 84 0.917
25 62 0.645 64 0.875 62 0.871
26 58 0.724 59 0.932 57 0.860
27 67 0.836 68 0.809 68 0.868
28 74 0.892 75 0.973 73 0.932
29 64 0.797 66 0.894 66 0.879
30 61 0.869 63 1 59 0.966
31 61 0.787 62 0.952 62 0.919
32 70 0.743 72 0.903 71 0.915
33 69 0.812 69 0.971 69 0.884
34 65 0.892 66 0.955 64 0.984
35 76 0.803 79 0.924 77 0.883
36 69 0.928 73 0.945 73 0.932
37 67 0.731 69 0.942 68 0.868
38 78 0.833 78 0.846 78 0.833
39 79 0.722 80 0.913 79 0.861
40 68 0.735 69 0.957 65 0.954
41 35 0.629 34 0.882 34 0.794
42 66 0.773 66 0.803 65 0.815
43 50 0.820 50 0.860 50 0.840
44 38 0.789 38 0.895 38 0.842
45 54 0.722 53 0.792 54 0.833
46 48 0.750 48 0.729 49 0.714
47 53 0.717 54 0.870 53 0.925
48 43 0.698 43 0.814 42 0.857
Continued on the next page
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49 43 0.884 39 0.974 42 1
50 70 0.971 70 1 70 0.986
51 71 0.845 72 0.972 70 0.971
52 50 0.520 57 0.982 53 0.962
53 62 0.839 73 0.986 56 0.857
54 25 0.440 26 0.923 26 0.808
55 31 0.935 32 1 31 0.903
56 34 0.794 36 0.972 33 0.879
57 46 0.783 48 1 47 0.936
58 34 0.735 36 1 33 0.909
59 48 0.667 48 0.917 43 0.837
60 46 0.870 46 1 46 0.783
61 36 0.861 37 0.946 35 0.943
62 38 0.842 42 1 42 0.905
63 38 0.868 39 0.949 38 0.921
64 31 0.839 32 0.875 32 0.844
65 56 0.911 59 0.983 57 0.965
66 59 0.847 61 0.967 59 0.966
67 29 0.897 28 0.786 27 0.778
68 45 0.933 45 1 44 0.955
69 84 0.893 85 1 76 0.882
70 58 0.914 58 0.966 59 0.983
71 38 0.579 37 0.784 34 0.735
72 50 0.740 52 0.981 52 0.981
73 33 0.818 36 0.944 33 0.970
74 36 0.667 35 0.829 36 0.889
75 40 0.900 42 0.976 43 0.977
76 54 0.889 54 0.981 54 0.963
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